Docket nos. 87-998 | End date 1989 | |
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Full case name City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. Citations 488 U.S. 469 (more)
109 S. Ct. 706 Majority O'Connor (Parts I, III-B, and IV), joined by Rehnquist, White, Stevens, Kennedy Plurality O'Connor (Part II), joined by Rehnquist, White Plurality O'Connor (Parts III-A and V), joined by Rehnquist, White, Kennedy Ruling court Supreme Court of the United States Similar Adarand Constructors - Inc v Peña, Regents of the University, Grutter v Bollinger, Gratz v Bollinger, Hopwood v Texas | ||
City of richmond v j a croson co
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the city of Richmond's minority set-aside program, which gave preference to minority business enterprises (MBE) in the awarding of municipal contracts, was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the city failed to identify both the need for remedial action and that other non-discriminatory remedies would be insufficient.
Contents
- City of richmond v j a croson co
- City of richmond v j a croson co 1989 phr sphr human resources license exam vocabubee com
- References
Croson involved a minority set-aside program in the awarding of municipal contracts. Richmond, Virginia, with a black population of just over 50 percent had set a 30 percent goal in the awarding of city construction contracts, based on its findings that local, state, and national patterns of discrimination had resulted in all but complete lack of access for minority-owned businesses. The Supreme Court stated:
"We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race. To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs. [Citing Regents of the University of California v. Bakke]. Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classification. We think such a result would be contrary to both the letter and the spirit of a constitutional provision whose central command is equality."