Nationality United States Contributions Mechanism design Field Game theory Name Eric Maskin | Alma mater Harvard University Role Economist Influences Kenneth Arrow Influenced by Kenneth Arrow | |
 | ||
Born December 12, 1950 (age 73) ( 1950-12-12 ) New York City, New York USA Institution Harvard University
Institute for Advanced Study
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Princeton University
University of Cambridge Influenced Jean Tirole, Mathias Dewatripont Books Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form Education Harvard University (1976), Harvard University (1974), Harvard University (1972), Tenafly High School Awards Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, Guggenheim Fellowship for Social Sciences, US & Canada Similar People Roger Myerson, Leonid Hurwicz, Drew Fudenberg, Kenneth Arrow, Jean Tirole | ||
Eric maskin professor of economics harvard university nobel prize winner in economics
Eric Stark Maskin (born December 12, 1950) is an American economist and 2007 Nobel laureate recognized with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory". He is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University. Until 2011, he was the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, and a visiting lecturer with the rank of professor at Princeton University.
Contents
- Eric maskin professor of economics harvard university nobel prize winner in economics
- Eric maskin an introduction to mechanism design warwick economics summit 2014
- Biography
- Software patents
- References
Eric maskin an introduction to mechanism design warwick economics summit 2014
Biography
Maskin was born in New York City on December 12, 1950, into a Jewish family, and spent his youth in Alpine, New Jersey. He graduated from Tenafly High School in Tenafly, New Jersey, in 1968, and attended Harvard University, where he earned A.B.. He continued to earn a Ph.D. in applied mathematics at the same institution. In 1975-76, he was a visiting student at Darwin College, Cambridge University. In 1976, after earning his doctorate, Maskin became a research fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge University. In the following year, he joined the faculty at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1985 he returned to Harvard as the Louis Berkman Professor of Economics, where he remained until 2000. That year, he moved to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. In addition to his position at the Princeton Institute, Maskin is the director of the Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory at The Institute for Advanced Studies at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 2011, Maskin has returned to Harvard again.
Maskin has worked in diverse areas of economic theory, such as game theory, the economics of incentives, and contract theory. He is particularly well known for his papers on mechanism design/implementation theory and dynamic games. His current research projects include comparing different electoral rules, examining the causes of inequality, and studying coalition formation. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, and the European Economic Association, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was president of the Econometric Society in 2003.
Software patents
Maskin suggested that software patents inhibit innovation rather than stimulate progress. Software, semiconductor, and computer industries have been innovative despite historically weak patent protection, he argued. Innovation in those industries has been sequential and complementary, so competition can increase firms' future profits. In such a dynamic industry, "patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare". A natural experiment occurred in the 1980s when patent protection was extended to software", wrote Maskin with co-author James Bessen. "Standard arguments would predict that R&D intensity and productivity should have increased among patenting firms. Consistent with our model, however, these increases did not occur". Other evidence supporting this model includes a distinctive pattern of cross-licensing and a positive relationship between rates of innovation and firm entry.