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Thomas Snow (British Army officer)

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Allegiance
  
United Kingdom

Service/branch
  
British Army

Role
  
British Army officer


Name
  
Thomas Snow

Years of service
  
1879 - 1920

Rank
  
Lieutenant-general

Thomas Snow (British Army officer)

Born
  
5 May 1858 Newton Valence, Hampshire (
1858-05-05
)

Commands held
  
British 4th Division British 27th Division

Battles/wars
  
Zulu War Mahdist War World War I: Battle of Le Cateau First Battle of the Aisne Second Battle of Ypres Battle of the Somme Battle of Arras Battle of Cambrai

Awards
  
Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George Mention in Despatches (8)

Died
  
August 30, 1940, London, United Kingdom

Education
  
Eton College, St John's College, Cambridge

Battles and wars
  
World War I, Battle of Le Cateau

Lieutenant General Sir Thomas D’Oyly Snow (5 May 1858 – 30 August 1940) was a British Army officer who fought on the Western Front in World War I. He played an important role in the war, leading 4th Division in the retreat of August 1914, and commanding VII Corps at the unsuccessful Gommecourt diversion on the first day on the Somme (1 July 1916) and at the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917.

Contents

Thomas Snow (British Army officer) Thomas Snow British Army officer Wikipedia

Early life and military career

Snow was born at Newton Valence, Hampshire, on 5 May 1858. He was the eldest son of the Reverend George D'Oyly Snow and his wife Maria Jane Barlow, Snow attended Eton College (1871–1874) and went to St John's College, Cambridge in 1878.

Snow obtained a commission in the 13th Regiment of Foot in 1879, taking part in the Anglo-Zulu War in South Africa the same year. In 1884–1885, having transferred to the Mounted Infantry Regiment of the Camel Corps, Snow fought with them in the Nile Expedition of the Mahdist War at the Battle of Abu Klea and the Battle of El Gubat. He was severely wounded at the latter battle on 19 January 1885.

In 1887, he was promoted to captain and attended the Staff College, Camberley from 1892 to 1893 as a student. Snow was promoted in 1895 to brigade major at Aldershot and further in 1897 to major in the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. Snow was brigade major for William Gatacre in the Nile campaign of 1898, fighting at the Battle of Atbara and the Siege of Khartoum.

He was promoted to brevet lieutenant colonel and in April 1899, he became the second-in-command of the 2nd Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment, and was posted to India, causing him to miss out on service in the Boer War. In March 1903, he was promoted to substantive lieutenant colonel and returned home, so never actually commanded a battalion of his own. In June 1903 he was promoted to colonel and appointed assistant quartermaster-general of the 4th Corps (which later became Eastern Command). He stayed there being promoted to assistant adjutant-general (1905), brigadier general, general staff (1906), and commander of the 11th Brigade (October 1909).

Snow was then promoted to major general in March 1910 and became the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 4th Division, then serving in Eastern Command, in early 1911. In 1912, as GOC of the 4th Division, Snow took part in the Army Manoeuvres of 1912, the last major manoeuvres before World War I, as part of the 'Blue Force' under Sir James Grierson which gained a clear 'victory' over the 'Red Force' of Douglas Haig. According to James Edmonds, who served under him, his only practice at division command was three or four days at army manoeuvres, which were not practical as General Sir Charles Douglas, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from April 1914, had forbidden retreats to be practiced. However, he also concentrated on making junior officers critique one another’s performance, and on night moves, march discipline and concealment from the air. He drew up Standing Orders for War, which were used by other divisions in 1914.

