Minimax Condorcet

Description of the method

Minimax selects the candidate for whom the greatest pairwise score for another candidate against him is the least such score among all candidates.

Formally, let s c o r e ( X , Y ) denote the pairwise score for X against Y . Then the candidate, W selected by minimax (aka the winner) is given by:

Variants of the pairwise score

When it is permitted to rank candidates equally, or to not rank all the candidates, three interpretations of the rule are possible. When voters must rank all the candidates, all three variants are equivalent.

Let d ( X , Y ) be the number of voters ranking X over Y. The variants define the score s c o r e ( X , Y ) for candidate X against Y as:

1. The number of voters ranking X above Y, but only when this score exceeds the number of voters ranking Y above X. If not, then the score for X against Y is zero. This variant is sometimes called winning votes.
2. s c o r e ( X , Y ) := { d ( X , Y ) , d ( X , Y ) > d ( Y , X ) 0 , e l s e
3. The number of voters ranking X above Y minus the number of voters ranking Y above X. This variant is called using margins.
4. s c o r e ( X , Y ) := d ( X , Y ) − d ( Y , X )
5. The number of voters ranking X above Y, regardless of whether more voters rank X above Y or vice versa. This variant is sometimes called pairwise opposition.
6. s c o r e ( X , Y ) := d ( X , Y )

When one of the first two variants is used, the method can be restated as: "Disregard the weakest pairwise defeat until one candidate is unbeaten." An "unbeaten" candidate possesses a maximum score against him which is zero or negative.

Satisfied and failed criteria

Minimax using winning votes or margins satisfies the Condorcet and the Majority criterion, but not the Smith criterion, Mutual majority criterion, Independence of clones criterion, or Condorcet loser criterion. When winning votes is used, Minimax also satisfies the Plurality criterion.

When the pairwise opposition variant is used, Minimax also does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion. However, when equal-ranking is permitted, there is never an incentive to put one's first-choice candidate below another one on one's ranking. It also satisfies the Later-no-harm criterion, which means that by listing additional, lower preferences in one's ranking, one cannot cause a preferred candidate to lose.

Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities and that everyone wants to live as near to the capital as possible.

The candidates for the capital are:

The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:

The results of the pairwise scores would be tabulated as follows:

Result: In all three alternatives Nashville, the capital in real life, has the lowest value and is elected winner.

Example with Condorcet winner that is not elected winner (for pairwise opposition)

Assume three candidates A, B and C and voters with the following preferences:

The results would be tabulated as follows:

Result: With the alternatives winning votes and margins, the Condorcet winner A is declared Minimax winner. However, using the pairwise opposition alternative, C is declared winner, since less voters strongly oppose him in his worst pairwise score against A than A is opposed by in his worst pairwise score against B.

Example without Condorcet winner

Assume four candidates A, B, C and D. Voters are allowed to not consider some candidates (denoting an n/a in the table), so that their ballots are not taken into account for pairwise scores of that candidates.

The results would be tabulated as follows:

Result: Each of the three alternatives gives another winner: