|Name Subutai Subutai|
Native name Subugatai
Role Military Strategist
|Born c. 1175Burkhan Khaldun, Mongolia|
Other names Latin transcriptions: Subetei, Subetai, Subotai, Tsubotai, Tsubodai, Tsubetei, TsubataiClassic Mongolian: Subugatai, Subu'ataiModern Mongolian: Subeedei (Mongolian: Sүbeedei), Middle Mongolian: "Sube'edei"
Title Orlog baghatur, Noyan of a Mingghan
Relatives Jelme, Chaurkhan, Qaban, Nerbi
Died 1248, Tuul River, Mongolia
Similar People Ogedei Khan, Batu Khan, Jochi Khan, Muqali, Tolui
Medieval 2 total war stainless steel t rkce b42 gel bakalim b y k subutai
Subutai (Classical Mongolian: Sübügätäi or Sübü'ätäi; Tuvan: Сүбэдэй; Modern Mongolian: Сүбээдэй, Sübedei; Chinese: 速不台 1175–1248) was an Uriankhai general, and the primary military strategist of Genghis Khan and Ögedei Khan. He directed more than twenty campaigns in which he conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles, during which he conquered or overran more territory than any other commander in history. He gained victory by means of imaginative and sophisticated strategies and routinely coordinated movements of armies that were hundreds of kilometers away from each other. He is also remembered for devising the campaign that destroyed the armies of Hungary and Poland within two days of each other, by forces over five hundred kilometers apart. By any metric, he is one of the most successful commanders in history.
- Medieval 2 total war stainless steel t rkce b42 gel bakalim b y k subutai
- Mongols Expedition of Subutai and Jebe Battle of Kalka 1223 DOCUMENTARY
- Early life
- As a general
- First campaigns in the West
- Against Xi Xia and Jin
- The second series of Western campaigns
- Attack on eastern and central Europe
- Final years
- Historical fiction
Mongols: Expedition of Subutai and Jebe - Battle of Kalka 1223 DOCUMENTARY
Historians believe Subutai was born in the year 1175, probably just west of the upper Onon River in what is now Mongolia. He belonged to the Uriankhai clan. Subutai's family had been associated with the family of Temujin (future Genghis Khan) for many generations. Subutai's great-great grandfather, Nerbi, was supposedly an ally of the Mongol Khan Tumbina Sechen. Subutai's father, Jarchigudai, supposedly supplied food to Temujin and his followers when they were in dire straits at lake Baljuna, and Subutai's elder brother Jelme also served as a general in the Mongol army and was a close companion of Temujin. Jelme rescued a severely wounded Temujin (hit by an arrow from Jebe, then an enemy) in the process of unification of the Mongolian plateau. Another brother, Chaurkhan (also romanized as Ca'urqan) is mentioned in the Secret History of the Mongols.
Despite this close family association, Subutai may be considered proof that the Mongol Empire was a meritocracy. He was a commoner by birth, the son of Jarchigudai, who was supposedly a blacksmith. When he was 14 years old, Subutai left his clan to join Temujin's army, following in the footsteps of his older brother Jelme who had joined when he was 17 years old, and he rose to the very highest command available to one who was not a blood relative to Genghis. Within a decade he rose to become a general, in command of one of 4 tumens operating in the vanguard. During the invasion of Northern China in 1211, Subotai was partnered with the senior Mongol general Jebe. In 1212 he took Huan by storm, the first major independent exploit mentioned in the sources. Genghis Khan is reported to have called him one of his "dogs of war" in The Secret History of the Mongols:
"They are the Four Dogs of Temujin. They have foreheads of brass, their jaws are like scissors, their tongues like piercing awls, their heads are iron, their whipping tails swords . . . In the day of battle, they devour enemy flesh. Behold, they are now unleashed, and they slobber at the mouth with glee. These four dogs are Jebe, and Kublai (different than Kublai Khan), Jelme, and Subotai."
