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People v. Berry was an important American murder-in-the-heat-of-passion case that gained widespread attention because of the court's novel approach to finding "adequate provocation" in order to lower a regular murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. Because the lower court had insisted on a more traditional definition of "adequate provocation" in its jury instructions, the California Supreme Court reversed Berry's murder conviction. It did, however, affirm Berry's conviction for assault using deadly force.
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The case has also been discussed or mentioned in more than forty separate academic journal articles relating to murder, female victims of domestic violence, and rape. More than 160 court decisions in California have cited, mentioned, or discussed this opinion.
Background
Albert Joseph Berry was charged with murdering his wife, Rachel Pessah. The couple married in May 1974; Ms. Pessah was 26 years younger than Berry, and a recent immigrant from Israel. Three days after their wedding Rachel returned to her home country by herself for six weeks. Upon her return, she informed Berry that she had fallen in love with another man and was having an affair. This began a two-week period of bizarre sexual taunting by the victim, reciprocated with repeated violent domestic abuse (including Berry choking his wife into unconsciousness on at least one occasion), and which culminated in Berry strangling his wife with a telephone cord on July 26, 1974. Police arrested Albert Joseph Berry for her murder on August 1, 1974.
Legal significance
Traditionally (at common law), a murder charge could be downgraded to "voluntary manslaughter" if there were three attendant factors present at the time of the killing: adequate provocation (such as discovering one's spouse in the act of adultery), the heat of passion or extreme emotional disturbance, and inadequate cooling time before the homicidal act occurred. Lowering the charge to voluntary manslaughter could mean a significant reduction in the sentence, and could spare a defendant who would otherwise face the death penalty for murder.
In this case, the traditional formulation for voluntary manslaughter did not seem applicable initially, and the trial court refused to include it in the jury instructions. Whereas the classic cases of "adequate provocation" involved a sudden, shocking incident, this case involved a thirteen-day period of teasing and insults. Also, many earlier cases regarding the discovery of spousal infidelity had used the rule "words are not enough" - the murderer had to have caught the victim "in the act" in order to claim heat of passion, and that did not occur in Berry's case. The prolonged period of acrimony, which undoubtedly had a cumulative effect, did not fit squarely with the traditional common-law prerequisite of "no cooling time" for voluntary manslaughter
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the traditional elements of a "voluntary manslaughter" argument should be stretched to include rage induced by prolonged periods of teasing or taunting. Because the jury had not received an instruction that allowed for voluntary manslaughter to apply to these facts, the Supreme Court reversed the murder conviction.
A prominent psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Blinder, had testified at trial that the victim was suicidal and that her taunting of Berry was an attempt to provoke him into killing her. He also testified that the long course of psychological torment she inflicted on Berry would have produced the same type of blind, uncontrollable rage traditionally associated with "heat of passion" defenses.
Other information
The lead prosecutor in this case was Evelle J. Younger. The defense attorney on appeal was Edward W. Suman.
The California Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in People v. Valentine, which held that: "There is no specific type of provocation required by section 192 and that verbal provocation may be sufficient." It also cited People v. Borchers, which held that: "Heat of passion used in the statute defining manslaughter pointed out that passion need not to mean 'rage' or 'anger' but may be any 'violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion."