Following the end of World War II, the United States government was concerned about the large deficit spending that had been necessary for the war effort. To reduce expenditures, the Truman administration instructed the services to draw-down their forces quickly and return to a peacetime military. The two main issues facing the services were the question of unification of the services under a single command, and the funding that each branch would have in the markedly reduced military budget. The discussion of the post-war military flowed from General of the Army George C. Marshall's call for unification of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. Marshall believed that the services needed a unified overall command to better coordinate their activities, to save lives, and to minimize waste and redundancy. He first advanced his general ideas on the subject in November 1943, and his proposals led to what became known as the "unification debates".
On 9 May 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a four-man (two Army, two Navy) Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, under the chairmanship of Admiral James O. Richardson (commander of the U.S. Fleet, 1940–41), which held hearings in Washington, D.C., and in the field for ten months. The committee reported to the J.C.S. on 11 April 1945. With Richardson dissenting, the three-man majority recommended: (1) the creation of a single department of armed forces; (2) three equal services (thus adding an independent Air Force); (3) a single commander of all forces who would be in charge of strategic planning and would direct military operations in the field; (4) a single Services of Supply; (5) a U.S. Chiefs of Staff organization with duties limited to advising the president on military strategy and the budget but without operational authority.
Admiral Richardson submitted a minority report advising against the concentration of power in a single department and the creation of an independent air force. The Navy feared that its particular problems and strategic mission might tend to be ignored if it were only one of three military departments. Moreover, the justification for the Navy's having its own air and land forces might be questioned.
In late April 1945 the new Truman administration came to be concerned that the War was costing the American taxpayer over $100 billion a year or 41% of Gross Domestic product (GDP). The administration accepted that the country was on the verge of a fiasco, and that in late 1946 or early 1947, at the present spending rate, the country would financially collapse.
With the end of World War II, the US Navy had newly built and was maintaining the largest fleet the world has ever seen. The Truman administration directed to immediately stop all war builds and drastically cut all other expenditures by 66 percent in less than one year and 90 percent in four years. The Army and Air Force were able to store a small percentage of the combat vehicles in place and quickly scrap and sell the remainder, usually only keeping the latest models in service. It was difficult and demoralizing for the US Navy personnel to mothball or scrap their newly built ships. Ships that took a year or more to build and could still perform it's intended function if a new war broke out. It was not uncommon for Navy officers to move slowly when mothballing or scrapping ships. US Marine officers, on some pacific islands, stored most of their land combat vehicles in defiance of orders to scrap them. Cost reductions failed to meet the projected 66% fiscal reduction goal, and the projected 90% goal also would not be met.
The generals from the Army Air Force in 1946, believed that with the increased destructive power of the nuclear age, the question arose as to the value for conventional military forces. The Air Force generals believed that much of the forces of the other services were obsolete. They held that the future for national defense lay with a long-range bomber force carrying nuclear weapons. This view, was accepted by the administration as being correct, and the meaningful contribution of the other services came into jeopardy.
In 1947, the Truman administration along with a Republican Congress, believed the national debt to be the greatest danger to the long term economic health of the country. Spending goals for military defense, were set to be significantly reduced to 4% GDP in 1949, along with a longer term goal of 3% GDP in 1951 under the next administration.
In this environment, the navy branch believed their future depended on securing and defending specific missions for themselves.
Along these lines came the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 which reorganized the military, creating a means by which the various commands were coordinated under a military establishment of three equal executive departments, the Army, Navy and Air Force. The unified command establishment was named the Department of Defense, and was created along with the National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and an independent United States Air Force. The Act left the Navy with the autonomy it had sought and the Act's passage seemed to end the debate, but soon after President Truman decided massive reductions in defense spending still had to be made, and the nation's military budget was cut from $45 billion to $14.3 billion in a single year. This placed tremendous pressure on all military departments. Soon, efforts were set in place by the Air Force to amend the Act.
The generals of the newly formed air force propounded a new doctrine: that strategic bombing, particularly with nuclear weapons, was the sole decisive element necessary to win a future war, and was therefore the sole means necessary to deter an adversary from launching a Pearl Harbor-like surprise attack or war against the United States. To implement this doctrine, which the air force and its supporters regarded as the highest national priority, the air force proposed that it should be funded by the Congress to build a fleet of U.S. based long-range strategic heavy bombers. The air force generals argued that this project should receive large amounts of funding, beginning with an upgraded B-36 Peacemaker intercontinental bomber. With four times the payload of the B-29 and twice the range.
