Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR) is a hypothesis that consciousness in the brain originates from processes inside neurons, rather than from connections between neurons (the conventional view). The mechanism is held to be a quantum physics process called objective reduction that is orchestrated by molecular structures called microtubules. Objective reduction is proposed to be influenced by non-computable factors imbedded in spacetime geometry which thus may account for the Hard Problem of Consciousness. The hypothesis was put forward in the early 1990s by theoretical physicist Roger Penrose and anaesthesiologist and psychologist Stuart Hameroff.
Contents
Overview
The hypothesis states that consciousness derives from deeper-level, finer-scale quantum activities inside cells, most prevalent in the neurons. It combines approaches from molecular biology, neuroscience, quantum physics, pharmacology, philosophy, quantum information theory and from a yet to come theory to "gravitize" quantum mechanics.
While mainstream theories assert that consciousness emerges as the complexity of the computations performed by cerebral neurons increases, Orch-OR posits that consciousness is based on non-computable quantum processing performed by qubits formed collectively on cellular microtubules, a process significantly amplified in the neurons. The qubits are based on oscillating dipoles forming superposed resonance rings in helical pathways throughout microtubule lattices. The oscillations are either electric, due to charge separation from London forces, or (most favorably) magnetic, due to electron spin—and possibly also due to nuclear spins (that can remain isolated for longer periods) and that occur in gigahertz, megahertz and kilohertz frequency ranges. Orchestration refers to the hypothetical process by which connective proteins, such as microtubule-associated proteins (MAPs), influence or orchestrate qubit state reduction by modifying the spacetime-separation of their superimposed states. The latter is based on Penrose's objective collapse theory for interpreting quantum mechanics, which postulates the existence of an objective threshold governing the collapse of quantum-states, related to the difference of the space-time curvature of these states in the universe's fine scale structure.
The basis of Orch-OR has been criticized from its inception by mathematicians, philosophers, and scientists, prompting the authors to revise and elaborate many of the theory's peripheral assumptions, retaining the core hypothesis. The criticism concentrated on three issues: Penrose's interpretation of Gödel's theorem; Penrose's abductive reasoning linking non-computability to quantum processes; the brain's unsuitability to host the quantum phenomena required by the theory, since it is considered too "warm, wet and noisy" to avoid decoherence. In other words, there is a missing link between physics and neuroscience and to date, it is too premature to claim that the Orch-OR hypothesis is right or wrong.
Penrose–Lucas argument
The Penrose–Lucas argument states that, because humans are capable of knowing the truth of Gödel-unprovable statements, human thought is necessarily non-computable.
In 1931, mathematician and logician Kurt Gödel proved that any effectively generated theory capable of proving basic arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. Furthermore, he showed that any such theory also including a statement of its own consistency is inconsistent. A key element of the proof is the use of Gödel numbering to construct a "Gödel sentence" for the theory, which encodes a statement of its own incompleteness, e.g. "This theory can't assert the truth of this statement." This statement is either true but unprovable (incompleteness) or false and provable (inconsistency). An analogous statement has been used to show that humans are subject to the same limits as machines.
However, in his first book on consciousness, The Emperor's New Mind (1989), Penrose made Gödel's theorem the basis of what quickly became a controversial claim. He argued that while a formal proof system cannot prove its own consistency, Gödel-unprovable results are provable by human mathematicians. He takes this disparity to mean that human mathematicians are not describable as formal proof systems, and are therefore running a non-computable algorithm. Similar claims about the implications of Gödel's theorem were originally espoused by the philosopher John Lucas of Merton College, Oxford.
The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!
Motivation
If correct, the Penrose–Lucas argument creates a need to understand the physical basis of non-computable behaviour in the brain. Most physical laws are computable, and thus algorithmic. However, Penrose determined that wave function collapse was a prime candidate for a non-computable process.
In quantum mechanics, particles are treated differently from the objects of classical mechanics. Particles are described by wave functions that evolve according to the Schrödinger equation. Non-stationary wave functions are linear combinations of the eigenstates of the system, a phenomenon described by the superposition principle. When a quantum system interacts with a classical system—i.e. when an observable is measured—the system appears to collapse to a random eigenstate of that observable from a classical vantage point.
