Zimbabwe National Army

Origins

The origins of the Zimbabwe National Army lie in the formation of the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers in 1898, a mounted corps supported by bicycles, a signal troop, and engineers. Raised by colonial authorities to suppress further uprisings after the Second Matabele War, it included a "Western division" and an "Eastern division" staffed by European volunteers. Field outings were conducted in concert with the British South Africa Police (BSAP).

In the 1890s, the nature of this force changed following the outbreak of the Second Boer War. In 1899, the Royal Rhodesia Regiment was founded, and by the time Salisbury joined the Central African Federation there were three battalions. As Southern Rhodesia was the dominant territory in the federation, its officers represented the senior commanders in charge of all federal units. During this period Southern Rhodesians served overseas on active duty for the British Empire, most notably in Malaya, Kuwait, and Aden.

When the federation was dissolved in 1963, Southern Rhodesia retained the personnel raised in its territory, including the largest proportion of white soldiers - some 3,400 of the 7,000 men who served in the defunct Federal Army. Over objections raised by newly independent African governments in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), it also claimed the majority of armoured vehicles and the potent strike aircraft of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force.

Recruitment and training for an insurgent campaign against the colony's administration by rival African nationalists from the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) began in 1963, and intensified after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Rhodesian Bush War, which lasted roughly fifteen years until late 1979, resulted in the creation of two Major insurgent armies, expansion of the Rhodesian Army, and militarisation of local society. By 1980 there were an estimated 150,000 Zimbabweans with military training or experience, access to arms, and allegiance to an established political organisation. Conscription had been introduced in 1955, and the National Service Act in 1976 provided for 12 months of full-time military service regardless of rank. Three-year reservist obligations for white, Coloured, and Asian males also continued. Personnel strength of the regular army peaked at 20,000 active members (half of them whites) and 2,300 with the air force. The paramilitary BSAP had 11,000 police and a reserve of 35,000. These uniform commands and others - including 20,000 Security Force Auxiliaries loyal to interim politicians and a 3,500-man Guard Force for securing protected villages - fell under the authority of Combined Operations (ComOps), headed by Lieutenant-General Peter Walls.

Integration

The Zimbabwe National Army was formed in 1980 from elements of the Rhodesian Army, integrated to a greater or lesser extent with combatants from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrilla movements (the armed wings of, respectively, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

Following majority rule in April 1980 and the cantonment of the ZANLA and ZIPRA under Operation Agila, British Army trainers (the British Military Advisory and Training Team, BMATT) oversaw the integration of guerrilla fighters into one unified army. A battalion structure was overlaid on the existing Rhodesian Army. For the first year a system was followed where the top-performing candidate became battalion commander. If he or she was from ZANLA, then his or her second-in-command was the top-performing ZIPRA candidate, and vice versa. This ensured a balance between the two movements in the command structure. From early 1981 this system was abandoned in favour of political appointments, and ZANLA/ZANU fighters consequently quickly formed the majority of battalion commanders in the ZNA.

The ZNA was originally formed into four brigades, 1 Brigade, Matabeleland, 2 Brigade, Mashonaland, 3 Brigade, Manicaland, and 4 Brigade, Masavingo. These comprised a total of 29 battalions. The brigade support units were composed almost entirely of specialists of the former Rhodesian Army, while unintegrated battalions of the Rhodesian African Rifles were assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades. A North Korean-trained 5th was formed in 1981 and was used in genocidal operations against dissidents and their sustainers who were mostly of the Ndebele-ethnic group in Matabeleland.

The ZNA is under the command of Lieutenant general Philip Valerio Sibanda, who took over from General Constantine Chiwenga following his elevation to the post of Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces in December 2003.

Raids on Gorongosa

Some Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) elements had crossed from Mozambique into Zimbabwe several times, had robbed some shops along the border and had burned down a timber factory. After several meetings with Mozambican officials it was agreed that the ZDF could pursue into Mozambique any RENAMO elements that might have raided Zimbabwe. This was the basis on which the ZDF started planning follow-up operations which took them deep into Mozambique culminating in occupation of former RENAMO bases at Gorongosa.

Operation Lemon

The first of these Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) follow-up operations was launched from Katiyo and Aberdeen in northern Manicaland, code-named Operation Lemon. The operation lasted from the 5–9 December 1984. It comprised elements of 3 Brigade, the Parachute Group, Special Air Service (SAS), and was supported by the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Bad weather conditions and the difficult mountainous terrain reduced the use of aircraft, and all the trooping had to be done by helicopters. The movement of troops on the ground was also difficult. Four contacts were made and two RENAMO bases were destroyed. However, most RENAMO elements in the bases managed to escape and only eight were captured.

