Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

Background

The proxy conflict can be traced back to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when Imperial Iran became an Islamic Republic. The revolutionaries called specifically for the ousting of monarchies and secular regimes to be replaced with Islamic republics, much to the alarm of its smaller Sunni-run Arab neighbors Iraq (then under the Ba'athists), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Persian Gulf States – most of whom were monarchies and all of whom had sizable Shia populations. Islamist insurgents rose in Saudi Arabia in 1979, Egypt in 1981, Syria in 1982, and Lebanon in 1983.

Prior to the Iranian Revolution, the two countries constituted the Nixon Doctrine's "twin pillar" policy in the Middle East. The monarchies, particularly Iran, were allied with the US to ensure stability in the Gulf region and act as a bulwark against Soviet influence during the Arab Cold War. The alliance acted as a moderating influence on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Saudi Arabia sponsored an international Islamic conference in Mecca in 1962. It created the Muslim World League, dedicated to spreading Islam and fostering Islamic solidarity. The League was "extremely effective" in promoting Islam, particularly conservative Wahhabi Islam in the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia also spearheaded the creation of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 1969.

In 1980, Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of revolutionary unrest in Iran and quell the revolution in its infancy. Fearing a potential revolutionary wave that could threaten Iraq's stability and embolden its Shia population, Hussein launched an invasion on 20 September, triggering the Iran–Iraq War which lasted for eight years and killed hundreds of thousands. During the war, Iraq received financial or military support from neighboring countries including Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, in part to hedge Iranian power and prevent the spread of its revolution. Apart from the Iran–Iraq War, Iran and Saudi Arabia engaged in tense competition elsewhere, supporting opposing armed groups in the Lebanese Civil War, the Soviet–Afghan War, and other conflicts. After the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to support different groups and organizations along sectarian lines such as in Iraq and Yemen.

The Arab Spring in 2011 sparked a revolutionary wave across the Middle East, leading to revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen as well as the civil wars in Libya and Syria. In response, Saudi Arabia called for the formation of a Gulf Union to deepen ties among the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The proposal reflected the Saudi government's preoccupation with preventing potential uprisings by disenfranchised minorities in the Gulf monarchies as well as its regional rivalry with Iran. The union would have centralized Saudi influence in the region by giving it greater control over military, economic, and political matters affecting member states. With the exception of Bahrain, other members rejected the proposed federation, with Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates wary that it would lead to Saudi dominance. However, due to the decreasing importance of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a wedge issue and mutual tensions with Iran, GCC states have sought strengthened economic and security cooperation with Israel, who is involved in its own proxy conflict with Iran.

Saudi Arabia has also become increasingly concerned about the United States' commitment as an ally and security guarantor. The American foreign policy pivot to Asia, its lessening reliance on Saudi oil, and the potential of rapprochement with Iran have all contributed to a more assertive Saudi foreign policy. The onset of the Arab Winter exacerbated Saudi concerns about Iran as well as its own internal stability. The surrounding revolutions and civil wars prompted Riyadh to take greater action to maintain the status quo, particularly within Bahrain and other bordering states, with its new foreign policy being described as a "21st century version of the Brezhnev Doctrine." The complex nature of economic and security concerns, ideological division, and intertwined alliances has also drawn comparisons to pre-World War I Europe.

Nuclear programs of Iran and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has taken the “strategic decision” to acquire “off-the-shelf” atomic weapons from Pakistan, risking a new arms race in the Middle East, according to senior American officials. In 2003, public policy think tank GlobalSecurity.org reported that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had entered a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation to provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in return for access to cheap oil for Pakistan. Iran has had a nuclear program since the 1950s and after the rise of the fundamentalist regime in 1979, the new government continued to pursue a nuclear program. Both governments claim that their programs are for peaceful purposes but foreign governments and organizations have accused both countries of taking steps in order to obtain nuclear weapons capabilities.

