Helen Steward (born 1965 in Chester) is a British Philosopher. She is currently Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Action at the University of Leeds. Her research focusses on Philosophy of Action, Free Will, Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics.
Helen Steward is Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Action at the University of Leeds. Her interests include the metaphysics and ontology of mind and agency; the free will problem; the relation between humans and animals; and the philosophy of causation and explanation. She joined the University of Leeds in 2007, having previously been a Tutorial Fellow at Balliol College, Oxford for fourteen years. She obtained a D.Phil from Oxford University in 1992, a B.Phil in 1988 and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics in 1986. In February 2015 she was awarded a Research Leadership Fellowship by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.
A Metaphysics for Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) - BBIP podcast
Agency and Action ed. H. Steward and John Hyman (Cambridge: CUP, 2004).
The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States (Oxford: OUP, 1997).
Selected articles
'What is a Continuant?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, LXXXIX, 2015: 109-23
‘Do Animals Have Free Will?’, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 68 (1), Apr 2015: 43-48 [1]
A Metaphysics for Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) - BBIP podcast
‘Responses’, Inquiry 56 (2013): 681-706. (Contains Steward's responses to the comments of eight authors on her monograph, A Metaphysics for Freedom, to which a special issue of Inquiry was dedicated).
'Processes, Continuants and Individuals', Mind 122 (2013): 781-812
'Actions as Processes', Philosophical Perspectives 26:1 (2012): 373-88
‘Précis of ‘A Metaphysics for Freedom’ and ‘Responses to Randolph Clarke, John Bishop and Helen Beebee’, Res Philosophica 91:3 (2014): 513-18 and 547-57
‘Causing Things and Doing Things’ in C.G. Pulman (ed.) Hart on Responsibility (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 71–90
‘The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Ethics 16:2 (2012): 241-71
Perception and the Ontology of Causation', in Naomi Eilan, Hemdat Lerman and Johannes Roessler (eds.), Perception, Causation and Objectivity: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011):139-60.
‘Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency’, in Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2011: 141-57
'Free Will' in J.Shand (ed.) Central Issues of Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 152-64
'The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism', Philosophical Explorations 12.2 (2009): 167-179
'Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom', Nous 43 (2009): 64-93
'Determinism and Inevitability', Philosophical Studies 130 (2006), 535-63
'Animal Agency', Inquiry 52 (2009): 217-31.
‘Agency, Causality and Properties’, in Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3), 2011. Available online 10.1007/s11466-011-0146-2