The Navy seeing an opportunity for funding to avoid the drawdown, disagreed. Pointing to the impact the Navy's carrier arm had on the outcome of the war in the Pacific, they argued that tactical naval power and carrier aviation were essential to maintaining national defense. Admiral Marc Mitscher, the former commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force, was one such officer who publicly commented on the value of the US Navy in winning the war, and its value in the future defense of the nation. The Navy leadership believed that wars could not be won by strategic bombing alone. The Navy also held a moral objection to relying upon the widespread use of nuclear weapons to destroy the major population centers of an enemy homeland. The Navy pointed out that with the "supercarrier" ships they hoped to build in the future. Naval aviation would be able to continue in its tactical role of close air support using modern aircraft and in addition would, the Navy believed, also be able to take on the strategic role of nuclear deterrence. USS United States (CVA-58) was designed to handle aircraft up to 100,000 pounds, which the Navy believed, would be large enough to carry the nuclear weapons of the day. Plans for the United States-class carriers called for them carrying up to 14 heavy bombers each, with enough aviation fuel for eight bombing raids per plane. With a capability to run 112 nuclear weapon drops before resupply became necessary, the United States-class carriers would be capable of performing the nuclear deterrence mission. The admirals requested funding for the building of eight United States-class carriers over a five-year period.
Fiscally the Navy request was four times larger than the Air Force's request for funding while providing for only a tenth of the combat bomber aircraft.
The first Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, supported the Navy position and on 28 July 1948 authorized construction of United States with a production run of five ships. Of special note, is the timing of this announcement to the Nov 1948 presidential elections. The President at this time, was focused on campaigning off the back of a Pullman train doing "whistle stop" appearances all across the United States covering almost 22,000 miles in total.
Following the re-election of President Truman in November 1948, President Truman "reminded Forrestal about fiscal spending goals" not being met within his Defense Department. In late February 1949 President Truman asked Forrestal to resign. The President did not believe Forrestal had adequate control over the various services, and he appeared unwilling to command the cuts in the Navy that the president wanted. The drawdown for the Navy was well behind schedule and causing budgetary embarrassment for the administration with Congress.
The now-common procedure of in flight refueling was demonstrated in a circumnavigation of the globe by an Air Force B-50 completing on 2 March 1949 which set a new world non-stop flying record of 23,452 miles. The public relations impact of this milestone event resonated positively with the public and at nearly every level of government. The main Air Force argument in support of the B-36, compared to the proposed carrier United States, was cost, both in lives and money. Through some convincing calculations published in Reader's Digest, Air Force advocates contended that the cost of one super carrier and its task force was equal to 500 B-36s and exposed 242 times as many men to danger. Public opinion supported a "more bang for the buck" move to a "peacetime" military.
Fiscal 1951 proposed budgets, made public, cut the Navy's total allocation by an additional two-thirds from the already lean 1949 budget. This proposed budget was threatening to literally mothball what was left of the Navy (including all or nearly all of the carriers) reducing the Navy to little more than escort and cargo ships, transfer the Marines to the Army and all aviation assets to the Air Force.
In late March 1949, Truman fired Forrestal and replaced him with Louis A. Johnson. A former Assistant Secretary of War, he had been the primary fundraiser for Truman's campaign for the White House in 1948. Johnson had no qualms over supporting Truman's military budget reductions and fiscally preferred the Air Force's argument. The Air Force disliked the Navy's aircraft carriers, as they were an expensive asset the Air Force planners considered obsolete in the age of long range aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Johnson, who was a staunch proponent of the nuclear capable bomber force, consequently sought to limit as much as possible the Navy's procurement of the new large carriers to conserve funds in the markedly reduced post-war military budget.
Less than a month after taking office, and without consulting Congress, Johnson ordered cancellation of United States on 23 April 1949. This vessel was the symbol and hope for the Navy's future, and its cancellation greatly demoralized the service. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan and a number of high-ranking admirals resigned in protest effective 24 May 1949. Johnson did not seem disturbed by the resignations. His decision to cancel United States provided him with economy in the military budget needed to meet his budgetary goals, while demonstrating that he was in firm control of the military and able to make difficult decisions.