Mongol histories say that Subutai said to Genghis Khan, "I will ward off your enemies as felt cloth protects one from the wind."
As a general
Subutai was one of the first Mongol generals, alongside Genghis Khan, who realized the value of engineers in siege warfare. Even in field battles he made use of siege engines, much as Chinese armies had in their own wars. In the Battle of Mohi, the Hungarian crossbowmen repelled a night bridge crossing by the Mongols, and inflicted considerable casualties on the Mongols fighting to cross the river the following day. Subutai ordered huge stonethrowers to clear the bank of Hungarian crossbowmen and open the way for his light cavalry to cross the river without further losses. This use of siege weapons was one of the first recorded uses in the West of artillery outside of siege warfare. While the stonethrowers were clearing the path to cross the main bridge, Subutai supervised construction of another temporary bridge downriver to outflank the Hungarians.
Subutai was also well known for incorporating conquered peoples who brought specialized skills into his forces, especially engineers. He was skilled at intelligence gathering and planning his campaigns well in advance. For instance, he used spies to gather information on the Russian principalities, the Poles, and the Hungarians at least a year before the attacks on each. He tailored his strategy to match the enemy, adjusting his tactics according to the opponents, the terrain, and the weather as required. He emphasized the use of light cavalry in his army, maneuvering the enemy into feints and ambushes, and efficiently pursuing and defeating broken armies to destroy further resistance. Subutai kept his forces in line with the Mongol tradition of dispensing with excess baggage train and ensured his troops could efficiently live off the land and rapidly advance great distances on campaign. He preferred to maneuver the enemy into a position of weakness before committing to battle. Subutai was very vigilant about conserving Mongol lives, and would devise elaborate strategic maneuvers or conduct frequent massacres to limit casualties.
First campaigns in the West
Genghis Khan sent Subutai to hunt down the Merkits and their allies, the Kipchak/Cuman confederacy. Subutai defeated them on the Chu River in 1216 and again in 1219 in Wild Kipchak territory. Mohammad II of Khwarizm attacked Subutai shortly afterwards along the Irghiz. Despite being outnumbered 3:1, Subutai held him off after a fierce battle. According to Persian sources, this battle seems to have eroded Mohammed's confidence in his ability to defeat the Mongols in pitched battle, since Subutai only commanded a small 20,000 man force and did not want to even fight him.
Genghis Khan led the Mongol army westwards in late 1219 to invade Khwarizm as retaliation for the execution of Mongol ambassadors. With roughly 100,000 armed men, the Mongol army was numerically inferior to the forces of the Khwarizim Empire, but through deception and rapid maneuver, the Mongols defeated the isolated Khwarezm armies in detail before they could react. Serving as the Mongol equivalent of Genghis Khan's Chief of Staff, Subutai marched with the Khan's army through the deadly Kyzylkum Desert to emerge behind the Khwarezm defense network at Bukhara. After the rapid capture of the Khwarezm center of defense Samarkand, Genghis Khan dispatched Subutai and Jebe with 30,000 men to hunt the Khwarezm Shah and prevent him from rallying the other Khwarezm armies. Shah Mohammad attempted to save himself by fleeing into central Persia, but while he eluded capture, the relentless chase meant he could not rally his forces. As a result, the Khwarezm forces in reserve remained divided and were easily destroyed by Genghis Khan's main army. Drained by the fierce pursuit, Mohammed fell ill and died at a fishing village on the Caspian Sea in early 1221.
Subutai spent part of the winter in Azerbaijan. Here he conceived the idea of conducting the most audacious reconnaissance-in-force in history: 20,000 Mongol forces would circle the Caspian Sea through the Caucasus Mountains to fall on the rear of the Wild Kipchaks and Cumans. After destroying resistance in Persia and submitting Azerbaijan, the Mongols invaded the Christian Kingdom of Georgia. Though the Georgian King was reluctant to actually commit to battle, Subutai forced his hand by ravaging the countryside. Using the tactics of feigned retreat and a pincer maneuver, Jebe and Subutai defeated two powerful Georgian armies, most notably the Battle of the Caucasus Mountains, where the Georgians fielded the greatest concentration of knights ever seen. This Mongol reconnaissance mission may have inadvertently altered the history of the Crusades, as Georgia had planned on sending their now destroyed army to join the 5th Crusade. Though Georgia lay defenseless after these catastrophic defeats, the Mongol mission was to raid and scout, not conquer.