If collapse is truly random, then no process or algorithm can deterministically predict its outcome. This provided Penrose with a candidate for the physical basis of the non-computable process that he hypothesized to exist in the brain. However, he disliked the random nature of environmentally-induced collapse, as randomness was not a promising basis for mathematical understanding. Penrose proposed that isolated systems may still undergo a new form of wave function collapse, which he called objective reduction (OR).
Details
Penrose sought to reconcile general relativity and quantum theory using his own ideas about the possible structure of spacetime. He suggested that at the Planck scale curved spacetime is not continuous, but discrete. Penrose postulated that each separated quantum superposition has its own piece of spacetime curvature, a blister in spacetime. Penrose suggests that gravity exerts a force on these spacetime blisters, which become unstable above the Planck scale of
where:
Thus, the greater the mass-energy of the object, the faster it will undergo OR and vice versa. Atomic-level superpositions would require 10 million years to reach OR threshold, while an isolated 1 kilogram object would reach OR threshold in 10−37s. Objects somewhere between these two scales could collapse on a timescale relevant to neural processing.
An essential feature of Penrose's theory is that the choice of states when objective reduction occurs is selected neither randomly (as are choices following wave function collapse) nor algorithmically. Rather, states are selected by a "non-computable" influence embedded in the Planck scale of spacetime geometry. Penrose claimed that such information is Platonic, representing pure mathematical truth, aesthetic and ethical values at the Planck scale. This relates to Penrose's ideas concerning the three worlds: physical, mental, and the Platonic mathematical world. In his theory, the Platonic world corresponds to the geometry of fundamental spacetime that is claimed to support non-computational thinking.
No evidence supports Penrose's objective reduction, but the theory is considered testable and the FELIX (experiment) has been suggested to evaluate and measure the objective criterion.
In August 2013, Penrose and Hameroff reported that the experiments had been carried out by Bandyopadhyay et al., supporting Penrose's theory on six out of his twenty theses, while invalidating none of the others. They subsequently responded to critiques, including a 2013 critique from Reimers' group.
The creation of the Orch-OR model
Penrose and Hameroff initially developed their ideas quite separately from one another, and it was only in the 1990s that they cooperated to produce the Orch-OR theory. Penrose came to the problem from the view point of mathematics and in particular Gödel's theorem, while Hameroff approached it from a career in cancer research and anesthesia that had given him an interest in brain structures. Specifically, when Penrose wrote his first consciousness book, The Emperor's New Mind in 1989, he lacked a detailed proposal for how such quantum processes could be implemented in the brain. Subsequently, Hameroff read The Emperor's New Mind and suggested to Penrose that certain structures within brain cells (neurons) were suitable candidate sites for quantum processing and ultimately for consciousness. The Orch-OR theory arose from the cooperation of these two scientists, and was developed in Penrose's second consciousness book Shadows of the Mind (1994).
Hameroff's contribution to the theory derived from studying brain cells. His interest centered on the cytoskeleton, which provides an internal supportive structure for neurons, and particularly on the microtubules, which are the most important component of the cytoskeleton. As neuroscience has progressed, the role of the cytoskeleton and microtubules has assumed greater importance. In addition to providing structural support, microtubule functions include axoplasmic transport and control of the cell's movement, growth and shape.
Microtubule condensates
Hameroff proposed that microtubules were suitable candidates for quantum processing. Microtubules are made up of tubulin protein subunits. The tubulin protein dimers of the microtubules have hydrophobic pockets that may contain delocalized π electrons. Tubulin has other, smaller non-polar regions, for example 8 tryptophans per tubulin, which contain π electron-rich indole rings distributed throughout tubulin with separations of roughly 2 nm. Hameroff claims that this is close enough for the tubulin π electrons to become quantum entangled. During entanglement, particle states become inseparably correlated.