In Bahrain

Saudi Arabia and Iran have sought to extend their influence in Bahrain for decades. While the majority of Muslims in Bahrain are Shia, the country is ruled by the Sunni Al Khalifa family. Iran claimed sovereignty over Bahrain until 1970, when Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi abandoned claims after negotiations with the United Kingdom. The Iranian Revolution led to resumed interest in Bahraini affairs. In 1981, the front organization Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain led a failed coup attempt to install a Shiite theocratic regime led by Hadi al-Modarresi. Since then, the government has accused Iran of supporting terrorist plots within its borders.

For decades, neighboring Sunni states have feared that Iran might stir up unrest among regional Shia populations, especially in Bahrain. The Al Khalifa regime's stability depends heavily on Saudi support. The island is connected to Saudi Arabia by the 25 kilometer King Fahd Causeway, and its proximity to Saudi Arabia's oil-rich, majority Shia Eastern Province is viewed by Riyadh as a security concern. Any political gains by the Shia in Bahrain are seen by the Saudis as gains for Iran.

In response to the Arab Spring in 2011, the GCC regimes sought to maintain their legitimacy through social reform, handouts, and violent repression. Member states also distributed a share of their combined oil wealth to Bahrain and Oman to maintain stability. Saudi-led GCC forces quickly intervened in support of the Al Khalifa regime to put down the anti-government uprising in Bahrain. The Bahraini government publicly blamed Iran for the protests, but an independent commission established by King Hamad rejected the claim, instead highlighting human rights abuses committed in the crackdown. The protests, along with the Iran nuclear deal, strained Bahrain's relationship with the United States. Bahrain has sought closer ties with Russia as a result, but this has been limited due to Saudi Arabia's alliance with the US.

In August 2015, authorities in Bahrain arrested five suspects over a bombing in Sitra. Officials linked the attacks to the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, though Iran denied any involvement. In January 2016 it joined Saudi Arabia in cutting diplomatic ties with Tehran following the attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran.

In Syria

Syria has been a major theater in the proxy conflict throughout the civil war, which began in 2011. Iran and the GCC states have provided varying degrees of military and financial support to opposing sides, with Iran backing the government and Saudi Arabia supporting rebel militants.

Syria is an important part of Iran's sphere of influence, and the Bashar al-Assad regime has long been a strong ally. During the early stages of the Arab Spring, Supreme Leader Khamenei initially expressed support for the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, characterizing them as an "Islamic awakening" akin to its own revolution in 1979. When protests broke out in Syria, Iran changed its position and condemned them, comparing the uprising to its own presidential election protests in 2009 and accusing the United States and Israel of being behind the unrest.

The war threatens Iran's position, and Saudi Arabia and its allies have sided with Sunni rebels in part to weaken Iran. For years Iranian forces have been involved on the ground, with soldiers in Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps facing heavy casualties. In 2014, with no end in sight to the conflict, Iran increased its ground support for the Syrian Army, providing elite forces, intelligence gathering, and training. Iran also backs pro-Assad Hezbollah fighters.

Russia intervened in September 2015 to provide support for the Assad government and target rebel groups, working together with Iran and utilizing Iranian air bases to stage air strikes. Saudi Arabia countered by increasing its support for the rebels and supplying American made anti-tank TOW missiles, a move which slowed initial progress made by Russian and Syrian forces.

In 2015 Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to participate in peace talks in Vienna in participation with United States Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, but the talks ultimately failed.

In Yemen

Yemen has been called one of the major fronts in the conflict as a result of the revolution and subsequent civil war. Yemen had for years been within the Saudi sphere of influence. The decade-long Houthi insurgency in Yemen stoked tensions with Iran, with accusations of covert support for the rebels. A 2015 UN report alleged that Iran provided the Houthi rebels with money, training, and arms shipments beginning in 2009. However, the degree of support has been subject to debate, and accusations of greater involvement have been denied by Iran. The 2014–2015 coup d'état was viewed by Saudi leadership as an immediate threat, and as an opportunity for Iran to gain a foothold in the region. In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened and launched airstrikes in the country, declaring the entire Saada Governorate a military target and imposing a naval blockade.

