According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it "Developed and executed the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) which extends our protection strategy overseas to include important foreign infrastructure that if attacked or destroyed would critically impact the U.S. The prioritized National Critical Foreign Dependencies List (NCFDL) currently contains over 300 assets and systems in over 50 countries." According to the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the CFDI was launched by the federal government "working in close coordination and cooperation with the private sector" in 2007 "to identify assets and systems located outside the United States, which, if disrupted or destroyed, would critically affect public health and safety, the economy, or national security. The resulting strategic compendium guides engagement with foreign countries in the CIKR [critical infrastructure and key resources] protection mission area". Using an initial inventory of infrastructure located outside the United States created by the federal government, DHS and the Department of State (DOS) developed the CFDI, "a process designed to ensure that the resulting classified list of critical foreign dependencies is representative and leveraged in a coordinated and inclusive manner."
Development of the CFDI was planned in three phases, on an annual and ongoing basis. The first phase was identification, beginning with "the first-ever National Critical Foreign Dependencies List in FY2008". This was done by the DHS working with "other Federal partners", in a process that "includes input from public and private sector CIKR community partners." Next comes prioritization, in which "DHS, in collaboration with other CIKR community partners and, in particular, DOS, prioritized the National Critical Foreign Dependencies List based on factors such as the overall criticality of the CIKR to the United States and the willingness and capability of foreign partners to engage in collaborative risk management activities." The third "involves leveraging the prioritized list to guide current and future U.S. bilateral and multilateral incident and risk management activities with foreign partners. DHS and DOS established mechanisms to ensure coordinated engagement and collaboration by public entities, in partnership with the private sector."
The "2008 Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) list" was contained in a February 2009 diplomatic cable to the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, which was leaked, redacted and released in the United States diplomatic cables leak by WikiLeaks in 2010. The BBC described it as "one of the most sensitive" leaks as of 6 December 2010. In its redaction process, WikiLeaks removed only a minority of the details of names and locations, and left the rest uncensored; details of the exact location of the assets were not included in the list. The list did not include any military facilities, but rather facilities important for the global supply chain, global communications, and economically important goods and services.
In the cable the State Department asked American diplomats to identify installations overseas "whose loss could critically impact the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States." The order was under the direction of the Department for Homeland Security in co-ordination with the Department of State.
In summary the list consists of Submarine communications cables, major port hubs, critical sea lanes, oil pipelines, mines, dams, and pharmaceutical facilities. A major emphasis on European pharmaceutical facilities was said by the BBC to suggest a fear of biological warfare or global pandemic.
The cable had been classified secret and not for review by non-U.S. personnel,. The publication of the cable was followed by strong criticism from the US government and the British government, but a tepid response from news outlets and other foreign nations.
WikiLeaks spokesman Kristinn Hrafnsson said with reference to the cable: "This further undermines claims made by the US Government that its embassy officials do not play an intelligence-gathering role. Part of the cable read: "Posts are not/not being asked to consult with host governments with respect to this request." Hrafnsson later explained to The Times that the list itself "had been made available to 2.5 million people including military personnel and private contractors by the U.S. government". He went on to say: "in terms of security issues, while this cable details the strategic importance of assets across the world, it does not give any information as to their exact locations, security measures, vulnerabilities or any similar factors, though it does reveal the U.S. asked its diplomats to report back on these matters."
US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley denounced the disclosure saying it "gives a group like al-Qaeda a targeting list." Anthony Cordesman, a 'national security analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies', said: "this has given a global map – a menu, if not a recipe book – to every extremist group in the world. To me it would be amazing to see how WikiLeaks could rationalize this." However, Alistair Millar, 'director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation', said: "it's a little different...than with diplomatic cable leaks...in this case, this is largely information available to everyone if they really wanted to look."
Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Security, said the list "could jeopardize our national security".
A spokesman for British prime minister David Cameron said: "The leaks and their publication are damaging to national security in the United States, Britain and elsewhere. It is vital that governments are able to operate on the basis of confidentiality of information."
Vic Toews, the Public Safety Minister of Canada, seemed "unconcerned or unaware" of the release of the list. He said: "I don't follow gossip very much so I don't really know the impact of WikiLeaks, but I can assure you that the security agencies in Canada are following it very closely and to the extent that I need to be involved and address those issues, they will brief me on the issues."