The ZDF considered this operation as a major failure and the code word Lemon was corrupted to mean any failure in all subsequent operations. It was further established that there were no other permanent bases in the area, only some advance posts and temporary bases used by RENAMO as launching pads for food raids into Zimbabwe. It was also revealed for the first time that the main RENAMO bases were at Messinse, Chito, Nyazonia, Buetoni, Gorongosa Central Base and Casa Banana.

Operation Grape Fruit

The report for Operation Lemon was taken seriously by the commanders of the ZDF, and in July 1985 preparations for major offensive operations were started. Rehearsals for a Fireforce operation were carried out at Inkomo Barracks near Harare. Three infantry brigades were mobilised together with the Parachute Group, One Commando Battalion and the AFZ. Men and equipment were moved to Chimoio in Mozambique, with a Forward Replenishment Point (FRP) being established at Grand Reef near Mutare.

Intelligence sources had indicated that RENAMO's main regional base in Manica province was at Muxamba and that Casa Banana was the national stronghold of RENAMO. Both bases had to be attacked and Muxamba was targeted first, being only 70 kilometres south of Chimoio. The most important consideration however, was the hope that activities around Muxamba might divert RENAMO's attention from monitoring too closely the movement of the three heavily armed Zimbabwean infantry battalions marching from Chimoio towards the Gorongosa Mountains.

Muxamba was believed to hold at least 400 RENAMO elements commanded by Major General Mabachi. The attack on Muxamba was launched on the 20th of August 1985 by elements of 3 Brigade, supported by the Parachute Group and the AFZ. The operation went on for four days with minor problems for the ZDF. One helicopter was riddled with small arms fire but managed to return to Chimoio.

Raid on Cassa Banana

Intelligence sources had indicated that Cassa Banana, RENAMO's national headquarters had a strength of 400 elements. However, the organisation maintained a string of other smaller bases along the Gorongosa Mountains, which were considered as part of the main base. This raised the total estimated strength in the area to 1 000 elements. During the night of 27 August 1985, three Zimbabwe infantry battalions were established in their Form Up Points (FUP) with the help of the SAS and Commando elements. At Chimoio a Fireforce was being given final briefing, and five AFZ planes were given orders for a first light take-off for Gorongosa on the morning of 28 August.

Although the RENAMO elements captured at Katiyo had given a grid reference for Cassa Banana, further intelligence had cast some doubt as to which of the several RENAMO bases scattered on all sides of the Gorongosa Mountains was the actual headquarters of RENAMO. It was because of this uncertainty that the Fireforce was divided into three sections each with one helicopter gunship, two transport helicopters and two transport aircraft with paratroopers.

Each Fireforce section was detailed to attack specific suspected RENAMO positions around the Gorongossa Mountains. It was during this three pronged attack that one helicopter flew overhead Cassa Banana airstrip and the pilot noticed a green pickup truck disappearing into some bushes. It was then that the pilot recognised the place as that given at the briefing as Cassa Banana. The jets from Thornhill, which were already in place overhead a predetermined Initial Point (IP), were then talked on to the target, and the raid on Cassa Banana began.

The aircraft attacked the target, knocking out several Anti-Aircraft gun positions. Two helicopter gunships continued to hit suspected strategic positions and managed to flash out several pockets of resistance. A third helicopter was directing the dropping of the first wave of paratroopers. When the paratroopers had entered the base, the infantry battalions, which were close by, were ordered to move in and occupy strategic positions. The Fireforce then moved on to deal with the several pockets of resistance from the smaller RENAMO bases all along the Gorongosa Mountains. It took the whole day to silence all of these pockets of resistance.

There is no official Zimbabwean record of the number of casualties on the first raid on Cassa Banana. However, considering the amount of effort, the numbers of troops involved on both sides, and the time it took to capture the base, there must have been a lot of deaths and injuries on both sides.

Operation Lifeline-Tete Corridor

This corridor is a tarred 263-kilometre road running from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean border through the Mozambican city of Tete to Zobue on the Malawi border. After UDI in 1965, this route carried Rhodesian goods to and from Malawi, which had not applied United Nations sanctions against the Smith regime. After the independence of Mozambique in 1975, the bulk of Malawi's trade with South Africa went through Rhodesia by road via Tete. It was only in 1984 that trade via this route declined because of RENAMO attacks.

It was in the wake of these developments that in June 1984 the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe formed a joint security committee 13. The aim of the committee was to monitor operations on a day-to-day basis and to attempt to remove all security threats along the Tete Corridor. Zimbabwe's First Mechanised Battalion was ordered to move into Mozambique and they established their headquarters in Tete thereby securing the strategic bridge crossing the Zambezi River. In 1985, President Samora Machel of Mozambique formally requested the governments of Tanzania and Zimbabwe to contribute troops for "the restoration of law and order" in Mozambique. This led to the deployment of Tanzanian troops north of the Zambezi river and Zimbabwean troops to the south.