To replace Sullivan, Johnson recommended Francis P. Matthews for the position of Secretary of the Navy. A lawyer from Omaha, Nebraska, during the Second World War he had served as a director of the USO, a service organization that entertained the troops. He came to the attention of Johnson by assisting him with political fund raising for the 1948 Truman campaign. Upon being considered for the position, Matthews admitted the nearest he had come to naval experience was rowing a boat on a lake. On 24 May 1949 Truman made the appointment.
Said Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson:
There's no reason for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do, so that does away with the Navy.
On or about 17 May 1949, Secretary Johnson announced his intent to transfer the United States Marine Corps aviation assets to the Air Force. At this time his decisions were met with an uproar from Congress, in June, to "cease and desist" as investigative hearings were being called for. Any new or additional force changes had to be withdrawn and quietly dropped, as Congress announced hearings on matter related to" unification and strategy". With an initial focus on recent anonymous documents that inferred fraud and collusion on the part of the B36 manufacturer Convair and Secretary of Defense Johnson.
A research group, Op-23, a naval intelligence unit formed in early 1948 by order of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld to advise the CNO on unification and later headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke, had been gathering information to help defend the Navy's position, including material critical of the B-36's performance and capabilities. in late May 1949 an anonymous document which came to be known as the "Worth Paper" appeared. The document pointed out that prior to his posting as Secretary of Defense Johnson had been on the board of directors of Convair, the manufacturer of the B-36 bomber. It pointed out he had an apparent conflict of interest in representing the government with this manufacturer. It went on to claim that the B-36 was a "billion-dollar blunder" and alleged "fraud" on the part of B-36 contractors regarding: costs, capabilities and test results.
Secretary Johnson's idea of an executive was someone who gave orders, and those orders were to be carried out immediately and without question. When the naval officers had the audacity to question his decisions on weapons and strategy (Such as the cancellation of the super carrier), he took that as a sign of unparalleled insubordination. When unsupported attacks appeared against his character, he wanted those responsible to be severely punished. This could explain the animosity he felt for the Navy at the time of the admiral's revolt.
The situation was exacerbated by a series of articles written for the public by Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery which appeared in the The Saturday Evening Post. The final article in the series, "Don't Let Them Scuttle the Navy!", so angered Johnson that he wanted Admiral Gallery court-martialed for gross insubordination. Gallery was not made to sit before a court-martial, but he was passed over for promotion to vice admiral, effectively ending his career.
The first phase of the House Armed Services Committee hearing and investigation on "Unification and Strategy" was held 9–25 August 1949. The focus was on the allegations of fraud and corruption emanating from the "Worth Paper". The author of the "anonymous document" was determined to be Cedric R. Worth, a former Navy commander serving as a civilian assistant to Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball. Worth was called as a witness and testified before the House Investigating Committee. The committee found no substance to charges of improper interest relating to the roles of Johnson and Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington in aircraft procurement.The Air Force was exonerated of all charges of wrong doing. At the conclusion, the committee recommended that Worth be fired. Following a naval court of inquiry, Worth was dismissed. The apparent vindication for Secretary Johnson and inappropriate work by Worth was an embarrassment to the Navy.