1914

On the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Snow was still in command of 4th Division, which was initially deployed for home defence on the eastern coast, headquartered in Suffolk. Although Snow had written the Eastern Command's Defence Scheme for event of war as a staff officer years before, he recalled he found that "very few people knew, or cared, that such a scheme existed and the chaos on the East Coast was appalling"

When the division arrived at the front (25 August) Snow’s orders were to help prepare a defensive position on the Cambrai-Le Cateau position, as General Headquarters (GHQ) had no idea of the seriousness of the situation facing II Corps (this being at a time when I and II Corps were retreating on opposite sides of the Forest of Mormal, and the British Expeditionary Force's Chief of Staff, Archibald Murray, was about to collapse from strain and overwork). Snow was in time to take part in the Battle of Le Cateau. The 4th Division covered the left flank of II Corps and he was one of those who urged Smith-Dorrien to stand and fight. The diary of Lieutenant General Horace Smith-Dorrien, the GOC of II Corps, recorded:

I learned in the course of the morning that the 4th Division (General Snow, now Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas D'Oyly Snow) had reached Le Cateau from England, and was delighted to hear that the Chief [that is, Field Marshal Sir John French, commanding the BEF] had immediately pushed it out to Solesmes, about seven miles north-west of Le Cateau, to cover the retirement of the Cavalry and 3rd Division.

Snow's division retired successfully after the battle, but both GHQ and the French were left with an exaggerated impression of the losses suffered at Le Cateau. Wilson, BEF Sub Chief of Staff, issued the infamous “sauve qui peut” order (27 August), ordering Snow to dump unnecessary ammunition and officers’ kits so that tired and wounded soldiers could be carried. Smith-Dorrien was later rebuked by Field Marshal French for countermanding the order. Snow later wrote “the retreat of 1914 was not, as is now imagined, a great military achievement, but rather a badly bungled affair only prevented from being a disaster of the first magnitude by the grit displayed by the officers and the men”.

Then-Brigadier General Aylmer Haldane, who commanded the 10th Brigade under Snow in 1914, was highly critical of him, although he also thought many other officers of the division not up to the standards of competence required in war. By September 1914 three out of four battalion CO’s had been “sent home”, and Snow was lucky to retain his command. Snow later revisited some places from the retreat from Mons with Haldane, who recorded in his diary (10 November 1917) “Though he is an old friend of mine I have never felt the same towards him since that time … when he showed what a poor spirited man he was when troublous times were upon us”.

In September, during the First Battle of the Marne, Snow was hospitalised, badly injured with a cracked pelvis, after his horse fell and rolled on him. In November, after partially recovering (he required further treatment for the rest of the war), he took command of the 27th Division, then being raised at Winchester for deployment to the front at the end of the year. The division consisted of regulars returning from overseas.

1915

His 27th Division was initially trenched at St. Eloi before relieving a French division in the Ypres Salient. During Second Battle of Ypres, April 1915, Snow's was at first the only unit with HQ east of Ypres. He led his division through the first German poison gas attack. His performance resulted in his creation as a KCB.

In June, General Lambton, the British Commander in Chief's Military Secretary, wrote to King George V recommending Generals Julian Byng, Snow and Edwin Alderson, as candidates for command of the proposed Canadian Corps. However, General Alderson, the incumbent commander of the 1st Canadian Division, was appointed to command the Canadian Corps and, on 15 July, Snow became commander of VII Corps.

1916

Snow's VII Corps delivered an attack upon the German held trench fortress of Gommecourt salient on 1 July 1916, as a part of the opening of the Battle of the Somme offensive. The object was to pinch off the salient and beat off counterattacks, whilst also serving as a diversion from the main offensive further south.

He did not think Gommecourt a good place for a feint, and protested to Third Army, but GHQ insisted the attack go ahead. Edmonds later wrote that Snow was more scared of Haig and of Allenby, his Army Commander, than he was of the enemy.

A senior officer of the 46th (North Midland) Division later wrote that Snow “had purposely taken no care” to keep preparations secret. He was hampered by the fact that most of the German artillery was hidden behind Gommecourt Wood, out of range of all but the heaviest British guns, whilst there was insufficient British artillery (16x18 pounder guns and 4x4.5’’ howitzers per brigade). The 56th (1/1st London) Division captured the German first line before being beaten back. The 46th Division's attack failed. The latter failure was blamed on Stuart-Wortley, GOC 46th Division, who was later sacked – although there was a consensus that he was a poor general, he may also have been something of a scapegoat to protect Snow (or even Allenby, GOC Third Army), as competent senior commanders were in short supply and corps commanders were seldom sacked at this stage of the war. After the war Snow wrote that the Gommecourt salient had proven stronger than anticipated.

