Docket nos. 04-623 | End date 2006 | |
Full case name Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al., v. Oregon, et al. Citations 546 U.S. 243 (more)
126 S.Ct. 904, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 767, 74 USLW 4068, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 433, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 608, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 49 Prior history Summary judgment granted to plaintiffs in part, permanent injunction entered, sub nom. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp.2d 1077 (D. Ore. 2002); on appeal, treated as transferred, petitions for review granted, injunction continued, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2003); cert. granted, sub. nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 125 S.Ct. 1299 (2005) Majority Kennedy, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer Dissent Scalia, joined by Roberts, Thomas Ruling court Supreme Court of the United States Similar Washington v Glucksberg, Baxter v Montana, Gonzales v Raich, Vacco v Quill, Cruzan v Director - Missouri | ||
Civics honors semester project speech gonzales v oregon
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), was a decision of the US Supreme Court, which ruled that the US Attorney General cannot enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act against physicians who prescribed drugs, in compliance with Oregon state law, to terminally ill patients seeking to end their lives, often referred to as medical aid in dying. It was the first major case heard under the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts.
Contents
Background
In 1994, voters in the state of Oregon approved Measure 16, a ballot initiative that established the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, with 51.3% of voters supporting it and 48.7% opposing it. The Act legalized medical aid in dying in the state of Oregon. A 1997 referral by the Oregon Legislative Assembly aimed to repeal the Death with Dignity Act but was defeated by a 60% margin.
The law permits physicians to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to a competent adult, agreed by two doctors to be within six months of dying from an incurable condition. As of February 29, 2012, the Oregon Public Health Division reported that since "the law was passed in 1997, a total of 935 people have had DWDA prescriptions written and 596 patients have died from ingesting medications prescribed under the DWDA."
On November 9, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an Interpretive Rule that physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose and that any physician administering federally controlled drugs for that purpose would be in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.
The State of Oregon, joined by a physician, a pharmacist, and a group of terminally ill patients, all from Oregon, filed a challenge to the Attorney General's rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The court ruled for Oregon and issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Interpretive Rule. The ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Majority opinion
In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment but for different reasons. The majority opinion did not dispute the power of the federal government to regulate drugs, but it disagreed that the statute in place empowered the attorney general to overrule state laws on the appropriate use of medications allowed.
The court found that it was inappropriate to apply Chevron deference toward the Attorney General's "interpretive rule" that controlled substances could not medically be used for the purpose of physician-assisted suicide.
Scalia
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Roberts and Justice Thomas, argued that under Supreme Court precedent, deference was due to the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute: "If the term 'legitimate medical purpose' has any meaning, it surely excludes the prescription of drugs to produce death."
Thomas
Thomas also filed a brief dissent in which he argued that the court's majority opinion was inconsistent with the reasoning in Gonzales v. Raich. He also dissented in that decision in which five of the six justices in the majority in Oregon found broad federal authority under the Controlled Substances Act for Congress to forbid the growth of medical marijuana.
He had argued for a more limited congressional power under the Commerce Clause in Raich, which focused on intrastate and interstate commerce. In Oregon, by contrast, the case was a matter of the validity of an executive interpretation of that statute.