The United States intervened in October 2016 after missiles were fired at a US warship, which was in place to protect oil shipments along the sea lane passing through the Mandeb Strait. The US blamed the rebels and responded by targeting radar sites with missile strikes along the Red Sea coast. In response, rebels called the strikes evidence of American support for the Saudi campaign.

In Iraq

While the majority of Muslims in Iraq are Shia, the country was ruled by the Sunni governments; Ottomans, British installed Hashemites, then Saddam. Iraq under Saddam Hussein was hostile to both Iran and Saudi Arabia up until his ouster and acted as a counterbalancing state. The American-led invasion in 2003 caused a power vacuum in the region. With the antagonistic Ba'athist regime removed, Iran sought a more friendly Shia-dominated government and supported sympathetic rebel factions. Saudi Arabia remained more passive during the American occupation of Iraq, taking caution to preserve its relations with the United States by avoiding any direct support of Sunni insurgent groups. Riyadh supported the Bush administration's commitment to stay in the country, as it limited Iran's influence. The edicts issued in May 2003 by Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator Paul Bremer to exclude members of the Ba'ath Party from the new Iraq government and to disband the Iraqi Army undermined the occupation effort. The orders empowered various insurgent factions and weakened the new government's functional capabilities, leaving Iraq vulnerable to future instability.

Iran supported Shia opposition groups and the subsequent Iran-friendly regime as part of an effort to undermine the American-led coalition, which Iran feared would install a government hostile to their interests. Following the United States withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, the country drifted closer to Iran's sphere of influence. The instability that resulted from the Iraqi Civil War and the rise of ISIL threatened the existence of the Iraqi regime and led to an Iranian intervention in 2014. Iran mobilized Shia militia groups to halt and ultimately push back the advancing Sunni insurgency. The Iraqi government remains particularly influenced by Iran, and consults with it on most matters.

In Afghanistan

The rivalry has contributed to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan. Afghanistan shares historical ties with Iran, and is strategically important to Saudi Arabia. After the Cold War, Saudi policy shifted from fighting the spread of communism to containing Iranian influence in South and Central Asia. Saudi Arabia was one of three countries to officially recognize the Sunni Taliban government in 1996 along with its allies Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. In 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban in the wake of the September 11 attacks benefited Iran, who had previously been on the brink of war with the group. The regime change removed its primary threat along its eastern borders, and the removal of Saddam Hussein two years later further bolstered its position, allowing it to refocus its efforts on other areas of the Middle East like Syria and Yemen.

In Pakistan

Since 1989 Pakistan has been dealing with sectarian conflict. The country's diverse population is divided not only among various sects of Islam, but also along various ideologies. It has adherents from Shi'a, Sunni, and Ahmadi designations of Islam as well as a minority of Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs. The population is predominantly Sunni and has about 20-25% of Shi'a adherents, making it the second largest nation in the world after Iran with such a significant Shi'a population. About 2.3% of Muslims in Pakistan identify as Ahmadiyya. Roughly 1.6% of the population are Hindu, Christian, Sikh, Jain, Baha'i Faith, and Buddhist. Typically the adherents of Buddhism and Jainism are comparatively very low.

Militants targets in Pakistan include the Sunni, Shia, and the minority Ahmadi, Hindu, and Christian religious groups. As many as 4,000 people are estimated to have been killed in Shia-Sunni sectarian fighting in Pakistan between 1987–2007. Since 2008 "thousands of Shia" have been killed by Sunni extremists according to the human rights group Human Rights Watch. One significant aspect of the attacks on Shi'a in Pakistan is that militants often target Shi'a worshiping places (Imambargah) during prayers in order to maximize fatalities and to "emphasize the religious dimensions of their attack." Human Rights Watch also states that in 2011 and 2012 Pakistan minority groups Hindus, Ahmadi, and Christians "faced unprecedented insecurity and persecution in the country." Attacks on Sufi shrines by Salafi have also been reported.