Hameroff originally suggested the tubulin-subunit electrons would form a Bose–Einstein condensate,. He then proposed a Frohlich condensate, a hypothetical coherent oscillation of dipolar molecules. However, this too was rejected by Reimers' group. Hameroff then responded to Reimers. "Reimers et al have most definitely NOT shown that strong or coherent Frohlich condensation in microtubules is unfeasible. The model microtubule on which they base their Hamiltonian is not a microtubule structure, but a simple linear chain of oscillators." Hameroff reasoned that such condensate behavior would magnify nanoscopic quantum effects to have large scale influences in the brain.
Hameroff proposed that condensates in microtubules in one neuron can link with microtubule condensates in other neurons and glial cells via the gap junctions of electrical synapses. Hameroff proposed that the gap between the cells is sufficiently small that quantum objects can tunnel across it, allowing them to extend across a large area of the brain. He further postulated that the action of this large-scale quantum activity is the source of 40 Hz gamma waves, building upon the much less controversial theory that gap junctions are related to the gamma oscillation.
Consequences
The Orch-OR theory combines the Penrose–Lucas argument with Hameroff's hypothesis on quantum processing in microtubules. It proposes that when condensates in the brain undergo an objective wave function reduction, their collapse connects non-computational decision-making to experiences embedded in spacetime's fundamental geometry.
The theory further proposes that the microtubules both influence and are influenced by the conventional activity at the synapses between neurons.
In 1998 Hameroff made 8 probable assumptions and 20 testable predictions to back his proposal.
In January 2014 Hameroff and Penrose announced that the discovery of quantum vibrations in microtubules by Anirban Bandyopadhyay of the National Institute for Materials Science in Japan provides favorable evidence towards the Orch-OR hypothesis.
Criticism
The Orch-OR theory was criticized by scientists who considered it to be a poor model of brain physiology.
Penrose–Lucas argument
The Penrose–Lucas argument about the implications of Gödel's incompleteness theorem for computational theories of human intelligence was criticized by mathematicians, computer scientists, and philosophers, and the consensus among experts in these fields is that the argument fails, with different authors attacking different aspects of the argument.
LaForte pointed out that in order to know the truth of an unprovable Gödel sentence, one must already know the formal system is consistent. Referencing Benacerraf, he then demonstrated that humans cannot prove that they are consistent, and in all likelihood human brains are inconsistent. He pointed to contradictions within Penrose's own writings as examples. Similarly, Minsky argued that because humans can believe false ideas to be true, human mathematical understanding need not be consistent and consciousness may easily have a deterministic basis.
Feferman faulted detailed points in Penrose's second book, Shadows of the Mind. He argued that mathematicians do not progress by mechanistic search through proofs, but by trial-and-error reasoning, insight and inspiration, and that machines do not share this approach with humans. He pointed out that everyday mathematics can be formalized. He also rejected Penrose's Platonism.
Searle criticized Penrose's appeal to Gödel as resting on the fallacy that all computational algorithms must be capable of mathematical description. As a counter-example, Searle cited the assignment of license plate numbers to specific vehicle identification numbers, as part of vehicle registration. According to Searle, no mathematical function can be used to connect a known VIN with its LPN, but the process of assignment is quite simple—namely, "first come, first served"—and can be performed entirely by a computer. However, since an algorithm (as defined in the Oxford American Dictionary) is a 'set of rules to be followed in calculations or problem-solving operations', the assignment of LPN to a VIN is not an algorithm as such, merely the use of a database in which every VIN has a corresponding LPN. No algorithm could arbitrarily 'compute' database assignments. Thus, Searle's counter-example does not describe a computational algorithm that is not mathematically describable.
Decoherence in living organisms
In 2000 Tegmark claimed that any quantum coherent system in the brain would undergo wave function collapse due to environmental interaction long before it could influence neural processes (the "warm, wet and noisy" argument, as it was later came to be known). He determined the decoherence timescale of microtubule entanglement at brain temperatures to be on the order of femtoseconds, far too brief for neural processing. Other scientists sided with Tegmark's analysis, insisting that quantum coherence does not play, or does not need to play any major role in neurophysiology.
