In epistemology, phenomenal conservatism (PC) holds that it is reasonable to assume that things are as they appear, except when there are positive grounds for doubting this. (The term derives from the Greek word "phainomenon", meaning "appearance".)
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The principle was initially defended in Huemer 2001, where it was formulated as follows:
A later formulation, designed to allow the principle to encompass inferential as well as foundational justification, reads as follows.
Arguments for PC
Phenomenal conservatism has been defended on three grounds.
- First, the principle enables one to account for the justification of most, perhaps all, of the beliefs that we commonly take as justified, including sensory observations, memory beliefs, and beliefs based on reasoning.
- Second, it is argued that alternative epistemological positions are self-defeating in the sense that, unless PC is true, few or no beliefs would be justified, including beliefs in any alternative epistemological theories. This is supported by the claims
- that all or nearly all beliefs are causally explained by appearances, that is, one believes a proposition because it seems true to one; and
- that a belief is justified only if it is causally explained by a factor that constitutes justification for the proposition believed.
- Third, it is argued that PC is most faithful to the motivations underlying epistemological internalism.
Criticisms of PC
Critics of phenomenal conservatism have argued:
In addition, as a form of foundationalism, PC is open to some of the common objections to that doctrine.
References
Phenomenal conservatism Wikipedia(Text) CC BY-SA