Fatah–Hamas reconciliation process

Background

Until the First Intifada, Fatah was the sole dominating party in the Palestinian political arena, including the PLO. In 1987, Hamas arose as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation. Following the Oslo Accords, the PLO, of which Fatah still was the dominant member, formally denounced armed resistance. Hamas refused to recognize Israel and opposed the Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements between the PLO and Israel. Under pressure of Israel and the international community, Fatah attempted to eliminate Hamas, especially after Mahmoud Abbas had succeeded Arafat as President of the Palestinian National Authority. Tensions mounted ahead the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and culminated in the Battle of Gaza in June 2007, resulting in a split of the Palestinian government.

In reconciliation attempts, Hamas has mainly focussed on reform of the PLO and its inclusion in the organisation. After Hamas' victory in the 2006 elections, it unsuccessfully tried to run the PA Government due to Israeli and international boycott.

Although Hamas has maintained that it is ready to conclude a long-term truce with Israel (hudna), it has vowed to never recognize Israel, because this would imply the recognition of the "Zionist occupation of Palestine", which Hamas views as an Arab Islamic country. In the view of Hamas, recognition of Israel would imply the acceptance of the expulsion of more than 700,000 Palestinians during the Nakba during the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. Hamas' refusal to recognize Israel and denounce armed resistance, unlike the PLO and implicitly Fatah, has been the main reason for Israel and the international community to oppose the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Fatah has met with massive external pressure not to cooperate with Hamas.

Israeli obstruction

Israel has consistently thwarted Fatah–Hamas reconciliation. In 2009, for example, Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel would never make peace with Hamas and ″cannot accept Hamas as a negotiating partner″. Following the April 2011 Cairo agreement, he ruled out a peace agreement, if Fatah and Hamas would reconcile. He said: ″The PA must choose either peace with Israel or peace with Hamas. There is no possibility for peace with both″ and ″How can you talk to us about peace when you're talking about peace with Hamas. You can choose [to make] peace with Israel or you can choose peace with Hamas″.

President Abbas has consistently been under pressure to prevent reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. In September 2013, Abbas admitted that he was under pressure from the US and Israel not to achieve unity with Hamas. PLC council member for Hamas Anwar Zaboun said that both USA and EU maintain a veto on the reconciliation.

In 2011, an Israeli official declared that Israel would cut its ties with the Palestinian Authority if it brought Hamas into its government. In reaction to the February 2012 Doha agreement and the announcement of a unity caretaker government composed of non-affiliated technocrats (thus without Hamas members), Netanyahu reiterated that Abbas must choose between peace with Israel and peace with hamas, but that he had chosen "to abandon the path of peace and join with Hamas". When Abbas ten days later openly declared that the next government would remain committed to all signed obligations and agreements, rather than silently let run a non-political technocrats government, Hamas was angered and indeed the unity government did not emerge.

When eventually the Palestinian Unity Government of June 2014 was established, with none Hamas ministers, Israel nevertheless condemned the unity government, imposed sanctions on the new PA government and ended peace talks with Abbas.

One of the effective means of pressure often used by Israel is the withholding of taxes it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. Israel collectively punished the Palestinians, for example, following the formation of the 2006 PA government and the successive 2007 government, following the May 2011 reconciliation agreement and after UN applications.

2005 Cairo Declaration

On 19 March 2005, a broad spectrum of Palestinian factions, including Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP and DFLP, signed the Palestinian Cairo Declaration. This was possibly the first Intra—Palestinian conciliation attempt. Its aim was to unite the Palestinian factions against the Israeli occupation, restructure the Palestine Liberation Organization and avoid further violent interactions between the Palestinian groups. One of the aims of the Cairo Declaration was to reform the PLO "in order to include all the Palestinian powers and factions, as the organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"

2006 Prisoners' Document

In May 2006, leaders of 5 Palestinian factions in an Israeli prison, including from Fatah and Hamas, signed a National Conciliation Document, known as the Prisoners' Document. It was written with the intention to reconcile all factions and unite them in their struggle against the Israeli occupation and form a government of national unity. It envisioned an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with al-Quds al-Shareef as its capital. President Abbas immediately endorsed the Document, which implicitly recognizes Israel. He demanded, however, that Hamas explicitly approve it, threatening with a national referendum on the Document. Eventually, the political leadership of all factions endorsed a revised version of the Prisoners' Document. Hamas refused, however, to explicitly recognize Israel and to forswear armed resistance within the occupied territories. Israel quickly dismissed the Document because it did not explicitly recognize Israel.

On 11 September 2006, President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh reached a tentative agreement to form a government of national unity. They agreed that the new government should be based on the Prisoners’ Document. On 20 September, the Palestinian daily al-Ayyam published the text of the draft-agreement, called ″Program for a new government″, consisting of 7 points. The accord states that the government will ″respect″ the agreements signed by the PLO, and support plans based on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. In the Abbas-Haniyeh draft agreement, Hamas for the first time recognizes the peace agreements between the PLO and Israel.