In response to Tegmark's claims, Hagan, Tuszynski and Hameroff claimed that Tegmark did not address the Orch-OR model, but instead a model of his own construction. This involved superpositions of quanta separated by 24 nm rather than the much smaller separations stipulated for Orch-OR. As a result, Hameroff's group claimed a decoherence time seven orders of magnitude greater than Tegmark's, although still far below 25 ms. Hameroff's group also suggested that the Debye layer of counterions could screen thermal fluctuations, and that the surrounding actin gel might enhance the ordering of water, further screening noise. They also suggested that incoherent metabolic energy could further order water, and finally that the configuration of the microtubule lattice might be suitable for quantum error correction, a means of resisting quantum decoherence.
Since the 90's numerous counter-observations to the "warm, wet and noisy" argument existed at ambient temperatures, in vitro and in vivo (i.e. photosynthesis, bird navigation). For example, Harvard researchers achieved quantum states lasting for 2 sec at room temperatures using diamonds. Plants routinely use quantum-coherent electron transport at ambient temperatures in photosynthesis. In 2014, researchers used theoretical quantum biophysics and computer simulations to analyze quantum coherence among tryptophan π resonance rings in tubulin. They claimed that quantum dipole coupling among tryptophan π resonance clouds, mediated by exciton hopping or Forster resonance energy transfer (FRET) across the tubulin protein are plausible.
In 2009, Reimers et al. and McKemmish et al., published critical assessments. Earlier versions of the theory had required tubulin-electrons to form either Bose–Einsteins or Frohlich condensates, and the Reimers group claimed that these were experimentally unfounded. Additionally they claimed that microtubules could only support 'weak' 8 MHz coherence. The first argument was voided by revisions of the theory that described dipole oscillations due to London forces and possibly due to magnetic and/or nuclear spin cloud formations. On the second issue the theory was retrofitted so that 8 MHz coherence is sufficient to support the whole Orch-OR hypothesis.
McKemmish et al. made two claims: that aromatic molecules cannot switch states because they are delocalised; and that changes in tubulin protein-conformation driven by GTP conversion would result in a prohibitive energy requirement. Hameroff and Penrose responded to the first claim by stating that they were referring to the behaviour of two or more electron clouds, inherently non-localised. For the second claim they stated that no GTP conversion is needed since (in that version of the theory) the conformation-switching is not necessary, replaced by oscillation due to the London forces produced by the electron cloud dipole states.
Neuron cell biology
Hameroff proposed that microtubule coherence reaches the synapses via dendritic lamellar bodies (DLBs), where it could influence synaptic firing and be transmitted across the synaptic cleft. De Zeeuw et al. then proved this to be impossible, by showing that DLBs are located micrometers away from gap junctions. Bandyopadhyay et. al. speculated that this issue might be resolved if their notion of wireless transmission of information globally across the entire brain is proven. Hameroff and Penrose doubt whether such a wireless transmission would be capable of transmitting superimposed quantum-states.
Hameroff's 1998 hypothesis required that cortical dendrites contain primarily 'A' lattice microtubules, but in 1994 Kikkawa et al. showed that all in vivo microtubules have a 'B' lattice and a seam. Then Bandyopadhyay showed that microtubules can change their structure from B-lattice to A-lattice as part of the processing of information, and that tubulin in microtubules exists in multiple states.
Orch-OR also required gap junctions between neurons and glial cells, yet Binmöller et. al. proved in 1992 that these don't exist. But a 1999 research supported the evidence between neurons and astrocytes.
Hameroff speculated that visual photons in the retina are detected directly by the cones and rods instead of decohering and subsequently connect with the retinal glia cells via gap junctions, but this too was falsified.
Other biology-based criticisms have been offered. Papers by Georgiev point to problems with Hameroff's proposals, including a lack of explanation for the probabilistic firing of axonal synapses and an error in the calculated number of the tubulin dimers per cortical neuron. Hameroff insisted in a 2013 interview that those falsifications were invalid.