Norullah Noori

Governor under the Taliban

Fareeda Kuchi Balkhi, a Kuchi nomad tribeswoman, who ran as a candidate for the Wolesi Jirga in 2005, described her delivery of a list of 1000 Kuchi stranded in an impromptu refugee camp to then Governor of Balkh Noori as the beginning of her political activism in 1998. Fareeda told Carlotta Gall, of the New York Times that Noori accepted her list, and forwarded to humanitarian agencies, and aid did arrive.

In the fall of 2001, when the United States, allied with the Northern Alliance, and other anti-Taliban forces, started to use military force to seek out al Qaeda, Noori was one Taliban leader who is reported to have directed the Taliban fighters in his province to lay down their weapons and surrender.

In December 2001, shortly after the overthrow of the Taliban, Human Rights Watch called for a human rights tribunal to be convenened against Noorullah, and two other former Taliban Governors of Northern Provinces, to investigate claims they had been responsible for alleged massacres of Hazara and Uzbek civilians. The reports of civilian massacres were alleged to have occurred during the previous three years (1998-2001). The two other Taliban leaders were Mullah Dadullah and Mullah Mohammed Fazil. Fazil, like Norullah, had already surrendered, and would be sent to Guantanamo.

Held aboard the USS Bataan

Former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef described being flown to the United States Navy's amphibious warfare vessel, the USS Bataan, for special interrogation. Zaeef wrote that the cells were located six decks down, were only 1 meter by 2 meters. He wrote that the captives weren't allowed to speak with one another, but that he "eventually saw that Mullahs Fazal, Noori, Burhan, Wasseeq Sahib and Rohani were all among the other prisoners." Historian Andy Worthington, author of The Guantanamo Files, identified Noori as one of the men Zaeef recognized. He identified Mullah Wasseeq as Abdul-Haq Wasiq, Mullah Rohani as Gholam Ruhani and Mullah Fazal as Mohammed Fazil.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants—rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Mullah Norullah Noori's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on August 8, 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.

1. He was fighting on the front lines at Mazar-E-Sharif as a Taliban fighter. As the front lines in Mazar-E-Sharif fell, he moved with a majority of the remaining fighters to Kunduz to reestablish the front lines.
2. He participated in a meeting where Taliban leaders decided to surrender to the Northern Alliance.
3. He was captured by Northern Alliance forces along with a Taliban leader and five Taliban soldiers.

Transcript

Noori chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published a five page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat—or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Norullah Noori's first annual Administrative Review Board.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

b. Connections/Associations c. Other relevant data

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

b. Exculpatory

1. The detainee emphasized this was merely a civilian position and he had no real political responsibilities within the Taliban. Additionally, he had no interaction with the leaders in the Taliban.
2. The detainee admitted his allegiance with the Taliban as he was fearful of standing against the current governing body in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee does not know any of the al Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo. He cannot interact with the Arabs as he does not speak their language.

Transcript

Noori chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Norullah Noori's second annual Administrative Review Board.

Third annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Norullah Noori's third annual Administrative Review Board.

The following primary factors favor continued detention

b. Training c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as the Taliban leader in charge of Mazar Bal, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee's name appears on a list of key Taliban personalities.
3. The detainee is a close associate of a high-ranking Taliban leader.
4. The detainee hosted al Qaida commanders.
5. The detainee held a meeting with the head of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, who discussed jihad in Uzbekistan.
6. While serving as the governor of Balkh province in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan the detainee met a subordinate of Usama bin Laden to pass a message from the Taliban supreme leader.

d. Intent

1. As of late July 2003, Taliban leaders close to the detainee were leading efforts in Zabol province, Afghanistan to destabilize the Afghan transitional administration.
2. As of early November 2003, while he as the Taliban zone chief, the detainee provided assistance to a friend who was using profits from the sale of narcotics to provide material support to the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee had given him money and provided him with a money exchange shop.
3. A group of individuals, including a Taliban member, continue to work to support the detainee.

e. Other Relevant Data

The following primary factors favor release or transfer

Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon R. England, the Designated Civilian Official. The review board convened on January 31, 2007. The Board's recommendation was unanimous. The Board's recommendation was redacted. The Board's recommendation was forwarded to England on March 29, 2007. England authorized his continued detention on April 2, 2007.

Writ of habeas corpus

Norullah Noori had a writ of habeas corpus, Civil Action No. 08-cv-1828, filed on his behalf in late 2008, before US District Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. On December 17, 2008 Patricia A. Sullivan filed a "status report" on his behalf. She reported that Norullah Noori had a DTA appeal filed on his behalf in 2007.

Joint Review Task Force

When he assumed office in January 2009 President Barack Obama made a number of promises about the future of Guantanamo. He promised the use of torture would cease at the camp. He promised to institute a new review system. That new review system was composed of officials from six departments, where the OARDEC reviews were conducted entirely by the Department of Defense. When it reported back, a year later, the Joint Review Task Force classified some individuals as too dangerous to be transferred from Guantanamo, even though there was no evidence to justify laying charges against them. On April 9, 2013, that document was made public after a Freedom of Information Act request. Norullah Noori was one of the 71 individuals deemed too innocent to charge, but too dangerous to release. Although Obama promised that those deemed too innocent to charge, but too dangerous to release would start to receive reviews from a Periodic Review Board less than a quarter of men have received a review.

Release negotiations

Most Afghans had been repatriated to Afghanistan by 2009. Throughout the fall of 2011 and the winter of 2012 the United States conducted peace negotiations with the Taliban, and widely leaked was that a key sticking point was the ongoing detention of Norullah and four other senior Taliban, Khirullah Khairkhwa, Mohammed Fazl, Abdul Haq Wasiq and . Negotiations hinged on a proposal to send the five men directly to Doha, Qatar, where they would be allowed to set up an official office for the Taliban.

In March 2012 it was reported that Ibrahim Spinzada, described as "Karzai's top aide" had spoken with the five men, in Guantanamo, earlier that month, and had secured their agreement to be transferred to Qatar. It was reported that Karzai, who had initially opposed the transfer, now backed the plan. It was reported that US officials stated the Obama administration had not yet agreed to transfer the five men.

Release from Guantanamo Bay

Noori and four other prisoners who were known as the Taliban five were released from Guantanamo Bay and flown by U.S. military C-17 aircraft into Qatar on June 1, 2014 where they were set free. Their release was in exchange for that of U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl who had been captured in Afghanistan five years earlier. The exchange was brokered by the Emir of Qatar. Noori, and the others, were required to stay in Qatar for 12 months as a condition of their release.