A second hearing convened in October focused upon the proposed reduction in the Navy and the cancellation of the USS United States project and the soundness of the proposed expansion of the strategic bomber forces. The Army and Air Force command testified that naval aviation should be used to reinforce the Air Force, but could not be used for sustained actions against long range in-land targets. Regarding the USS United States, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg commented: "I accept the military capability of this ship as stated by the Chief of Naval Operations. My opposition to building it comes from the fact that I can see no necessity for a ship with those capabilities in any strategic plan against the one possible enemy." The new Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, announced that no Navy man would be censored or penalized for the testimony he offered at the hearing. The naval officers called to testify were expected to support Secretary Matthews, but instead officer after officer arose to testify that the Air Force reliance on the B-36 was inadequate for national defense, and that the entire strategy of atomic bombing was misguided. Among the officers testifying from 6–17 October, were the naval leaders of World War II: Ernest King, Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Raymond Spruance, Thomas Kinkaid, Richard Conolly, Robert Carney and Captain Arleigh Burke. Captain Burke had run tests which showed the Navy was already in possession of a fighter aircraft, the McDonnell F2H Banshee, that could reach high enough altitudes to intercept bombers like the B36, and he knew it would be unreasonable to assume that an opposing major world power would not also have developed such an aircraft. In that case, the B-36 would need to be accompanied with long range fighter escorts with the requisite range and ceiling to complete its mission, and the Air Force had no such fighter available in their inventory. The Air Force rebutted all previous testimony, point by point, with only Secretary of the Air Force Symington and Air Force General Vandenberg on 18–19 October. The remainder of the testimony before the House Armed Services Committee further weakened the already faltering Navy position. Of particular note were the arguments of Army General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated that there would be no need in the future for an island hopping campaign or large amphibious capabilities, and more importantly, strategic bombing was "our first-priority retaliatory weapon." Bradley made no attempt to hide his contempt for the Navy's methods during the case, and he directly accused senior naval officers of poor leadership, disloyalty, and being "completely against unity of command and planning".
The House Armed Services Committee found a number of actions taken by the administration and by the services involved to be overstepping. It held that evaluation of the B-36's worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services jointly should not pass judgment on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson's decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the Navy. In disapproving of Johnson's "summary manner" of terminating the carrier and his failure to consult congressional committees before acting, the committee stated that "national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions." The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that "there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast" and observed that "there has been a navy reluctance in the inter-service marriage, an over-ardent army, a somewhat exuberant air force... It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon."
During the hearings public opinion shifted strongly against the Navy. The Navy's tendency to favor covert approaches, to public relations, their efforts during the revolt were widely perceived to be deceitful and underhanded. OP-23's use of questionable documents, that made use of false capability limitations, regarding "strategic bombing myths" damaged the Navy's credibility before the House Armed Services Committee during the October 1949 testimonies. Throughout 1949 the Air Force public relations machine had matured to be extremely effective. Using aviation magazines and other widely circulated press organizations to publish informative articles, garnering support both in Congress and directly with the American people. "What drives a distinguished group of admirals to denounce strategic bombing while pleading for the means with which to conduct it, to find the A-bomb immoral in the hands of the Air Force but quite moral in the hands of the Navy?" (Time Magazine) The Philadelphia Inquirer captured the mood, as reported by the popular press, best. "The Navy brass can contribute to national safety by dropping their guerilla warfare against the other services and endeavor by forthright, constructive criticism to improve on defense strategy." The Washington Post added: "A real meeting of minds can not be achieved until both sides are willing to play on the same team, and right now the burden of proof is on the Navy." A Gallup poll conducted on 15 October showed an overwhelming 74% of voters favoring the Air Force role in any future war, with only 4% favoring the Navy.
Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, when justifying the cancellation of the carrier United States and the need for more strategic bombers stated, "We must hit within one week after the war starts and it can be done only by land-based planes such as we now have."
After the hearings, Secretary Matthews set about punishing those officers who had testified and were still actively serving in the Navy, in defiance of his own public promise not to do so. Admiral Denfeld (OP-23s creator) was first to go, he was summarily relieved on Navy Day, October 27, 1949. He explained that he and Denfeld disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. Matthews then had vice admiral William H. P. Blandy reassigned to a rear admiral posting, an assignment below the standing of his rank, he subsequently retired. Vice Admiral Bogan, also chose to retire rather than face assignment to a position of lesser authority. Secretary Matthews ordered him to a posting in a rear admiral's billet the week before he retired, preventing the "tombstone" promotion to four stars he would have otherwise received. OP-23 was disbanded but not before the Inspector General's office seized all documents. Captain Crommelin, an outspoken antagonist, continued to openly speak out against the system and the "trend toward military dictatorship" he was sent home to Alabama on 15 March 1950 on "extended furlough" with half pay. In December, an attempt was made by Matthews and Johnson to block the promotion of Captain Burke by lining out his name from the promotion list, but this was seen and reversed by the direct intervention of President Truman.
The House Armed Services Committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Denfeld by Secretary Matthews, concluding that Denfeld's removal was a reprisal because of his testimony to Congress. The Committee asserted that such actions taken by the executive branch posed a challenge to effective representative government.