Lin Yu-fang, a politician in Taiwan, stated, in regards to the revealing of the six undersea telecommunications cables in China, there are "actually no secrets concerning the cables", but he said there "could be certain thorny political or military issues involving Taiwan, the U.S. or Japan if more sensitive secrets were exposed".
A CBS article elaborating on the release stated that "although much of the information contained [in the list] was already in the public domain, officials in Washington and London have been quick to condemn WikiLeaks for publishing it, calling the act evidence of the organization's willingness to potentially aid terror groups in its mission to reveal U.S. secrets." The New York Times stated that the list "appears largely limited to sites that any would-be terrorist with Internet access and a bit of ingenuity might quickly have identified."
The Lancashire Evening Post pointed out in an article that the list "contains information on defence sites in Lancashire which is more than five years out of date." The article specifically pointed out that the "Royal Ordnance (RO) site at Chorley...has been developed as Buckshaw Village for the past five years" and the "BAE facility in Plymouth, Devon...[was] sold as part of a deal three years ago."
Mayne Pharma told the Herald-Sun that "its entry on a classified diplomatic cable is out-of-date and full of errors", since the drug listed on the cable as its resource, a snake anti-venom, hasn't been made by the company for "more than ten years".
Roger Aston, the chief executive of Mayne Pharma, said: "I can only go on what I can see now in the media (about WikiLeaks) but judging from what I've seen about what they've said about Mayne Pharma and Faulding, a lot of it (the information) is old, out of date stuff that's not relevant."
Dean Veverka of Southern Cross concurred, saying, "(Roger Aston's comments) that the information in the WikiLeaks document was ten years out of date could be accurate. To only list Southern Cross as the only internet cable network here might have been relevant 10 years ago (when only coaxial cables were available), but Australia now has seven cables going out of country. Australia has a very resilient network nowadays."
Bill Gorman, sales director of David Brown Ltd., said: "We make gearboxes for our platinum and gold mines. We have supplied equipment via the US for other countries, but have only once exported directly to the States, for a copper mine seven years ago. I have no idea why we're on the list."
A BAE Systems spokeswoman said: "The information in the list was incorrect. The site in Plymouth was sold in 2007, and in Chorley, there are no longer any weapons manufacturing, although there is still an office there. The information about Preston was correct. The safety and security of our people and facilities is of highest priority."
The 2008 CFDI list, as redacted by WikiLeaks, listed the following infrastructures:
A number of sea ports were listed, including several Chinese ports (Shanghai Port, Guangzhou Port, Hong Kong Port, Ningbo Port, Tianjin Port) as well as one Taiwanese port (Kaohsiung Port) and several European ports (Port of Antwerp, Port of Hamburg, Rotterdam Port).
Bermuda - GlobeNet, formerly Bermuda US-1 (BUS-1) undersea cable landing Devonshire, BermudaCanada - Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing at Herring Cove, Nova Scotia, CanadaChina - C2C Cable Network undersea cable landings at Chom Hom Kok, Tseung Kwan O, and Shanghai; China-US undersea cable landings at Chongming and Shantou; and FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing as Tong Fuk Denmark - TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Blaabjerg, DenmarkFiji - Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Suva, FijiFrance - APOLLO undersea cable, Lannion, France; FA-1 undersea cable, Plerin, France; and TAT-14 undersea cable landing St. Valery, FranceFrench Guiana - Americas-II undersea cable landing Cayenne, French GuianaGermany - TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Norden, Germany; Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing SyltIreland - Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Dublin IrelandJapan - C2C Cable Network undersea cable landings in Chikura, Ajigaura, and Shima; China-US undersea cable in Okinawa; FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing in Wada; Japan-US undersea cable landings at Maruyama and Kitaibaraki; KJCN undersea cable landings at Fukuoka and Kita-Kyushu; Pacific Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing in Ajigaura and Shima; and Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landings in Toyohashi and Emi.Martinique - Americas-II undersea cable landing Le Lamentin, MartiniqueMexico - FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing, Tijuana and Pan-American Crossing (PAC) undersea cable landing, MazatlanNetherlands - Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing, Beverwijk; TAT-14 undersea cable landing, KatwijkPanama - FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Fort Amador, PanamaPhilippines - C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Batangas, Philippines; and EAC undersea cable landing Cavite, PhilippinesRepublic of Korea - C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Pusan, Republic of Korea; EAC undersea cable landing Shindu-Ri, Republic of Korea; FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea; and KJCN undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of KoreaSingapore - C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Changi, Singapore; EAC undersea cable landing Changi North, Singapore; C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Changi, Singapore; and EAC undersea cable landing Changi North, SingaporeTaiwan- C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Fangshan, Taiwan; C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Tanshui, Taiwan; China-US undersea cable landing Fangshan, Taiwan; EAC undersea cable landing Pa Li, Taiwan; FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Toucheng, TaiwanTrinidad and Tobago - Americas-II undersea cable landing Port of SpainUnited Kingdom - APOLLO undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom; Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Whitesands Bay; FA-1 undersea cable landing Skewjack, Cornwall Station; Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Southport, United Kingdom; TAT-14 undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom; Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Highbridge, United Kingdom; Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Pottington, United Kingdom; and Yellow/Atlantic Crossing-2 (AC-2) undersea cable landing Bude, United KingdomVenezuela - Four cable landing sites in Venezuela. GlobeNet undersea cable landings at Punta Gorda, Catia La Mar, and ManongaAustralia - Southern Cross undersea cable landings at Brookvale and Sydney, AustraliaBrazil - Americas-II undersea cable landing at Fortaleza; GlobeNet undersea cable landing at Fortaleza; and GlobeNet undersea cable landing Rio de JaneiroNetherlands Antilles - Americas-II undersea cable landing, WillemstadNew Zealand - Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Whenuapai, New Zealand; and Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Takapuna, New ZealandAustralia - Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade; Nickel MinesChina - Fluorite (Mine); Germanium Mine; Graphite Mine; Rare Earth Minerals/Elements; Tin Mine and Plant; and Tungsten - Mine and PlantDemocratic Republic of Congo - Cobalt (Mine and Plant)Gabon - Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical gradeGuinea - Bauxite (Mine)South Africa - Chromite mines around Rustenburg; Ferrochromium; Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade; Palladium Mine and Plant; Platinum Mines; and RhodiumIndonesia - Tin Mine and PlantJapan - Iodine MineBelgium - Germanium MineNorway - Cobalt Nickel MineRussia - Uranium Nickel Mine: Used in certain types of stainless steel and superalloys; Palladium Mine and Plant; and RhodiumUkraine - Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical gradeKazakhstan - Ferrochromium Khromtau Complex, Kempersai, (Chromite Mine)India -Orissa (chromite mines) and Karnataka (chromite mines)Brazil - Iron Ore from Rio Tinto Mine; Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade; Niobium (Columbium), Araxa, Minas Gerais State (mine); and Ouvidor and Catalao I, Goias State: NiobiumChile - Iodine MineCanada - Germanium Mine; Graphite Mine; Iron Ore Mine; Nickel Mine; Niobec Mine, Quebec, Canada: NiobiumMexico - Graphite MinePeru - Tin Mine and PlantBAE Land System OMC, Benoni, South AfricaBrown David Gear Industries LTD, Benoni, South AfricaMaybe Faulding Mulgrave (F H Faulding) Victoria, Australia: Manufacturing facility for Midazolam injection.Mayne Pharma (fill/finish), Melbourne, Australia: Sole suppliers of Crotalid Polyvalent Antivenin (CroFab)Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and GeneratorsPolypropylene Filter Material for N-95 MasksStraits of MalaccaHitachi, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and GeneratorsPorts at Chiba, Kobe, Nagoya, and YokohamaMetal Fabrication Machines TitaniumMetal (Processed) Biken, Kanonji City, JapanHitachi Electrical Power Generators and Components Large AC Generators above 40 MVAHitachi Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV Busan PortStraits of MalaccaStraits of MalaccaBaxter AG, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)Octapharma