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The credibility thesis is a proposed heterodox theoretical framework for understanding how societal institutions or social rules come about and evolve. It posits that institutions emerge from intentional institution-building but never in the originally intended form. Instead, institutional development is endogenous and spontaneously ordered and institutional persistence can be explained by their credibility, which is provided by the function that particular institutions serve rather than their theoretical or ideological form. The credibility thesis can be applied to explain, for example, why purported institutional improvements do not take hold as part of structural adjustment programs, while other economies in the developing world deliver growth despite absence of clear and strong market mechanisms such as indisputable private property rights or clearly delineated and registered land tenure.
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Postulates of the credibility thesis
According to the credibility thesis, institutional persistence, meaning the survival and change of particular institutions through time is determined by the function of the institution and actors' expectations of the institution to play that function.In this sense, the thesis predicts that institutions that persist over time are credible, thus functional. If not, they would have changed or gone extinct. This principle holds for whatever form an institution may assume, regardless whether it is formal or informal, public or private, democratic or autocratic.
A typical example is sharecropping, which has been regarded as economically inefficient or "second-best". However, its persistence throughout time has challenged this premise, leading others to conclude that it is efficient, thus credible and functional. That credibility has been confirmed in other studies.
Changes in institutional arrangements, such as changes from informal land tenure and informal housing to a formalized real estate market or gradually declining prevalence of formal marriage or customary rights, are brought about by rule-making in a multi-actor playing field, where even the strongest actors cannot fully dictate institutional arrangements.In effect, when powerful actors exogenously impose institutions that contradict the evolutionary flow of endogenously emerged functions, the newly designed arrangements will invariably develop into "empty institutions" and "non credible" institution.
An institution that appears stable and unchanging over time is often alleged to exist in an equilibrium wherein actors' conflicting interests on what form the institution should take are locked in a frozen conflict. For example, whether land holdings should be registered in a cadastre or if informal exchange of payment for use rights can suffice as confirmation of a land sale, constitute two possible institutional arrangements and either can be beneficial to different actors' interests. That no actor perceives an immediate opportunity to change the arrangement to their advantage is a sign of the credibility of the assignment and the source of the equilibrium of institutional arrangement. However, in actuality disequilibrium characterises institutional arrangements and equilibrium is transitory and rare. What is perceived as persistence of institutions is, in fact, the occurrence of infinitesimally small institutional changes over time under a veneer of apparent stability. In this context, the credibility thesis is predicated upon the notion of dynamic disequilibrium. It is also why in this respect the credibility theory is juxtaposed to structural functionalism, which is based on presupposed societal equilibrium.
A series of underlying postulates for the credibility thesis have been proposed:
Methodological approaches
"Given that all involved actors are constantly interested in changing institutional design, credibility cannot be measured by directly asking respondents whether they find an institution credible. Instead it has to be operationalized through proxies, such as the level of conflict that an institution generates; the extent of 'institutional robustness' expressed as a function of institutional lifespan and flexibility; the degree to which an institution facilitates or frustrates overall socio-economic, political and cultural change; and the extent to which an institution fulfils the functions it ought to perform in the eyes of social actors." Such opening of the black box of institutions possible using mixed methods to describe institutions in detail over time and space, which serves as an archaeology of institutions. The archaeology of institutions can be understood as "an approach by which the change of institutions is meticulously recorded, interpreted and studied through the collection of data from every possible source, regardless of whether that is socio-economic, historical, ethno-anthropological, geographical, psychological or legal-political." An example of this, is the history of China's titling. While predominantly applied to land-related institutions, this approach could be applied to analysis of other means of production, such as capital (e.g. banks and industries), labor (trade unions) or beyond (water management and notaries).
The proxies that can be used to measure credibility include the following:
When credibility is assessed through these proxies, a better sense can be obtained of the current function that institutions fulfil for a group of actors. In result, one is likely better positioned to predict institutional interventions that might rally social support. Depending on the level of credibility, these can be envisioned as positioned on a gradient from condoning or non-intervention to co-opting, facilitating, prohibiting and ordaining.
The CSI Checklist (Credibility Scales and Intervention) was developed for this purpose.
Apart from studying credibility in real-life situations, the particular premises of the theory – endogeneity, disequilibrium, and functional adaptation – make it also suitable for simulation in agent-based models.
Emergence of the theory
The question of credibility first emerged along with concern about certain institutional interventions failing. In the mid-20th century Vilhelm Aubert noted that the Housemaid Law in Norway had been implemented but flaunted by all involved actors. The concept of credibility was initially coined as an explanandum for the success and failure of Western monetary, anti-inflationary policies in the 1970s. A concern for the credibility of policy emerged in the latter half of the 20th century in response to frequently observed failures of neoliberal structural adjustments in the developing world associated with the Washington Consensus. Institutional reform, such as privatization, failed to deliver the predicted economic growth, not because of lacking credible commitment on part of actors but due to the absence of endogenous credibility.
In contrast, the growth of the Chinese economy despite lack of many institutions considered to be essential for economic growth indicated that institutional arrangements do not necessarily determine economic outcomes, and also at the same time economic development does not automatically lead to teleologically predetermined institutional forms. This has been particularly striking in the case of real estate sector in China. Thus it was suggested that research should embrace Lamarckian interpretation of functionalism and focus on the function or quality and performance measures of institutional performance rather than their form.
The term credibility thesis was put forth by Peter Ho in 2014. In a review of the credibility thesis, Delilah Griswold contended that "credibility is a powerful metric by which to understand and evaluate tenure systems. Importantly, understanding the credibility of a given institution requires analysis outside of theory and politics, analysis that is locally and temporally specific and multilayered."