After ravaging Georgia, the Mongols cut across the Caucasus Mountains during the winter to get around the Derbent Pass. The Mongols were tricked by their guides into taking a perilous route and emerged from the mountains exhausted, only to be confronted with a far larger steppe coalition army. Using clever diplomacy, Subutai isolated and defeated the Alans, Circassians, and Don Kipchaks/Cumans in detail. After plundering the southern Russian steppes, the Russian princes united with the retreating Cuman confederacy to defeat the Mongols with an 80,000 man host. Despite being heavily outnumbered, Subutai sacrificed the 1,000 men of his rear guard to induce the coalition army to recklessly pursue him and become separated. After 9 days of pursuit, Jebe and Subutai suddenly turned and crushed the combined Rus and Cuman army at the Kalka (31 May 1223). In addition to destroying all the armies in their way and setting up their own espionage network, the Mongol leaders made a strategic alliance with Venetian traders that would reap great rewards a decade later. In exchange for giving them exclusive trading rights, the Venetians would act as Mongol spies in Europe. After defeating the Volga Bulgars (who likely made up a story about driving off the Mongols), the campaign concluded with Subutai rejoining Genghis Khan as the Mongol army was making its way back home.
In the Secret History of the Mongols, the only reference to this early battle is: "Then he (Chinghis Khan) sent Dorbei the Fierce off against the city of Merv, and on to conquer the people between Iraq and the Indus. He sent Subetei the Brave off to war in the North where he defeated eleven kingdoms and tribes, crossing the Volga and Ural Rivers, finally going to war with Kiev."
Against Xi Xia and Jin
Subutai played a key part in the campaign against the Xi Xia in 1226. While Genghis invaded the Xi Xia by a more traditional northern route, Subutai unexpectedly attacked from the west over the mountains in modern Turkestan, and Xia Xia resistance collapsed. In 1227, he conquered the Jin districts along the upper Wei River, and even raided the Kingdom of Tibet. Though the Mongols conquered Xia Xia, Mongol operations against Jin China were interrupted by the death of Genghis Khan in 1227. Genghis Khan was succeeded by his son Ögedei in 1229.
After a humiliating defeat in 1230–1231, Ögedei personally led the main Mongol army against the Jin (in Central China) and appointed Subutai to salvage the situation. Against Subutai, the Jin generals retreated from Shaanxi and implemented a scorched earth policy to hold the fortified Tongguan Pass. Subutai attempted to outflank them by maneuvering through a less guarded pass, but the attempt to break into the plains of Henan ended in failure after Subutai's advanced raiding parties were checked at Shan-ch’e-hui. The Mongols besieged and took Fengxiang, a secondary target. In 1231–1232 the Mongols made another attempt to outmaneuver the Jin fortified lines. This time Subutai was able to outmaneuver the Jin armies.
The Mongols won decisive victories at Sanfengshan (9 February 1232), Yangyi (24 February 1232), and T’iehling (1 March 1232). Subutai was able to maneuver along the Jin lines of retreat and destroyed their entire army. After the battle, the top Jin general Wan-Yen Yi was captured: his last wish was to meet with Subutai to pay his respects to the legendary general. Ögedei and the main Mongol army returned to Mongolia, leaving Subutai with a small force to complete the conquest of Henan. The heavily fortified city of Kaifeng was besieged for a year and fell in early 1233. Though the Jin were completely defeated, the Mongol besieging force ran very short on food. To solve this problem, Subutai made an alliance with Song to get help to complete the job in mid-1233. With Song help, the last Jin stronghold of Caizhou fell in 1234. But it did not take the Song long to fall out with the Mongols. Two Song armies seized Kaifeng and Luoyang during the summer of 1234. The Mongols returned, destroyed the Song armies, and retook the cities.