1917

In 1917 Snow took part in the British Army's offensives at the Battle of Arras in the Spring (his corps fought on right (southern) wing of Third Army) and the Battle of Cambrai in November.

At Cambrai Snow’s VII Corps were on the right flank, and at one point it was suggested that they might be placed under French command if the French joined in the offensive. This did not happen.

Despite being in pain from his injured pelvis, Snow surveyed his positions from Ronssoy-Epehy Ridge each day, and warned his superiors that a German counterattack was brewing for 29 or 30 November. They were still preoccupied with the attack at Bourlon Wood on the left, and did not believe – wrongly - that the Germans had sufficient reserves left after Third Ypres to mount a major attack. At 7pm on 28 November his chief of staff (Brigadier-General “Jock” Burnett-Stuart) telephoned Byng’s chief of staff (Maj-Gen Louis Vaughan) to request reinforcements, and was told that the Guards Division could soon be sent. However, when the counterattack came, the Guards Division had already been committed to III Corps.

Bryn Hammond describes Snow at Cambrai as a “safe pair of hands” on account of his experience but also “tired and relatively old”. After criticism of British leadership during the German counter-attack, and along with several other BEF corps commanders, he was replaced largely on grounds of age on 2 January 1918.

He returned to England, being appointed to Western Command. He was promoted Lieutenant-General and received a KCMG in recognition of his services on the Western Front.

Post-war life

In 1918, Snow became General Officer Commanding-in-Chief for Western Command. He retired from the army in September 1919. He was also Colonel of the Suffolk Regiment from 1918 to 1919 and Colonel of the Somerset Light Infantry from 1919 to 1929.

He became largely confined to a bath chair and moved from Blandford to Kensington. He devoted much of his time to charitable work and became chairman of the Crippled Boys' Home for Training.

He died at his home in Kensington Gate, London on 30 August 1940, aged 82. His wealth at death was £15,531.95 (over £750,000 at 2016 prices).

Awards

  • Sudan: Mentioned in Despatches twice
  • 1907: CB
  • 1915: KCB
  • 1917: KCMG
  • First World War: Mentioned in Despatches six times
  • Commander, Legion of Honour
  • Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold (Belgium)
  • Personal life and descendants

    Snow was 6’4’’ in height.

    Snow married Charlotte Geraldine, second daughter of Major-General John Talbot Coke of Trusley, Derbyshire on 12 January 1897. They had two sons and one daughter.

    Snow was the grandfather of British broadcasters Peter Snow and Jon Snow (who writes about him in the Foreword to Ronald Skirth's war memoir The Reluctant Tommy) and great grandfather of historian and TV presenter, Dan Snow.

    Books

  • Beckett, Dr Ian F; Corvi, Steven J (editors) (2006). Haig's Generals. London: Pen & Sword. ISBN 9781844158928. CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)
  • Hammond, Bryn (2008). Cambrai, The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle. Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London. ISBN 978-0-7538-2605-8. 
  • Matthew (editor), Colin (2004). Dictionary of National Biography. 51. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198614111. CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link), essay on Snow originally written by Edmonds, updated by Roger Stearn
  • Simpson, Andy (2006). Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18. Stroud: Spellmount. ISBN 1-86227-292-1. 
  • Snow, Dan; Pottle, Mark (editors) (2011). The Confusion of Command, The War Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas D'Oyly Snow, 1914-1915. London: Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1-84832-575-3. CS1 maint: Extra text: authors list (link)
  • Terraine, John (1960). Mons, The Retreat to Victory. Wordsworth Military Library, London. ISBN 1-84022-240-9. 
  • Travers, Tim (1987). The Killing Ground. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 0-85052-964-6. 
  • References

    Thomas Snow (British Army officer) Wikipedia