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Michael Tye (philosopher)

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Region
  
Western philosophy

Education
  
University of Oxford

Role
  
Philosopher

Name
  
Michael Tye


Michael Tye (philosopher) httpsuploadwikimediaorgwikipediacommonsthu

Era
  
Contemporary philosophy

Main interests
  
Philosophy of mind, Consciousness, Metaphysics

Areas of interest
  
Philosophy of mind, Consciousness, Metaphysics

Influenced by
  
Fred Dretske, Frank Cameron Jackson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell

Books
  
Ten Problems of Consci, Consciousness Revisited: Materialis, Consciousness - Color - and Content, Consciousness and persons, The Imagery Debate

Similar People
  
Fred Dretske, Frank Cameron Jackson, Mark Sainsbury, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell

Schools of thought
  
Analytic philosophy

Michael Tye (born 1950) is a British philosopher who is currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. He has made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind.

Contents

Education and career

Tye was educated at Oxford University in England, studying first physics and then physics and philosophy. Before moving to Texas, Tye taught at Haverford College in suburban Philadelphia and Temple University in Philadelphia proper. He was also a visiting professor at King's College, London for some ten consecutive years while at Temple and briefly took up a chair at the University of St. Andrews. Besides philosophy of mind, Tye has interests in cognitive science, metaphysics, and philosophical logic, especially problems relating to vagueness.

Tye's third book, Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995), was an alternate selection of the Library of Science Book Club.

Philosophical work

Along with Fred Dretske and William Lycan, Tye defends the representationalist view of consciousness, more precisely what has been called the "strong" representationalist view, according to which "representation of a certain kind suffices for a sensory quality, where the kind can be specified in functionalist or other familiar materialist terms, without recourse to properties of any ontologically 'new' sort."

Books

  • The Metaphysics of Mind (1989)
  • The Imagery Debate (1991)
  • Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995)
  • Consciousness, Color, and Content (2000)
  • Consciousness and Persons (2003)
  • Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts (2009)
  • Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? (2016)
  • References

    Michael Tye (philosopher) Wikipedia