Pukkuksong 1

Strategic implications

The Pukkuksong-1 is the first sign of a North Korean sea-based nuclear deterrent, which complicates the U.S. and South Korean ability to preemptively destroy the country's nuclear capabilities by threatening a second strike. While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized.

North Korea's unique circumstances limit the ways such a capability could be employed. The Korean People's Navy has no nuclear submarines, and no diesel-electric submarines equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), so the launch submarine's range (and by extension the missile's) is limited and assuredly prevents it from threatening America's western seaboard.

Given their submarines' insufficient power to outrun U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and lack of aerial and surface coverage to protect them out to long distances, they cannot venture far out to sea, although a scenario where a missile-equipped sub travels into the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) on a "suicide mission" to fire the Pukkuksong-1 before it expects to inevitably get destroyed is not implausible given the loyalty of the elite crewmen of the submarine force.

A more likely scenario would be to deploy along the Korean coastline within its local air and surface cover to silently creep into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before reaching its pre-designated position to stay quietly submerged by running on batteries; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts.

A land based, mobile derivative of the Pukkuksong-1 would significantly complicate U.S, Japan and South Korean defenses. Unlike the liquid fueled Rodong or SCUD derivatives, the solid fueled Pukkuksong-1 can be fired at a much shorter notification time. The North Korean have since achieved this land-based, mobile derivative of the Pukkuksong-1 milestone in their 12th test of the missile on 12 February 2017.

First Completely Successful Pukkuksong-1 Test

On 24 Aug 2016 at around 5:30am (Pyongyang Standard Time), North Korea have successfully tested Pukkuksong-1 as the missile flew 500 km into Japan's ADIZ without issue. Unlike the recent successful Musudan flight, KCNA did not officially announce the test until a day later as a great success from Kim Jong Un. The entire development has since published worldwide.

In light of recent development of Pukkuksong-1, South Korean military sources concluded that the first successful Pukkuksong-1 test was in fact launched in lofted trajectory without confirm the actual apogee and therefore the range could have been at least 1,000 km or more had the missile was launched in normal trajectory and could be operationally deployed as early as 2017. Hawkish forces in South Korea have renewed calls for South Korea to construct nuclear submarines to counter North Korea 'provocation'.

However, the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University rejected South Korean claims of Pukkuksong-1 could be operationally deployed before 2017 and suggested its initial operational capability will not be achieved before 2018 June. Specifically, North Korea is still facing significant technological challenges including building a new class of submarine to carry 3 of such missiles at the same time.

On 30 August 2016, David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program suggested that the apogee achieved by this test was 550 km and the range would have been 1,250 km assuming the same payload on standard trajectory.

On the same day, the South Korean media reported that Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) have since recommends South Korea to deploy 2 batteries of THAAD instead of 1 in order to counter the possibility of North Korea fires Pukkuksong-1 outside of its 120 degree field of vision.

However Jeffery Lewis have also stressed that it does little to address the possibility of its lofted attacks, because the missile's reentry in lofted trajectory will be at very high speeds and at a very severe angle, since the ability of THAAD intercepting it will depends on the missile range. He has also pointed out that THAAD was never field tested against an intermediate-range target, moreover on an unusual angle of attack. With this in mind, he ended by suggesting that it is time to use diplomatic measures for dissuading North Korea to enhance such capabilities and defense measures is a very ineffective strategy due to North Korea has the ability to use numerous counter-measures for every measures that US and South Korea have made.

Suspected China involvement on proliferation of SLBM technologies to North Korea

On 3 September 2016, a US expert named Bruce Bechtol who is a North Korea expert at Angelo State University and another South Korean national security researcher named Shin Jong-woo claimed that China must have provided North Korea the relevant SLBM technologies so that it took just a mere 4 months to complete the first successful Cold launch Test (23 April 2016) to first complete test (24 August 2016) and further claimed that the Pukkuksong-1 is a carbon-copy of the first China's SLBM, JL-1. In a comparison, China took 15 years to develop JL-1. Bruce Bechtol also stated that his analysis is supported by space program expert Tal Inbar of Israel's Fisher Institute as well. However, Dave Schmerler, an expert with the James Martin Center of Non Proliferation Studies noted that the North Korean missile used a single engine design (the JL-1 used 4 engines) and grid fins for flight stability, features which are not found on the Chinese JL-1 and urge caution in jumping to conclusions. He added that the single engine design was more in common with the Iranian Sejjil MRBM than the JL-1.

Response from China to alleged proliferation activities

On 5 September 2016, the Chinese media refuted the report by citing that the People's Republic of China as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory state, and one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council will never proliferate by providing or selling nuclear and missile related technologies to North Korea (The actual excerpts are as follows: 作为联合国安理会常任理事国、《核不扩散条约》缔约国，中国绝对不会向朝鲜提供或者出售与核武器和弹道导弹相关的装备和技术。.

This report also cites that some US experts and think-tanks have all along being irresponsible by making defamatory statements to China, as they unreasonably link North Korea nuclear issuing to China and sought to use media influence to pressurise China. This report does not contain actual evidence of supposed China proliferation acts. (The actual excerpts read as follows: 一些美国媒体和智库一向很擅长将朝鲜的涉核问题与中国进行无端挂钩，就是希望通过这种方式向中国施压，而这些说法通常没有任何证据，是很不负责任的。)