In 2015 Pakistan declared its neutrality in the conflict in Yemen after Saudi solicitations for military support. However, due to its heavy economic dependence on the country, Pakistan provided some degree of covert support, joining Somalia in sending proxy forces to aid the Saudi-led campaign against Houthi rebels. In 2016 Saudi Arabia sought closer ties with Pakistan as part of its "look east" policy of expanding its reach to East and South Asia.

Recent events

The 2015 Mina stampede in Mecca during the annual Hajj pilgrimage further inflamed tensions. Tehran blamed the Saudi government for the tragedy and accused them of incompetence, which Riyadh rejected. In May 2016 Iran suspended participation in the upcoming Hajj. In September, Saudi Arabia launched a 24-hour Persian language satellite channel to broadcast the Hajj proceedings from 10 to 15 September. Ayatollah Khamenei accused Riyadh of politicizing the Hajj tragedy and argued that Saudi Arabia should not be running the pilgrimage.

On 2 January 2016, 47 people were put to death in several Saudi cities, including prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Protesters of the executions responded by demonstrating in Iran’s capital, Tehran. That same day a few protesters would eventually ransack the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and later set it ablaze. Police donned riot gear and arrested 40 people during the incident. In response, Saudi Arabia, along with its allies, Bahrain, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Comoros cut diplomatic ties with Iran. Iran's foreign ministry responded by saying the Saudis were using the incident as a pretext for fueling tensions.

The rule of King Salman has brought about a more assertive Saudi foreign policy, particularly reflected in the country's intervention in Yemen. He made significant changes in domestic policy to address growing unemployment and economic uncertainty. Such economic pressures further affected the regional dynamic in 2016. Russia, who has long maintained ties with Iran, has sought closer ties to Saudi Arabia. In September 2016, the two nations conducted informal talks about cooperating on oil production. Both have been heavily affected by the collapse of oil prices and considered the possibility of an OPEC freeze on oil output. As part of the talks, Russian President Vladimir Putin recommended an exemption for Iran, whose oil output has steadily increased following the lifting of international sanctions in January 2016. He stated that Iran deserves the opportunity to reach its pre-sanction levels of output. In what was seen as a significant compromise, Saudi Arabia offered to reduce its oil production if Iran capped its own output by the end of 2016.

Extremist movements throughout the Middle East have also become a major division between Iran and Saudi Arabia. During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia funded extremist militants in part to bolster resistance to the Soviet Union at the behest of the United States, and later to combat Shiite movements supported by Iran. The support had the unintended effect of metastasizing extremism throughout the region. The Saudi government now considers extremist groups like ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front to be one of the two major threats to the kingdom, the other being Iran. In a New York Times op-ed, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif agreed that terrorism was an international threat and called on the United Nations to block funding of extremist ideologies using Iran's WAVE initiative as a framework. However, he placed the blame on Saudi Arabia and its sponsorship of Wahhabism for instability in the Middle East. He argued that Wahhabism was the fundamental ideology shared among terrorist groups in the Middle East, and that it has been "devastating in its impact." He went so far as to proclaim "Let us rid the world of Wahhabism" and asserted that, despite arguments otherwise, Wahhabism was the true cause of the Iran–Saudi Arabia rivalry.

The election of Donald Trump in the United States in 2016 has prompted uncertainty from both countries about future U.S. policy in the Middle East, as both were targets of criticism during his campaign. The Saudi government anticipates the Trump administration to adopt a more hawkish stance than the Obama administration on Iran, which would potentially benefit Riyadh. Iran also anticipates the return of economic isolation, and President Hassan Rouhani made efforts to establish further international economic participation for the country by signing oil deals with Western companies before Trump took office.