Criminal law in the Waite Court

Background

Despite the massive increase in the criminal case load before the Supreme Court, the statutory structure of the federal criminal system was not substantially changed during the Waite Court. In 1874 and 1878, the criminal statutes were codified in Title LXX of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Title LXX occupied only 41 pages.

Bankruptcy fraud

In United States v. Fox (1877), the Court held that the criminal bankruptcy fraud statute exceeded Congress's powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Civil rights

In United States v. Cruikshank (1875), the Court overturned a conviction under the civil rights crime statute, holding that the First and Second Amendment were not incorporated against the states and the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state action. In United States v. Reese (1875), the Court overturned another civil rights conviction for depriving African-Americans of the right to vote, holding that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to voter suppression. In United States v. Harris (1883), known as the Ku Klux Case, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional the civil rights crime statute that applied to conspiracies to deprive state-law rights and privileges.

But, in United States v. Gale (1883), the Court upheld a statute that punished state officers for misconduct in federal Congressional elections. And, in United States v. Waddell (1884), the Court upheld a criminal civil rights law as applied to the rights of Homesteaders. In Ex parte Virginia (1880) and Ex parte Siebold (1879), the Court held that the civil rights crime statute was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. In The Ku Klux Cases (1884), the Court upheld a conviction for a conspiracy to prevent voters from voting for federal officials, finding a relevant constitutional right.

Counterfeiting

In United States v. Carll (1881), the Court defined the mens rea required under the counterfeiting statute. In Ex parte Carll (1883), the Court held that the offense of counterfeiting was stated where the name of the original payee had been erased and replaced.

In United States v. Arjona (1887), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition on counterfeiting the notes of foreign banks and corporations under the Foreign Commerce Clause and the law of nations power.

Embezzlement

In United States v. Britton (1883), the Court issued four opinions on the subject of the misapplication of public funds. In United States v. Smith (1888), the Court held that the clerk of the Collector of Customs was not a public officer and thus was not indictable for embezzlement.

Extortion under color of office

Section 12 of the Crimes Act of 1825 punished extortion under color of office:

Every officer of the United States who is guilty of extortion under color of his office shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment not more than one year, according to the aggravation of his offence.

In United States v. Germaine (1878), the Court held that § 12 applied only to defendants who were officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of Article Two of the United States Constitution. Because Germaine (a surgeon appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions) was not appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of a department, the Court held that he was not covered by the statute. The key dispute was whether the Commissioner of Pensions was a head of a department. Germaine held that the phrase "Heads of Departments" in the Appointments Clause had the same referent as the phrase "principal Officer" in the Opinions Clause of Article Two. Further, the Court held the definition of "inferior Officer[]" turned on "tenure, duration, emolument, and duties [that] were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary."

Fraud on the United States

An 1873 statute punished fraud in connection with claims against the United States. In United States v. Hall (1878), the Court upheld the conviction of a ward who had withheld from a guardian the proceeds of such a claim. In United States v. Benecke (1878), the Court held that the statute did not apply to money withheld before its passage.

In United States v. Irvine (1878), a prosecution concerning a lawyer who withheld money from a client, the Court held that the crime was not a continuing offense was thus was susceptible to the statute of limitations. In United States v. Hirsch (1879), the Court held that the crime was subject to a 5-year statute of limitations, rather than the 3-year statute of limitations under the revenue laws.

Mail fraud

In Ex parte Henry (1887), the Court held that each mailing can form the basis for a separate count of mail fraud.

Perjury

In United States v. Curtis (1883), the Court held that a false oath taken before a notary public could not be the basis for a perjury conviction because a notary has no power to issue such an oath. But, in United States v. Ambrose (1883), the Court held that an accounting of services given to a clerk of court is a "certification" covered by the statute.

Private money

In United States v. Van Auken (1877), the Court held that the offense of circulating private legal tender did not apply to the circulation of a bill which stated that it was payable in goods only.

Revenue laws

In United States v. Norton (1875), the Court held that the embezzlement of postal money orders was not an offense under the revenue laws. In United States v. Spiegel (1886), the Court held that possession of an uncancelled stamp for imported liquors was not a crime unless it had been intentionally removed.

Trademark

In the Trade-Mark Cases (1879), a criminal prosecution under the new trademark law, the Court found the act unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.

Federal jurisdiction

Indian country

In United States v. McBratney (1881), the Court held that the federal government had failed to reserve criminal jurisdiction over Indian country in Colorado upon its admission as a U.S. state. Thus, it had no jurisdiction to try the murder of a non-Indian by a non-Indian on the Ute reservation.

In Ex parte Crow Dog (1883), the Court held that the Nonintercourse Act of 1834's exception for Indian-on-Indian crimes had not been repealed by the "bad men" clause of a treaty, and that therefore there was no federal jurisdiction to try such a crime. Congress responded by passing the Major Crimes Act. In United States v. Kagama (1886), the Court upheld the Major Crimes Act.