When Abbas in a speech before the UN General Assembly on 21 September claimed that the program for a new government was strictly in line with the Quartet conditions (commitment to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap), he drew, however, strong opposition from more radical members of Hamas. The next day, Haniyeh declared that he would not head a government that recognizes Israel, but he reiterated Hamas' readiness to establish a Palestinian state in the occupied territories and to honor a long-term truce with Israel. On 23 September, Abbas declared the unity effort ″back to zero″ and both parties blamed each other for not respecting the agreement. On 16 December 2006, Abbas unilaterally issued a call for early parliamentary and presidential elections, displeasing Hamas.

February 2007 Mecca Agreement

The Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement was signed between Fatah and Hamas in the city of Mecca on February 8, 2007 after eight days of talks, agreeing to stop the military clashes in the Gaza Strip and form a government of national unity.

March 2008 Sana'a Declaration

On 23 March 2008, Hamas and Fatah signed a declaration in Sana'a, Yemen that amounted to a reconciliation deal. It called for a return of the Gaza Strip to the pre-June 2007 situation. Disagreement about the interpretation immediately appeared. While Fatah said, Hamas should relinquish its hold on Gaza first, Hamas demanded the reinstatement of the Hamas-led unity government too. On 8 November 2008, Palestinian reconciliation talks due to be held in Cairo were called off after Hamas announced a boycott in protest at the detention of hundreds of its members by president Mahmoud Abbas's security forces.

2009 talks

After the Israeli assault on Gaza, Operation Cast Lead, Hamas and Fatah started a new round of talks in Cairo end February 2009. On 7 March 2009, Salam Fayyad submitted his resignation as PM to pave the way for the formation of a national unity government.

On 12 March, the parties reportedly reached a compromise on the issue of the Palestinian Security Services, and on 15 March on holding presidential and legislative elections by 25 January 2010. On 17 March, there appeared problems on the terms of a national unity government. Fatah clung to adherence to the Quartet conditions, including recognition of Israel, and focus on negotiations with Israel. Hamas wanted a majority share in any new government and refused to recognize the self-proclaimed Jewish state.

The talks were, however, stalled in October due to "inappropriate conditions."

2010 talks

In February 2010, the parties, among other Palestinian groups, held talks aimed at reconciling rival factions. In March, representatives from Fatah and Hamas meet in Damascus. On the Doha Debates television show, representatives of Fatah and Hamas discussed the future of the Palestinian leadership.

After six rounds of reconciliation talks that resulted in failure, in early September 2010, Cairo did put forward a new document. The document envisioned general elections to be held in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the first half of 2010, a reform of Palestinian security services under the Egyptian control and the release of political prisoners by both factions. In November, Hamas and Fatah met in Damascus.

May 2011 Cairo agreement

On 27 April 2011, representatives of the two factions announced an agreement, mediated by Egypt, to form a joint caretaker government, with presidential and legislative elections to be held in 2012.

On 4 May 2011 at a ceremony in Cairo the agreement was formally signed by the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal. The accord provided ground for forming a "transitional" government of technocrats to prepare for legislative and presidential elections to the Palestinian Authority in one year. It also permitted the entry of Hamas into the Palestine Liberation Organization and holding of elections to its Palestine National Council decision-making body. The Palestinian Authority was to continue to handle security in the West Bank, as does Hamas in Gaza Strip. They were aimed to form a joint security committee to decide on future security arrangements.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu called the accord "a mortal blow to peace and a big prize for terror." Israel responded to the reconciliation with a punitive withholding of taxes. The United States said that it would judge the new Palestinian government by its policies and that it would have to recognize Israel, accept previous agreements with it and renounce violence. Khaled Meshal said that Hamas was prepared to work with Fatah to guide both Palestinian diplomacy and "resistance in all its forms" and that Hamas shared the goal of establishing "a Palestinian state, independent and completely sovereign, on the lands of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with its capital, Jerusalem, without a single settler, without conceding a single inch and without conceding the right of return" of Palestinian refugees to their former homes in Israel.

In June 2011, the negotiations regarding the formation of a unity government were suspended because of disagreements over who the Prime Minister will be. Fatah insisted on keeping Salam Fayyad. Fayyad was unacceptable for Hamas, who wanted a PM from Gaza. The two factions were also divided over how to deal with Israel. While Fatah favored peace with Israel, Hamas rejected international demands to renounce violence and recognize Israel's right to exist.

After the talks were indefinitely postponed, President Abbas focused on a bid for UN recognition for Palestinian statehood in September 2011 instead of forming a unity government. The decision was triggered by the break down of the Israeli–Palestinian peace talks after Netanyahu's refusal to renew a partial freeze on settlement construction in September 2010, and also by Israel's opposition to the Fatah–Hamas deal itself.

On 30 June 2011, President Abbas expressed his concern over a unity government because of the international opposition, particularly from the US, against a government with any Hamas involvement. He suggested that such a government might be put off at all ahead of a UN vote on statehood.

February 2012 Doha agreement

The Doha deal, signed by Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Mashal in February 2012, was described as a step forward in the stalled implementation of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement, signed in Cairo in April 2011.

