A bandwidth-sharing game is a type of resource allocation game designed to model the real-world allocation of bandwidth to many users in a network. The game is popular in game theory because the conclusions can be applied to real-life networks. The game is described as follows:
                    n                 playerseach player                     i                 has utility                               U                      i                          (        x        )                 for amount                     x                 of bandwidthuser                     i                 pays                               w                      i                                   for amount                     x                 of bandwidth and receives net utility of                               U                      i                          (        x        )        −                  w                      i                                  the total amount of bandwidth available is                     B                We also use assumptions regarding                               U                      i                          (        x        )                
                              U                      i                          (        x        )        ≥        0                                              U                      i                          (        x        )                 is increasing and concave                    U        (        x        )                 is continuousThe game arises from trying to find a price                     p                 so that every player individually optimizes their own welfare. This implies every player must individually find                     a        r        g        m        a                  x                      x                                    U                      i                          (        x        )        −        p        x                . Solving for the maximum yields                               U                      i                                                            ′                                      (        x        )        =        p                .
With this maximum condition, the game then becomes a matter of finding a price that satisfies an equilibrium. Such a price is called a market clearing price.
A popular idea to find the price is a method called fair sharing. In this game, every player                     i                 is asked for amount they are willing to pay for the given resource denoted by                               w                      i                                  . The resource is then distributed in                               x                      i                                   amounts by the formula                               x                      i                          =        (                                            w                              i                                                                    ∑                                  j                                                            w                                  j                                                                    )        ∗        (        B        )                . This method yields an effective price                     p        =                                                            ∑                                  j                                                            w                                  j                                                      B                                  . This price can proven to be market clearing thus the distribution                               x                      1                          ,        .        .        .        ,                  x                      n                                   is optimal. The proof is as so:
                    a        r        g        m        a                  x                                    x                              i                                                              U                      i                          (                  x                      i                          )        −                  w                      i                                  
                            ⟹                a        r        g        m        a                  x                                    w                              i                                                              U                      i                          (                                            w                              i                                                                    ∑                                  j                                                            w                                  j                                                                    ∗        B        )        −                  w                      i                                  
                            ⟹                          U                      i                                                            ′                                      (                                            w                              i                                                                    ∑                                  j                                                            w                                  j                                                                    ∗        B        )        (                              1                                          ∑                                  j                                                            w                                  j                                                                    ∗        B        −                                            w                              i                                                    (                              ∑                                  j                                                            w                                  j                                                            )                                  2                                                                    ∗        B        )        −        1        =        0                
                            ⟹                          U                      i                                                            ′                                      (                  x                      i                          )        (                              1            p                          −                              1            p                          ∗                                            x                              i                                      B                          )        −        1        =        0                
                            ⟹                          U                      i                                                            ′                                      (                  x                      i                          )        (        1        −                                            x                              i                                      B                          )        =        p                
Comparing this result to the equilibrium condition above, we see that when                                                         x                              i                                      B                                   is very small, the two conditions equal each other and thus, the fair sharing game is almost optimal.