The second series of Western campaigns
Ögedei decided to send a major part of the army into the western regions to finally crush the Wild Kipchaks and Bulgars. Subutai was tasked to direct the operations (under the overall command of prince Batu). He defeated Kipchak leader Bachman on the north side of the Caspian Sea and next conquered the Volga Bulgars. In late 1237, Subutai attacked Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal, operating with three columns (attacking as the Mongols usually did during the winter). The Rus forces were defeated in 3 separate engagements and their cities were taken in quick succession. The Mongols spent the summer of 1238 resting along the Don River. Columns were sent out to subjugate the various tribes living in the plains around the Black Sea. In 1239, the Rus state of Chernigov was defeated and their cities were taken. The Mongols were spared the need to conquer Novgorod when the principality smartly surrendered and agreed to pay tribute.
The Mongols had made a treaty with Galich-Vladimir, whose prince was therefore taken by surprise when the Mongols suddenly attacked in December 1240. Kiev, Vladimir, and other cities were quickly taken. The Mongols were ready to enter Central Europe. Subutai operated with several separate detachments, aiming to distract on the flanks, while he dealt with the main Hungarian army in the center. The Mongols defeated European armies at Chmielnik (18 March 1241), Kronstadt (31 March 1241), Liegnitz (9 April 1241), Muhi (10 April 1241), and Hermannstadt (10 April 1241). Hungary was overrun. The Mongols set out for home in 1242, after learning that Ögedei had died, relieving Vienna and the rest of Central Europe from further assaults.
Attack on eastern and central Europe
The attack on Europe was planned and carried out by Subutai, who achieved his lasting fame with his victories there. Having devastated the various Russian principalities, he sent spies as far as Poland, Hungary, and Austria in preparation for an attack into the heartland of Europe. Having a clear picture of the European kingdoms, he brilliantly prepared an attack nominally commanded by Batu Khan and two other princes of the blood. While Batu Khan, son of Jochi, was the overall leader, Subutai was the actual commander in the field, and as such was present in both the northern and southern campaigns against Kievan Rus'. He also commanded the central column that moved against the Kingdom of Hungary.
The Mongol invasion of Europe was a five-pronged attack. Kaidu ravaged Northern Poland, Baidar Southern Poland, while Shiban attacked through the rugged terrain in northeastern Hungary, Subutai invaded central Hungary, and Guyuk marched south through Transylvania. The Mongols dispersed their forces in order to confuse the Europeans as to their ultimate objectives, and defeat the European armies piecemeal before they could mass into a central force. Baidar and Kadan regrouped their northern force and defeated the main Polish army at the Battle of Legnica, right before it could merge with the Bohemian Army a days march away. While Güyük's army triumphed in Transylvania, a day after Legnica, Subutai was waiting for the Hungarian army on the Hungarian plain.
King Béla IV of Hungary had summoned a council of war at Esztergom, a large and important settlement upriver from Buda and Pest. As Batu was advancing on Hungary from the northeast, the Hungarian leadership decided to concentrate their strength at Pest and then head north to confront the Mongol army. When news of the Hungarian battle strategy reached the Mongol commanders, they slowly withdrew to the Sajo River, drawing their enemies on. This was a classic Mongol strategy, ultimately perfected by Subutai. He prepared a battlefield suitable to his tactics, and waited for his enemies to blunder in. It was a strong position, because woods prevented their ranks from being clearly scouted or seen, while across the river on the plain of Mohi, the Hungarian army was widely exposed.