The Truman administration essentially won the conflict with the Navy, and civilian control over the military was reaffirmed. Military budgets following the hearings prioritized the development of Air Force heavy bomber designs, accumulating a combat ready force of over 1,000 long-range strategic bombers capable of supporting nuclear mission scenarios. These were deployed across the country and at dozens of overseas bases. The Air Force portion of the total defense budget significantly grew, while the Navy's and Army's portion of the total defense budget was reduced.
What decisively saved the postwar Navy and Army, was the Korean War. Within six months, 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the U.S. was forced to confront an invading army with the forces it had on hand. The Truman administration immediately decided not to use the nuclear arsenal, and sought to check North Korean aggression with conventional forces.
As an initial response, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea, and was shocked to learn that such a blockade could only be imposed "on paper", since the U.S. Navy no longer had the warships with which to carry out his request. In fact, due to the extensive defense cuts and the emphasis placed on building a nuclear bomber force, none of the services was in a position to make a robust response with conventional military strength.
Shortly after the North Korean attacks began Defense Secretary Johnson made requests for an increase in defense appropriations and promised the Navy would soon get approval for a new "supercarrier" project. The secretary hastily proposed a supplemental appropriation request of $10.5 billion, (an increase of 79%), bringing the total requested to $23.8 billion. In making the additional request, Johnson informed a House appropriations subcommittee that "in light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations."
Preoccupied with public criticism of his handling of the Korean War, and wishing to deflect attention from the peacetime defense economy measures he had previously espoused, Truman decided to ask for Johnson's resignation. The president realized he now needed a Secretary that had the confidence of all three services, preferably one with significant military experience. Within three months of the start of the conflict Johnson was dismissed from his position as Secretary of Defense. He was replaced by the soldier and statesmen George Marshall, one of the original architects for the unification of the defense branches. Marshall deferred "overall unification" issues until after the fighting stops, but did insist on "regional unification" to "optimize combat" efforts and operations.
The Korean War made it clear that aircraft carriers were still a primary means of projecting conventional force and enforcing U.S. foreign policy. The B-36 had little place in the conflict, as the Air Force was not willing to risk the aircraft in combat in Korea, though it did find some use as a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
The Navy after 2 years of delays, did get a new "supercarrier" design. Launched in October 1955, Forrestal at 60,000 tons was 1.5 times the size of World War II Midway class carriers. She featured an armoured flight deck just large enough and sturdy enough to land a heavy bomber carrying a small nuclear bomb. The ship was also equipped with steam catapult launchers to assist the heavier nuclear bombers in getting airborne. The flight deck was angled, allowing the new carrier to launch and recover aircraft at the same time. The 1951 through 1955 development of hydrogen bomb technologies, significantly increased the weight of the bomb load well beyond original expectations. All efforts to develop a viable carrier based, heavy nuclear bomber during the 1950s from the: P-2 Neptune, AJ Savage to the P6M SeaMaster resulted in failures and cancellations.
Throughout the 1950s multiple efforts focused on nuclear warhead miniaturization, which resulted in a myriad of technological advances. This in turn enabled the Navy to realize missile submarines to accomplish a strategic nuclear mission starting in 1960.
Proponents of the Air Force doctrine saw the Korean War as an anomalous event, the demands of which were not relevant to dealing with the now real strategic nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Ultimately Soviet aggression never materialized thru a massive nuclear attack and this can be attributed, during the decade of the 1950s, to the counter-strike potential of the US Air Force's and NATO's nuclear bomber forces.
The design of the "supercarrier" has evolved through Enterprise, to the Nimitz class, to the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers. As of 2014, the US Navy has eleven nuclear powered supercarriers in active service as well as one conventionally powered supercarrier in reserve. Two Gerald R. Ford-class carriers are currently under construction, with eight more planned to follow through the 2040s with the first of the class replacing Enterprise and first nine of the Nimitz-class carriers on a one for one replacement when the Nimitz-class vessels begin to hit their 50-year life expectancy. The final Nimitz-class carrier, George H.W. Bush commissioned in January 2009 and is expected to serve alongside the Gerald R. Ford class until 2059 when the next generation supercarrier is commissioned.