Pharmazeutika, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)Sangachal TerminalBaku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan PipelineDruzhba Oil PipelineBaxter SA, Lessines, Belgium: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)Glaxo Smith Kline, Rixensart, Belgium: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine ComponentGlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA, Wavre, Belgium: Acellular Pertussis Vaccine ComponentBavarian Nordic (BN), Hejreskovvej, Kvistgard, Denmark: Smallpox VaccineNovo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Bagsvaerd, Denmark: Numerous formulations of insulinNovo Nordisk Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin suppliesStatens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark: DTaP (including D and T components) pediatric versionSanofi-Aventis Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin supplies Foot-and-mouth disease Vaccine finishingAlstrom, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and GeneratorsAlstrom Electrical Power Generators and ComponentsEMD Pharms Semoy, France: Cyanokit InjectionGlaxoSmithKline, Inc. Évreux, France: Influenza Neuraminidase inhibitor RELENZA (Zanamivir)Diagast, Cedex, France: Olympus (assists with detecting blood group)Genzyme Polyclonals SAS (bulk), Lyon, France: ThymoglobulinSanofi Pasteur SA, Lyon, France: Rabies virus vaccineBaku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan PipelineBASF Ludwigshafen: World's largest integrated chemical complexSiemens Erlangen: Essentially irreplaceable production of key chemicalsSiemens, GE, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and GeneratorsDraeger Safety AG & Co., Luebeck, Germany: Critical to gas detection capabilityJunghans Microtec Dunningen-Seedorf, Germany: Critical to the production of mortarsTDW-Gesellschaft Wirksysteme, Schroebenhausen, Germany: Critical to the production of the Patriot Advanced Capability Lethality Enhancement AssemblySiemens, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kVSiemens, GE Electrical Power Generators and ComponentsDruzhba Oil PipelineSanofi Aventis Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Lantus Injection (insulin)Heyl Chemish-pharmazeutische Fabrik GmbH: Radiogardase (Prussian blue)Hameln Pharmaceuticals, Hameln, Germany: Pentetate Calcium Trisodium (Ca DTPA) and Pentetate Zinc Trisodium (Zn DTPA) for contamination with plutonium, americium, and curiumIDT Biologika GmbH, Dessau Rossiau, Germany: BN Small Pox VaccineBiotest AG, Dreiech, Germany: Supplier for TANGO (impacts automated blood typing ability)CSL Behring GmbH, Marburg, Germany: Antihemophilic factor/von Willebrand factorNovartis Vaccines and Diagnostics GmbH, Marburg, Germany: Rabies virus vaccineVetter Pharma Fertigung GmbH & Co KG, Ravensburg, Germany (filling): Rho(D) IGIVIreland
Genzyme Ireland Ltd. (filling), Waterford, Ireland: ThymoglobulinGlaxo Smith Kline SpA (fill/finish), Parma, Italy: Digibind (used to treat snake bites)Trans-Med gas pipelinePoland
Druzhba Oil PipelineNovorossiysk Export TerminalPrimorsk Export TerminalNadym Gas Pipeline Junction: The most critical gas facility in the worldStrait of GibraltarInstituto Grifols, SA, Barcelona, Spain: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, AlgeriaRecip AB Sweden: Thyrosafe (potassium iodine)Switzerland
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. Basel, Switzerland: Tamiflu (oseltamivir)Berna Biotech, Berne, Switzerland: Typhoid vaccineCSL Behring AG, Berne, Switzerland: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan)Bosporus StraitBaku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan PipelineGoonhilly Teleport, Goonhilly Downs, United KingdomMadley Teleport, Stone Street, Madley, United KingdomMartelsham Teleport, Ipswich, United KingdomFoot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishingBAE Systems (Operations) Ltd., Presont [Preston], Lancashire, United Kingdom: Critical to the F-35 Joint Strike FighterBAE Systems Operations Ltd., Southway, Plymouth Devon, United Kingdom: Critical to Extended Range Guided MunitionsBAE Systems RO Defence, Chorley, United Kingdom: Critical to the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) AGM-154C (Unitary Variant)MacTaggart Scott, Loanhead, Edinburgh, Lothian, Scotland, United Kingdom: Critical to the Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN)Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node'Ayn Sukhnah-SuMEd Receiving Import Terminal'Sidi Kurayr-SuMed Offloading Export Terminal Suez CanalStrait of HormuzKhark (Kharg) IslandSea Island Export TerminalKhark Island T-JettyAl Basrah Oil TerminalRafael Ordnance Systems Division, Haifa, Israel: Critical to Sensor Fused Weapons (SFW), Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD), Tail