Only one day after the smaller Mongol army in Poland had won the Battle of Legnica, Subutai launched his attack, thus beginning the Battle of Mohi during the night of April 10, 1241. At Mohi, a single division crossed the river in secret to advance on the Hungarian camp from the southern flank. The main body began to cross the Sajo by the bridge at Mohi, and continued to attack the following day. This was met with fierce resistance, so catapults were used to clear the opposite bank of crossbowmen, as was noted earlier. When the crossing was completed, the second contingent attacked from the south, and a third from the north. The now reassembled Mongol force surrounded the fortified Hungarian camp, and bombarded it with trebuchets and flaming arrows.
The result was complete panic, and, to ensure that the Hungarians did not fight to the last man, the Mongols left an obvious gap in their encirclement. This was one of Subutai's classic tricks, to create a tactical situation which appeared to be favourable to the enemy, but which was anything but. The Mongols had already incurred heavier than usual casualties due to Batu's impatience in the assault on the bridge. Subutai did not want a battle where the massed crossbowmen, supported by mounted knights, stood firm and fought to the death against his army. He far preferred to let them flee and be slaughtered individually. The gap in the Mongol lines was an invitation to retreat, which would leave the knights and crossbowmen spread out all over the countryside, easy pickings for the disciplined Mongols. As Subutai had planned, the Hungarians poured through this apparent hole in the Mongol lines, which led to a swampy area, poor footing for horses and hard going for infantry. When the Hungarian knights split up, the Mongol archers picked them off at will. It was later noted that corpses littered the countryside over the space of a two-day journey. Two archbishops and three bishops were killed at the Sajo, plus 40,000 fighting men. At one stroke, the bulk of Hungarian fighting men were totally destroyed, with relatively minimal casualties to the Mongols, reportedly less than 1,000 men.
After the victory, Subutai split his forces into two. A light cavalry force under Kadan was sent to chase King Bela along the Adriatic Coast, while the main army with its siege engines under Subutai and Batu pacified Hungary proper. The Mongols successfully besieged numerous cities, including the capital of Esztergom. Kadan's army was unable to catch Bela, and lacking siege equipment, he could not forcibly capture the cities. However, Bela was also unable to rally his people due to his flight, which meant that Hungary was at the total mercy of the main Mongol army who could simply capture cities in succession like they did in Khwarezm. Batu reportedly began setting up administrative control, though this was accompanied by widespread devastation of agricultural areas in certain parts of Hungary.
By late 1241, Subutai was discussing plans to invade the Holy Roman Empire, when news came of the death of Ögedei Khan and a revolt by the Cumans in Russia. Over the objections of Subutai, the Mongol Princes withdrew the army to Mongolia for the election of a new Great Khan. The death of Ögedei effectively put an end to the Mongol invasion of Europe.
Subutai insisted that Batu attend the kurultai to elect the successor of Ogedei in Mongolian heartland. Batu declined to come and Güyük was elected after three years, with Subutai's support. Güyük had no love for Batu and wanted the best of the Mongol generals unavailable to Batu if the feud between them came to open war. The new Khagan placed Subutai in charge at the age of 70 of the campaign against the Song dynasty for 1246–1247. The Papal envoy Plano Carpini saw him when he was in Karakorum, Mongolia. He said Subutai was well respected among the Mongols and called Knight/Valiant (translation of Baghatur). Subutai returned to Mongolia from the Song campaign in 1248 and spent the rest of his life at his home in the vicinity of the Tuul River (near modern Ulaanbaatar), dying there at the age of 72. His descendants such as Uryankhadai and Aju would serve the Great Khans for the next three decades as commanders.
Though unknown to the west for many centuries, Subutai's exploits were first featured by the British Military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart in his book "Great Captains Unveiled" after World War I. Liddell Hart used the example of the Mongols under Genghis and Subutai to demonstrate how a new mechanized army could ideally fight using the principles of mobility, dispersion, surprise, and indirect means. Though he gained little support in Britain, Liddell Hart's books were read in Germany, whose armies during the initial 1940-1 invasions of France and Russia bore an astonishing similarity to the campaigns of Subutai, 700 years later. In particular, Erwin Rommel and George Patton were avid students of Mongol campaigns.