Federal officer removal

In Tennessee v. Davis (1879), the Court upheld the federal officer removal component of the Reconstruction-era removal statute (the civil rights removal component of which had come before the Chase Court).

Davis v. South Carolina (1883) concerned an attempt by a state court to continue criminal proceedings in spite of an effected federal officer removal. On the merits, the Court held that an assistant U.S. Marshall was entitled to official immunity. Further, the Court held that bail could not be forfeited for failing to appear in state court after the removal.

Courts-martial

In Ex parte Reed (1879), the Court held that the clerk of the navy postmaster could permissible be tried by courts martial. In Ex parte Mason (1881), the Court held that courts martial jurisdiction extended to a military prison shooting and that the courts martial had the power to add a dishonorable discharge onto the maximum sentence authorized by Congress.

Constitutional issues

Confrontation Clause

Reynolds v. United States (1878) was the first Supreme Court case where the defendant raised a Confrontation Clause issue. The Court held that the defendant's right to confront the witnesses (the alleged multiple wives) was forfeited by the wrongdoing of the defendant in procuring their absence.

Cruel and unusual punishment

In Wilkerson v. Utah (1879), the Court held that execution by firing squad was not cruel and unusual punishment.

Double Jeopardy Clause

In Kring v. Missouri (1883), the Court held that it violated double jeopardy for a statute to attempt to abrogate the rule that a guilty plea to second degree murder is an implied acquittal for first-degree murder. In Bohanan v. Nebraska (1886), without reaching the merits (but only deciding a motion to dismiss), the Court held that it had the authority to consider whether a second murder conviction in state court constituted double jeopardy.

Due process

In Brooks v. Missouri (1888), the Court held that a state rule requiring a new trial motion within four days of the verdict did not violate the Due Process Clause.

Equal protection and jury selection

Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Bush v. Kentucky (1883) reversed convictions because of racial exclusion in the jury system.

Hayes v. Missouri (1887) rejected an equal protection challenge to a statute that provided the prosecution 8 peremptory challenges in small towns and 15 in large cities.

Ex post facto law

In Kring v. Missouri (1883), the Court also found that the statute violated the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws (the plea was entered before the state constitutional amendment was passed). This alternative holding was overruled by Collins v. Youngblood (1990).

Grand Jury Clause

In Ex parte Wilson (1885) and United States v. Petit (1885), the Court held that hard labor is an infamous punishment and therefore that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment attached. In Mackin v. United States (1886), the Court held that an authorized sentence of two years imprisonment (even without hard labor) was sufficiently infamous to require a grand jury. In Ex parte Bain (1887) and Parkinson v. United States (1887), the Court held that an authorized sentence of one year in the penitentiary was sufficiently infamous.

In Hurtado v. California (1884), the Court held that the Grand Jury Clause was not incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hurtado remains good law, and—along with the Vicinage Clause of the Sixth Amendment and (maybe) the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment—the Grand Jury Clause remains the only criminal procedure provision of the Bill of Rights not to be incorporated.

Other

Sufficiency of an indictment

In United States v. Simmons (1877), the Court assessed the sufficiency of an indictment charging the production of untaxed alcohol. The Court held that an indictment must either name the defendant or state that the defendant's name is unknown.

In United States v. Hess (1888), the Court held that a mail fraud indictment was insufficient where it merely parroted the words of the statute. Rather, the Court required a more specific description of the scheme and the fraud.

Fugitive disentitlement

In Smith v. United States (1876) and Bonahan v. Nebraska (1887), the Court dismissed appeals pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.

Objections to grand juries

In United States v. Gale (1883), the Court held that a challenge to the composition of a grand jury (specifically, the disqualification of Confederate veterans) was wavied after the defendant entered a plea.

Corporate officer liability

In United States v. Northway (1887), the Court upheld the conviction of a bank president for a crime committed by his organization.

Costs

In United States ex rel. Phillips v. Gaines (1880), the Court held that it had no power to award costs in criminal cases.

Diplomatic immunity

In Ex parte Hitz (1884), the Court found that a Swiss consul indicted for embezzlement had no diplomatic immunity because he had resigned before the indictment.

Criminal investigations

Fourth Amendment

Ex parte Jackson (1877) was perhaps the first criminal Fourth Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court. The Court held that a warrant was required to open mail. In Ex parte Spies (1887), the Court held that a Fourth Amendment claim was waived because the facts establishing the legality of the search did not appear in the record.

Foreign extradition

In United States v. Rauscher (1886), the Court vacated the conviction of a defendant who had been extradited from Great Britain to the United States, but not in conformity with the extradition treaty between the two countries. Justice Gray concurred, and Chief Justice Waite dissented. But, in Ker v. Illinois (1886), involving a defendant apprehended in Peru—a country which also had such a treaty but which had recently experienced a coup that interfered with the extradition process—the Court held that a defendant could raise no objection to the legality of his capture.