Kits, and batteriesMina' al Ahmadi Export TerminalStrait of GibraltarMaghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, MoroccoStrait of HormuzRas Laffan Industrial Center: By 2012 Qatar will be the largest source of imported LNG to U.S.Abqaiq Processing Center: Largest crude oil processing and stabilization plant in the worldAl Ju'aymah Export Terminal: Part of the Ras Tanura complexAs Saffaniyah Processing CenterQatif Pipeline JunctionRas at Tanaqib Processing CenterRas Tanura Export TerminalShaybah Central Gas-oil Separation PlantTrans-Med Gas PipelineDas Island Export TerminalJabal Zannah Export TerminalStrait of HormuzBab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain nodeGeneramedix Gujurat, India: Chemotherapy agents, including florouracil and methotrexateFoot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishingJames Bay Power Project, Quebec: monumental hydroelectric power developmentMica Dam, British Columbia: Failure would impact the Columbia River BasinHydro Quebec, Quebec: Critical irreplaceable source of power to portions of Northeast U. S.Robert Moses-Robert H. Saunders Power Dam: Part of the St. Lawrence Power Project, between Barnhart Island, New York, and Cornwall, OntarioSeven Mile Dam, British Columbia: Concrete gravity dam between two other hydroelectric power dams along the Pend d'Oreille RiverPickering Nuclear Power Plant, OntarioChalk River Nuclear Facility, Ontario: Largest supplier of medical radioisotopes in the worldHydrofluoric Acid Production Facility, Allied Signal, Amherstburg, OntarioEnbridge Pipeline Alliance Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from Canada Maritime and Northeast Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from CanadaTransCanada Gas: Natural gas transmission from CanadaAlexandria Bay Point of Entry (POE), Ontario: Northern border crossingAmbassador Bridge Point of Entry, Ontario: Northern border crossingBlaine POE, British Columbia: Northern border crossingBlaine Washington Rail Crossing, British ColumbiaBlue Water Bridge POE, Sarnia, Ontario: Northern border crossingChamplain Bridge POE, Quebec: Northern border crossingCPR Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario (Michigan Central Rail Crossing)International Bridge Rail Crossing, Ontario International Railway Bridge Rail CrossingLewiston-Queenston POE, Ontario: Northern border crossingPeace Bridge POE, Ontario: Northern border crossingPembina, North Dakota POE, NorthDakota/Manitoba border crossing.North Portal Rail Crossing, SaskatchewanSt. Clair Tunnel Rail Crossing between Sarnia,Ontario and Port Huron, MichiganWaneta Dam, British Columbia: Earthfill/concrete hydropower damDarlington Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, CanadaE-ONE Moli Energy, Maple Ridge, British Columbia, Canada: Critical to production of various military application electronicsGeneral Dynamics Land Systems - Canada, London Ontario, Canada: Critical to the production of the Stryker/USMC LAV Vehicle IntegrationRaytheon Systems Canada Ltd. ELCAN Optical Technologies Division, Midland, Ontario: Critical to the production of the AGM-130 MissileThales Optronique Canada, Inc., Montreal, Quebec: Critical optical systems for ground combat vehiclesCangene, Winnipeg, Manitoba: PlasmaSanofi Pasteur Ltd., Toronto, Canada: makers of polio virus vaccineGlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, North America, Quebec: Pre-pandemic influenza vaccinesAmistad International Dam: On the Rio Grande near Del Rio, Texas and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila, MexicoAnzalduas Dam: Diversion dam south of Mission, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood controlFalcon International Dam: Upstream of Roma, Texas and Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas, MexicoRetamal Dam: Diversion dam south of Weslaco, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood controlGE Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators: Main source for a large portion of larger componentsBridge of the Americas (El Paso – Ciudad Juárez): Southern border crossingBrownsville POE: Southern border crossingCalexico East POE: Southern border crossingColombia-Solidarity Bridge: Southern border crossingKansas City Southern de Mexico (KCSM) Rail Line, (Mexico)Nogales POE: Southern border crossingLaredo Rail CrossingEagle Pass Rail CrossingSouthern border crossings, Otay Mesa Crossing, World Trade Bridge, and Ysleta Zaragosa Bridge Pharr International Bridge: Southern border crossingHydrofluoric Acid Production FacilityGE Electrical Power Generators and ComponentsGeneral Electric, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kVPanama CanalTrinidad and Tobago
Atlantic LNG: Provides 70% of U.S. natural gas import needs