Language English Media type Print (Hardback) ISBN 978-0-19-020644-4 Originally published October 2014 Page count 257 Country United States of America | Publication date October, 2014 Pages 257 OCLC 78812792 Publisher Oxford University Press | |
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Subjects National security, Federal government of the United States Similar Michael J Glennon books, Army books | ||
Michael j glennon national security and double government
National Security and Double Government is a 2014 book by Michael J. Glennon, professor of international law at Tufts University.
Contents
Dean s video november 2014 professor michael glennon s national security and double government
Background
Glennon worked closely with insiders in American politics in the 1970s and 1980s. As a law student, he worked as a staff assistant for congressman Donald M. Fraser (D-MN). After law school, he was assistant counsel for the Office of the Legislative Counsel at the United States Senate, and later, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and consultant to the State Department. He is currently professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Development of National Security and Double Government began in the 2000s when Glennon noticed an unchanging continuity in national security policy in United States government, particularly from the previous presidency of George W. Bush to the presidency of Barack Obama. He published an article on the subject in the Harvard National Security Journal titled "National Security and Double Government" in 2014, which later evolved into book form.
Synopsis
Glennon draws from the theories of British writer Walter Bagehot (1826–1877), who discussed the structure of British government in his book The English Constitution (1867). He argues that Bagehot's thesis of a "double government" in nineteenth century Britain also applies to the U.S. today. Glennon posits that there are two institutions in control: the "Madisonian" public institutions of the congress, presidency and the courts, which maintain the necessary public illusion that they are in charge and in control of policy, while a secretive "Trumanite" network of unelected, unaccountable national security bureaucrats actually make and set policy that the Madisonians appear to implement as their own. Glennon warns that control by the Trumanite network weakens constitutional restraints upon government, such as checks and balances and oversight, and results in less democracy, and a greater risk of despotism.