Full case name Winscombe v Piggott Judge sitting Edward Coke | Decided 1614 | |
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Citation(s) (1614) 1 CoRep 26b[1558-1774] All ER Rep 5077 ER 1177 |
Pigot's Case (1614) 1 CoRep 26b, [1558-1774] All ER Rep 50, 77 ER 1177 is a 17th-century decision of the English courts. It is often simply referred to by reference to the rule in Pigot's Case. The rule has been described as a "ghost of the past".
Contents
Facts
Henry Pigot was indebted to Benedict Winchcombe, and on 2 March 1611 they executed a bond by way of deed relating to the indebtedness. Subsequently, in 1614, Winchcombe was appointed as High Sheriff of Oxfordshire. At this point, some well-meaning but unknown person altered the deed to record this fact by inserting the words "Vicecomiti Comitatus Oxon" (Sheriff of the County of Oxford) immediately after the words Benedict Winchcombe, Esq and before the specification of the amount due. No other changes were made to the deed.
In 1614 Winchcombe brought an action against Pigot on the deed. Pigot, relying on existing case law, entered a plea of "non est factum" (it is not my deed), essentially arguing that because the deed had been altered, it was not the deed that he had originally entered into three years previously.
Decision
The case came before the eminent 17th-century English jurist, Lord Coke.
The jury had found as a fact that the amendments (a) were made by a stranger, and (b) that they did so without the permission of Winchcombe. The Court further held that the amendment was not a material one.
Coke held:
Much of Coke's judgment was pure obiter dictum. Having found that the amendments were not material and were made by a stranger, in the way in which Coke commonly did, he still dedicated the larger part of his judgment to consider the legal implications of material alterations by strangers and alterations by parties to the agreement. However, those obiter comments served to formulate the common law jurisprudence on the subject until today.
The decision has been summarised to the effect that:
- a deed is void if it is altered in any way by the promisee (the one to whom the deed is made);
- a deed is also void if altered in a material way by a stranger (that is, a third party) to the transaction; however
- a deed is not void if it is altered in a way that is not material by a stranger to the transaction.
The rule itself has now been modified by subsequent cases (some of which are summarised below). The most recent edition of Chitty on Contracts describes the rule as:
Earlier cases
Although the strict consequences of a party to the deed making a non-material alteration to the document appear harsh today, the case actually softened the effect of a much harsher line of earlier authorities. In raising his plea, Pigot was relying upon decisions such as Elliott v Holder (1567) 3 Dyer 261b, 73 ER 580 where it had been held that any alteration of a deed made it "utterly void":
Subsequent cases
In 1791 the scope of the rule in Pigot's Case was extended from deeds to all contracts and other legal instruments by the decision in Master v Millar (1791) 14 TR 320.
The rule remains good law in most common law jurisdictions, and has been cited with approval many times, including by the Privy Council in Goss v Chilcott [1996] UKPC 17.
Other recent citations of the rule include:
Repeal
The rule has been repealed by statute in New South Wales.