Harman Patil (Editor)

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

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End date
  
1983

Full case name
  
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, et al.

Citations
  
462 U.S. 416 (more) 103 S.Ct. 2481

Prior history
  
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Majority
  
Powell, joined by Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens

Dissent
  
O'Connor, joined by White, Rehnquist

Ruling court
  
Supreme Court of the United States

Similar
  
Webster v Reproductive Health Se, Stenberg v Carhart, Bellotti v Baird, Ayotte v Planned Parentho, Lum v Rice

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed its abortion rights jurisprudence. The case struck down several provisions of an Ohio abortion law.

Contents

Provisions of the law and decision regarding them

In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court struck down each of the challenged provisions.

Hospital requirement

One provision of the Akron statute required that abortions after the first trimester be performed in a hospital. The Court found this unconstitutional, because while the state has a compelling interest in regulating abortion after the first trimester, accepted medical practice does not recommend that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital. The regulation imposed an unnecessary burden that has the effect of infringing upon the constitutional right to an abortion.

Prohibition on unmarried minors

Another provision stated that a physician may not perform an abortion on an unmarried minor under 15 without obtaining either consent from one of her parents or a judicial bypass. The Court likewise struck down this provision, as the law and the Ohio courts provided no suitable mechanism for a minor to gain a judicial bypass, as the relevant laws and courts concerning juveniles did not mention abortion or establish the authority to determine the maturity or emancipation of a minor.

Information requirements

The Akron statute also required that before performing an abortion, the physician must inform the patient of the status of the pregnancy, stage of fetal development, expected date of viability, health risks of abortion, and availability of adoption agencies and childbirth resources. The Court found this provision unconstitutional, as the script, ostensibly provided to ensure informed consent, was found to be geared towards influencing the patient to choose not to have an abortion. The state may not attempt to influence the patient's choice between abortion and childbirth. The Ohio regulation extends the state's interest in informed consent beyond permissible limits, interfering with the discretion of the physician and placing unreasonable obstacles in his path.

  • The requirement that doctors tell patients that the fetus is "a human life from the moment of conception" also violates the provision in Roe v. Wade that "a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions."
  • The detailed description of the fetus that doctors are required to provide is speculative.
  • The list of risks of abortion that the doctor is required to provide is "intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure" and also overrides the physician's judgment, as he must tell his patient specific risks even if they are not present for that patient.
  • 24-hour waiting period

    Another provision mandated a 24-hour waiting period is imposed after the patient signs a consent form. The Court struck this down, as no state interest is served by the imposition of an "arbitrary and inflexible" waiting period.

    Disposal requirements

    The final challenged provision stated that physicians had to ensure that fetal remains are disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." The majority deemed this unconstitutional because criminal sanctions are imposed upon doctors who break this law, "humane" is unconstitutionally vague and a violation of due process. Rather than strike down "humane" and preserve "sanitary," the Court struck down the entire provision.

    Dissent

    In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices White and Rehnquist), urged that "the 'unduly burdensome' standard" from two prior cases, Maher v. Roe (1977) and Bellotti v. Baird (1979) "be applied to the challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the particular 'stage' of pregnancy involved." The "undue burden" test was later to gain acceptance by a plurality of the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), which replaced the earlier "strict scrutiny" standard of review of abortion regulations with the lesser "undue burden" standard, a standard which remains in effect.

    City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health was overruled by the plurality in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992).

    References

    City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Wikipedia