State Secrecy Law

Overview

The Japanese secrecy law covers defense, diplomacy, public safety and counterterrorism. In addition, it allows the government to lock away government documents for 60 years. Civil servants leaking information can expect ten years incarceration while journalists and other civilians helping them would get five years.

Process

Before SDS was launched, the Abe cabinet established the National Security Council (NSC) on December 4, 2013. The Abe cabinet explained that SDS and the Japanese NSC should work together.

Public comment were heard from July 24, 2014, to August 24, 2014.

The government announced that SDS would come into force on December 10, 2014.

Designation of Special Secret

The head of an administrative organ shall designate as Specially Designated Secrets

1. information of the types listed below
2. which is kept undisclosed
3. which requires special secrecy because unauthorized disclosure thereof would cause severe damage to the national security of Japan

Types of information

Item (i) Defense *Equivalent to the Appended Table 4 of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law

(a) Operation of the Self-Defense Forces or thereto relevant assessments, plans or research

(b) Signal or imagery information, and other important information collected in relation to defense

(c) Collection and organization of information listed in (b) or the capacity to do so

(d) Assessments, plans or research pertaining to development of defense capability

(e) Type or quantity of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and other material for defense use

(f) Structure of communications network and means of communications for defense use

(g) Cryptology for defense use

(h) Specifications, performance or usage of weapons, ammunition, aircraft or other material for defense use including those at the R&D stage

(i) Methods of production, inspection, repair or examination of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and other material for defense use including those at the R&D stage

(j) Design, performance or internal use of facilities for defense use

Item (ii) Foreign Affairs

(a) Among policy or contents of negotiations or cooperation with foreign governments or international organizations, those pertaining to the protection of lives and bodies of people, territorial integrity and other issues deemed important to national security

(b) Measures including embargoes on imports or exports that Japan carries out for national security purposes or thereto relevant policies

(c) Important information collected regarding the protection of the lives and bodies of people, territorial integrity, or the peace and security of the international community, or information that requires protection under international agreements including treaties related to national security

(d) Collection and organization of information listed in (c) or the capacity to do so

(e) Cryptology for diplomatic use, including communications between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japanese diplomatic establishments

Item (iii) Prevention of Designated Harmful Activities (e.g. Counterintelligence)

(a) Measures to prevent Designated Harmful Activities or thereto relevant plans or research

(b) Important information collected on the protection of lives and bodies of people, or information collected from foreign governments or international organizations in relation to prevention of Designated Harmful Activities

(c) Collection and organization of information listed in (b) or the capacity to do so

(d) Cryptology used for prevention of Designated Harmful Activities

Item (iv) Prevention of Terrorism

(a) Measures to prevent terrorism or thereto relevant plans or research

(b) Important information collected on the protection of lives and bodies of people, or information collected from foreign governments or international organizations in relation to prevention of terrorism

(c) Collection and organization of information listed in (b) or the capacity to do so

(d) Cryptology used for prevention of terrorism

Security clearance

Access to SDS shall be limited to government personnel, employees of Government of Japan contractors and prefectural police officers who, following the security clearance process, are identified as not risking unauthorized disclosure of SDS.

Penalty

Unauthorized disclosure of SDS shall be punished when intentionally or negligently committed by:

Those handling SDS as part of their ok

Those receiving and thus knowing SDS from an administrative organ for the sake of the public interest Intentional: Imprisonment for not more than 5 years

By negligence: Imprisonment for not more than 1 year or fine of not more than 300,000 yen

Acquisition of SDS through the following acts to serve the interests of foreign countries, etc. shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 10 years:

(1) Fraud, assault or intimidation; (2) Theft; (3) Intrusion on relevant facilities; (4) Eavesdropping on wired telecommunications; (5) Unauthorized access; (6) Any other act excluding (2) to (5) that undermines control of SDS holders.

Those who attempt, conspire to effect, instigate or incite intentional leakage or acquisition of SDS through the acts listed above shall be punished.

Reactions

About 80% of the Japanese population had opposed the law. Reporters Without Borders called the law "an unprecedented threat to freedom of information". Critics claim that the law is vague on what constitutes a "state secret" and represents a return to pre-WW II militarism when the Peace Preservation Act was used to stifle political opposition. They also contend that the law undermines basic democratic freedom and makes the administration "the judge, jury, and enforcer" in the matter.

The law was hailed by the American ambassador, Caroline Kennedy, and was seen as a victory for the United States government that had pressured Shinzo Abe and his government to control classified information more tightly. In the decades before, the 1952 Special Criminal Act and the 1954 United States Mutual Security Act Secrets Protection Law protected military equipment that the U. S. provided for Japan. With the "War on Terror" and the challenges by China and North Korea and a number of events where military security was breached by Japan, it was argued that the government established the law to strengthen its relationship in the context of its partnership with the United States.

In a 2016 assessment of the impact of the law Aditi Razdan indicated that while the law may have a chilling effect on the media, the extent of this is difficult to measure, as "(w)hen a state secret itself is not defined, it is nearly impossible to determine what media outlets can no longer report on." The Fukushima catastrophe, however, became in 2014 one of those "state secrets". Independent reporting about it has been hampered by the government since 2014. In the annual ranking of global press freedom Reporters Without Borders lowered Japan from the 11th place in 2010 to the 72nd place in 2016 because of the law about "state secrets". The agency noted that journalistic investigations about the Fukushima accident are forbidden by the law.