In March 2012, Mahmoud Abbas stated that there were no political differences between Hamas and Fatah as they had reached agreement on a joint political platform and on a truce with Israel. Commenting on relations with Hamas, Abbas revealed in an interview with Al-Jazeera that "We agreed that the period of calm would be not only in the Gaza Strip, but also in the West Bank," adding that "We also agreed on a peaceful popular resistance [against Israel], the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and that the peace talks would continue if Israel halted settlement construction and accepted our conditions."

On April 1, The reconciliation implementation however was described as "stalling", with no progress on the joint elections scheme. In addition, the Fatah blamed Hamas that its security forces have set up roadblocks and arrested dozens of Fatah members and individuals in Gaza, whom they accused of "spreading rumors." In a letter to Binyamin Netanyahu in April 2012, Abbas expressed his regret that Israeli continued to oppose a reconciliation.

May 2012 Cairo accord

On May 2012, Hamas and Fatah signed a further agreement in Cairo for new unity government and implementation of Palestinian elections, three and a half months after the Doha agreement. The new Cairo agreement essentially took steps to carry out the previous Doha agreement, particularly the registering of new voters in the Gaza Strip and the formation of an interim government.

January 2013 Talks following upgrade of Palestine in UN

In December 2012, in the aftermath of the UN status upgrade of the State of Palestine and the conflict in Gaza, calls for a unified Palestinian front have increased and the political leaders of Hamas and Fatah took several steps to reconcile their differences. In a televised address, PA President Mahmoud Abbas stressed that talks with Hamas would immediately follow the Palestinians' bid to upgrade their status at the UN General Assembly—an effort that succeeded. On 13 December, Fatah allowed Hamas to hold its first rally in the West bank since 2007, and on 4 January 2013, Hamas reciprocated by allowing Fatah supporters to hold a rally in Gaza for the first time since the civil war. On 9 January, it was announced that Khaled Meshaal and Mahmoud Abbas were holding renewed reconciliation talks in Cairo led by Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi.

2014 Gaza and Cairo Agreements

On 23 April 2014, Fatah and Hamas signed a new reconciliation agreement, which would see a unity government formed within five weeks, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections within 6 months. On 2 June 2014, President Abbas swore in the new technocratic unity government, headed by the incumbent PM, Rami Hamdallah. The Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu, said that world leaders should not rush to recognize the new government, calling Hamas a terrorist organisation that is committed to the destruction of Israel. The Palestinian PM's office issued a statement denouncing Netanyahu's words as intended to continue Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Israel suspended peace talks and announced new sanctions.

As the Government's work did not make progress, also troubled by massive Israeli raids in the West Bank following the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenager settlers, and the subsequent major attacks on Gaza during the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, the parties signed an additional agreement in Cairo on 25 September 2014. This agreement specified the tasks and responsibilities of the new Government.

2016 talks

In December 2015 and January 2016 Hamas and Fatah secretly held Qatar-brokered talks in Doha to try and complement the 2014 agreement. Talks were renewed on 7-8 February. In this round of negotiations Egypt was not involved. Hamas issued a brief statement on 8 February, saying both parties reached a practical vision of a solution to be discussed and implemented. Fatah leader Abdullah Abdullah said a solution must force Hamas to cede the Gaza Strip and on 23 February, Fatah political figure Jibril Rajoub made a statement about not allowing Hamas to continue to "seize" the Gaza Strip. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri criticized Rajoub's statement, saying it raises tensions and do not serve the reconciliation. Rajoub’s statements provoked condemnation from Palestinian factions, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as well as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, all of which labeled it as detrimental to reconciliation. Hamas demands Fatah's recognition of the events in 2007 and the salary crisis for government employees in Gaza.

Yousef Rizqa, the former minister of information in the previous Hamas government, told Al-Monitor, "The future of the Doha reconciliation talks does not seem positive and we cannot build [a position] upon them in light of the internal Fatah disputes over whether or not to aim for a reconciliation. It seemed to me that the meetings did not offer convincing solutions for fundamental issues, such as the future of the [government] employees in Gaza who have not been paid since 2006 or the Rafah crossing, which is constantly being closed. In addition, Egypt has not given Fatah the green light to complete reconciliation with Hamas, because it seems Cairo will not accept Qatar’s success in a matter in which Egypt has failed." Fatah and Hamas agreed on holding a second round of talks by the end of February but no meetings were held and no explanations were given.

A Qatari official told Al-Monitor that "Fatah and Hamas agreed not to speak to the media about the details of the reconciliation and avoid statements that could cause tension, in light of past experiences that had previously impeded reconciliation because of statements issued here and there."

Following the talks Fatah officials have threatened to retake Gaza by force. Hamas affiliated website, the Palestinian Information Center reported on 25 February that Fatah plan to retake Gaza with force by inciting an Israeli military operation and convincing Egypt to destroy the tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt to further isolate the Gaza Strip and limit its military abilities which rely in foreign aid.

In two visits of Paul Garnier, Switzerland ambassador to the Palestinian Authority, visited Ismail Haniyeh and on 10 May confirmed Switzerland's intention to broker a conference on reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. Switzerland was trying to find ways to solve the Gaza government employees crisis.