British Far East Command

1940–1942

The British had two commands with responsibilities for possessions in the Far East. GHQ India under General Sir Archibald Wavell the Commander-in-Chief, India and the Far East Command under Air Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham and from 23 December 1941 by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Royds Pownall.

The C-in-C Far East Command was responsible directly to the Chiefs of Staff for the operational control and general direction of training of all British land and air forces in Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of those territories. But the CinC exercised no command or control over any naval forces.

It was intended that C-in-C should deal primarily with matters of major military policy and strategy, but it was not the intention that the C-in-C should assume any administrative or financial responsibilities or take over any of the day-to-day functions at that time exercised by the General (or Air) Officers Commanding (GOC) of the different areas. The degree of "operational control" of British land and air forces, which the Commander-in-Chief Far East should assume, was defined as meaning "the higher direction and control" as distinct from "detailed operational control". To complicate matters, the GOCs correspond with the War Office, Air Ministry, Colonial Office and Local Governor's Offices on all matters on which they had previously dealt with those departments. But the GOCs had to keep the C-in-C informed if he wished.

To enable the Commander-in-Chief Far East to carry out his functions, he was allowed a small staff, initially consisting of seven officers drawn from all three Services with the necessary clerical and cipher staff. For intelligence purposes, he had at his disposal the Far East Combined Bureau, though it remained under Admiralty control. Although the establishment of his staff was later increased to fifteen it was never large enough. The Naval Base was a considerable distance across Singapore from the Malaya Army Headquarters which discouraged frequent meetings.

On 5 December 1941 London gave permission for C-in-C Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. The chief strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move, before any Japanese landings took place. The Malaya Command was responsible for the planning of Operation Matador.

When the Allied governments appointed General Sir Archibald Wavell as supreme commander of American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM), British Far East Command became redundant because its functions would in future be carried out by ABDACOM. So when Wavell arrived in Singapore, where the British Far East Command was based, on 7 January 1942. ABDACOM absorbed the British command in its entirety and C-in-C Far East Command Henry Royds Pownall became Wavell's Chief of Staff. On 15 January, Wavell moved his headquarters to Lembang near Bandung on Java and assumed control of Allied operations.

Commanders-in-Chief

Commanders-in-Chief have included:

After the Far East came under the jurisdiction, from August 1943, of South East Asia Command ('SEAC'). The initial land forces operational area for SEAC had been India, Burma, Ceylon, British Malaya, Sumatra, and, for offensive operations, Siam (Thailand) and French Indochina. On 15 August 1945 this was expanded to include the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. SEAC was disbanded in 1946 and in 1947 the Army Command was reformed under the name Far East Land Forces.

General Officers Commanding included:

1963–1971

1963 Far East Command was established, covering the region covered China, Hong Kong, Kobe and Singapore. Major bases included Hong Kong (HMS Tamar) and Singapore. It was organised as an interservice command:

11 January 1971 disbanded at Singapore (succeeded by ANZUK Force).

Commanders-in-Chief

Commanders-in-Chief have included:
British Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command

Commander, British Far East Land Forces