The decision to send Zimbabwean troops to help restore law and order in Mozambique was partly influenced by Zimbabwe's close relationship with the Mozambican government which dates back to FRELIMO's assistance during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. There was also the underlying fact that FRELIMO and ZANU shared a common Marxist ideology of scientific socialism. The South Africa-backed RENAMO professed to be an anti-communist movement, as did Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement, which was fighting against the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. There was thus an ideological alliance of the Maputo - Harare - Luanda axis, with support for these governments from the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States of America was providing covert and overt support to opposition movements such as UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique reflected the extension of the Cold War to Southern Africa.

Angola

After several hints, some of which the Zimbabwean Government denied, for the first time the ZDF Commander, General Constantine Chiwenga, acknowledged ZNA involvement in the Angolan Civil War.

According to information obtained by the Zimbabwe Independent, Zimbabwe had deployed over 2,000 combat troops, among them 20 military intelligence officers, in Angola. Their presence significantly assisted the Angolan Armed Forces in overtaking the strongholds of Jonas Savimbi.

Somalia (UNOSOM II)

Zimbabwe deployed, initially, an infantry company group of 163 personnel under Maj. Vitalis Chigume to Somalia as a national contribution to the UN mission UNOSOM II on 15 January 1993. By June 1993 the deployment had built up to a full battalion of 939 soldiers. This battalion was rotated every six months until October 1994, when new deployments ceased, and the last Zimbabweans were finally withdrawn in early 1995.

Four Zimbabweans lost their lives during the UNOSOM mission in Somalia. These included Pte. Themba Moyo, who was killed by local militia in an altercation during August 1994.

Command

Commander Zimbabwe National Army: Lt. Gen. Philip Valerio Sibanda (1 January 2004 to present)

Chief of Staff, General Staff: Maj. Gen. Trust Mugova

Chief of Staff, Administration: Maj. Gen. Douglas Nyikayaramba

Chief of Staff, Quartermaster Staff: Maj. Gen. Sibusiso B. Moyo

Brigadier-General (Administration Staff): Brig. Gen. Shylet Moyo.

Brigadier-General (Quartermaster Staff):

Brigadier-General Inspectorate: Brig. Gen. Kasirai Tazira

Director Public Relations: Lt. Col. Alphios Makotore

Director Civil-Military Relations: Col. Charles Matema (until his death in a car accident in February 2016).

Director of Training: During 2011 this was Brig. Justin Itai Mujaji but he is more recently reported to be 5 Inf Bde commander

Director of Engineering: Col. Mkhululi Bhika Ncube.

Director Corps of Signals: Col. Masenda

Director Electrical & Mechanical Engineering:

Director Medical Corps: Col. Mutetse

Director of Intelligence Corps: Col. Morgan[?] Mzilikazi

Director Zimbabwe Military Police Corps: Col. Fidelis Mhonda

Director of Transport: Col. Elliot Dzirutwe

Director Pay & Records: Col. Ezekiel Zabanyana

Director of Education: Col. Morris Masunungure. (Col. Enias Hungwe until his death on 26 June 2014.)

Director Social Services: Col. Zvanyadza Machinjili.

Chaplain-General: Col. Joseph Nyakudya.

Formations

The Zimbabwe National Army has eight brigade-sized formations, plus two districts. These are 1 to 5 Infantry Brigades, Presidential Guard Brigade, Mechanised Brigade and Artillery Brigade, Harare District and Bulawayo District.

One, now dated, web publication gave the infantry brigade organisation as:

Units

Training establishments

Personnel

These are the Zimbabwe National Army ranks authorised for use today and their equivalent Commonwealth designations. The ranking order is largely based on the British system, with the Air Force of Zimbabwe maintaining separate titles inherited from the Rhodesian Air Force.

Commissioned Officers

The ZNA lost many of its best trained and experienced officers in the early 1990s, failing to recruit or instruct enough personnel to make up for the imbalance caused by death, emigration, or retirement. By the outbreak of the Second Congo War, only a handful of the officer corps had seen action. An interim measure was the rapid promotion of troops from non-combat units, often selected for their political connections rather than leadership competence. Theoretically, promotions continue to be based on the pre-independence system, which dictates officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel pass a proficiency examination to qualify for advancement. In times of downscaling, those with poorer marks must retire or accept an immediate demotion.

Previous Army Commanders

- Lt. Gen. Constantine Guveya Chiwenga (July 1994 to 31 December 2003)

- Lt. Gen. Vitalis M. 'Fox' Gava Zvinavashe (1992 to 1994)

- Gen. T. R. Solomon Mujuru (1981 to 1992)

- Lt. Gen. Alistair ‘Sandy’ C. L. Maclean (18 April 1980 to 1981)

Anti-tank weapons

Light infantry weapons