Directives for Military Officers and Ministry Officials upon an Attack of Norway

Background

When Germany invaded Norway on April 9, 1940, many of Norway’s commanding officers of both the Army and the Navy were uncertain of what to do since they did not receive any orders. This led to many giving up without mounting a defence. Although the highest levels of government ordered an immediate mobilization, the ministers of the Norwegian government knew nothing about the details of mobilization, which were left totally to the Ministry of Defence. Since the Minister of Defence was new to his duties, he deferred this action to his Commander-in Chief, General Kristian Laake.

Kersaudy describes the events which then followed as: “On the morning of 9 April, however, the General obstinately refused to take the alert seriously and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the officer on duty at headquarters could prevail on him to leave his country home and return to Oslo. But once in Oslo, the General called the Minister of Defence and advised him to mobilize the four brigades stationed in southern Norway…” Sadly the mobilization plan for a partial mobilization at the time relied on the post office to order these brigades to mobilize, with an inherent delay of several days.

The situation was further confused by the radio announcement by Vidkun Quisling of a coup d'etat declaring an ad hoc government during the muddle of the invasion. He ordered that the defence mobilization should cease. This, combined with misdirection by other Nasjonal Samling leaders led to all-out confusion such that the mobilization was not effected until hours after the first German advance forces reached Norwegian soil. This poorly managed mobilization allowed German forces to establish a strong beachhead in Norway.

Despite the strength of the German invaders and the poor initial leadership and misdirection, the Norwegian armed forces, aided by British, French and Polish forces, kept up an organized military resistance for two months, longer than any other country invaded by Germany, except for the Soviet Union. The resistance was notably strong at Vinjesvingen, Gloppedalsura, Fossum bridge, Hegra and the Narvik front.

With the start of the cold war and the memory of the occupation years, the Norwegian people wanted to be well prepared for any future invasion. Therefore, directives were issued to guide response in the event of any invasion of Norway, the Direktiver for militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer ved angrep på Norge.

Even if the text of the directive does not directly apply to the rest of the rank and file of the armed forces, the duty to defend Norway, is "De Jure" based on the Norwegian Constitution §85 (Defence against treason or acts against the Storting) and §109 (Conscription), in short, both articles clearly states that one shall defend Norway against any threat, foreign or domestic.

”De facto” the directive is taught to all conscripts and is subsumed to be equally applicable to all personnel, regardless of rank.

The directive

The directive instructs all commanding officers and military officials in the Ministry of Defence that they were to:

Take up arms and fight courageously against each and every enemy who attempts to invade and conquer Norway.

Know that once a mobilization order has been issued, it can not be recalled before each and every individual musters at his point of mobilization.

Know that all orders, even those issued in the King’s name or the ministry’s name, which countermand the mobilization are phony and shall not be complied with.

Recognize it is every man’s duty to resist, even though all may appear lost and others give up. Resistance shall be continued both at home and abroad.

In the event of a partially successful or successful invasion, engage in both espionage and sabotage.

In the event of capture, provide no information to the enemy while a prisoner of war.

The directive consists of four sections, which are summarized below:

Translation

"Definitions

1) In this directive, the meaning of military befalingsmann is any befalingsmann with rank above sergeant, kvartermester and likewise and above, without regard to if he is salaried, conscripted, unpaid or commandeered."

Mention in legend

The directive has only been close to implementation once. On June 3, 1968 the Leningrad Military District in the former Soviet Union was placed on alert. Within a couple of days the mobilized forces in the Leningrad region reached 11,000 soldiers, 4,000 marines, 210 tanks, 500 troop transports, 265 self-propelled cannons, 1,300 logistics transports, 50 helicopters, and 20 transport aircraft (Antonov An-12), all of which were staged in the Petchenga-Murmansk area near Norway.

On the evening of June 7, the garrison (Garnisonen i Sør-Varanger or GSV) heard the noise of powerful engines coming from the manoeuvres along the entire Soviet front of the Norwegian-Soviet border. Actual observations were not possible over the border in the dark. On that same night, the GSV commanding officer ordered all GSV reserve forces to report to their emergency muster locations.

At daybreak the impressive strength of the Soviet forces staged along the entire border became visible. The GSV commanding officer called the ministry for instructions. Although unrecorded, the conversation (perhaps apocryphal) is said to have been as follows:

Commanding officer of GSV: What shall I do when the Soviet forces cross the border? Minister of Defence: Have you read the poster on the wall? Commanding officer of GSV: Yes Minister of Defence: Then you know the correct action once the Soviet forces cross the border. Commanding officer of GSV: Yes Mr. Minister, it means war.

The Soviet demonstration of strength lasted until 10 June, when the Soviet forces stood down.