Attack on Convoy BN 7

Red Sea Force

The approaches to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aden, the 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) wide Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb (Gate of Tears) and the 1,200 nmi (2,200 km; 1,400 mi) passage to Suez, became the main sea route to the Middle East when hostilities began with Italy. South of Suez the British held Port Sudan on the west coast of the Red Sea (about halfway down) and Aden, 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) east of Bab-el-Mandeb. About 350 nmi (650 km; 400 mi) north of the Strait, on the west side of the Red Sea, was an Italian naval base of Massawa (Rear-Admiral Mario Bonetti), well placed for attacks by submarine and destroyer on convoys. The Red Sea Force (Senior Naval Officer Red Sea, Rear-Admiral Murray, based at Aden) was established in April 1940, by Vice-Admiral Ralph Leatham, the Commander-in-Chief East Indies Station. The British closed the Red Sea to merchant ships on 24 May 1940, until convoys could be organised.

Italian flotilla

The Scout cruisers (esploratori, also Leone-class destroyers) Pantera and Leone had an unusually powerful armament of eight 4.7-inch (120 mm) guns, in four turrets on the centre line. Only two turrets could aim fore or aft but the eight-gun broadside was unique for destroyers. The class also carried 2 × 40 mm pom-pom anti-aircraft guns 4 × 20 mm machine-guns, 4 × 533 millimetres (21.0 in) torpedo tubes and 60 mines. The Sauro-class destroyers had an armament of 4 × 120 mm (4.7 in) guns 2 × 40 mm pom-poms, 2 × 31.2 mm machine-guns, 6 × 533 mm (21 in) torpedo tubes and 52 mines. Mechanical faults, a growing fuel shortage and the enervating effect of the climate hampered operations of the Red Sea Flotilla at Massawa.

Convoy BN 7

Convoy BN 7 was northbound through the Red Sea and consisted of 32 British, Norwegian, French, Greek and Turkish merchant ships. The escort consisted of the light cruiser HMNZS Leander (Commander J. W. Rivett-Carnac), the destroyer HMS Kimberley (Commander J. S. M. Richardson), the Egret-class sloop HMS Auckland, the Grimsby-class sloops HMAS Yarra and HMIS Indus and the Hunt-class minesweepers HMS Derby and HMS Huntley. Convoy BN 7 was nearing Perim Island (a volcanic island in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, off the south-west coast of Yemen), in the afternoon of 19 October, when an aircraft dropped four bombs close astern of one of the merchantmen. Leander and Auckland opened fire on the aircraft as it flew off to the west and shortly before dark, an undercarriage wheel of an Italian aircraft was picked up 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) south of the island. Next morning, Italian aircraft dropped four bombs, two of which fell ahead of the convoy and two bombs harmlessly astern of the French liner Felix Roussel, carrying New Zealand troops to Suez. At dusk Leander took station on the port beam of the convoy, between it and the Italian base at Massawa, which flanked the line of advance and the convoy zig-zagged through the night.

Italian Flotilla

The Italian flotilla sailed on 20 October; the destroyers to operate in two sections. The slower, more heavily armed Pantera and Leone (Commander Paolo Aloisi) were to divert the convoy escort and the faster Nazario Sauro (Commander Moretti degli Adimari) and Francesco Nullo (Lieutenant Commander Costantino Borsini) would then attack the convoy with torpedoes. At 21:15 the two sections separated and at 23:21, Pantera sighted smoke from the convoy.

Battle

Pantera signalled Sauro and moved ahead of the convoy to intercept, with Leone following 875 yards (800 m) behind. The convoy was about 35 nmi (65 km; 40 mi) north-north-west of Jabal al-Tair Island at 02:19 on 21 October, when Leander sighted two patches of smoke bearing north. Auckland reported two destroyers 4 nmi (7.4 km; 4.6 mi) off and Leander altered course to intercept, the captain assuming that they would run for home through the South Massawa Channel. After a challenge from Auckland, Pantera fired over Yarra at the convoy, inflicting some splinter damage to a lifeboat on the convoy commodore's ship. Auckland opened fire and the ships separated and turned away at full speed, west-south-west, towards Massawa. firing their aft guns. The destroyers were broad on the port bow of HMAS Yarra when Pantera fired two torpedoes at 23:31 and another pair at 23:34. Yarra avoided two torpedoes by turning towards them and "combing" their tracks. Observers in Yarra thought that the leading enemy vessel was hit with its fourth or fifth salvo.

Sauro and Nullo had been manoeuvring to a more favourable position after receiving Pantera's sighting report, turned towards the convoy and spotted Leander at 01:48 (21 October). Sauro fired a torpedo at Leander which missed and Leander opened fire but lost sight of Sauro after two minutes. Sauro made another torpedo attack at 02:07, then turned away towards Massawa. (Nullo was not able to attack after its rudder jammed for several minutes and lost contact with Sauro.) Borsini ordered Nullo towards the Italian batteries on Harmil Island. When the gunfire ceased, Leander altered course to north-west, to intercept the ships at the South Massawa Channel (Harmil Island Passage) and at 02:45, opened fire with 6-inch and star shells, on a ship that was firing red and green tracer. The range was increasing and the ship was lost to sight after the first salvoes. Leander altered course westwards to bring all guns to bear if the ships were making for the South Massawa Channel. At 02:20 Leander spotted Nullo by searchlight and exchanged fire for about ten minutes at about 4,600 yards (4,200 m), Leander scoring several hits which damaged Nullo's gyrocompass and gunnery director. At 02:51, Leander lost contact in the haze and ceased fire (having fired 129 6-inch rounds. Nullo headed toward Harmil Island with Leander in pursuit and at 03:00, Leander challenged a destroyer which turned out to be Kimberley, also in pursuit. After five minutes, the cruiser altered course east to rejoin the convoy, since the Italian ship was drawing away at the rate of 7 kn (8.1 mph; 13 km/h) and the convoy would be vulnerable to attack during a pursuit.

Harmil Island

Kimberley continued at maximum speed and at 03:50, sighted smoke ahead apparently from two ships retiring at high speed. At 05:40 (21 October), off Harmil Island, lookouts on Kimberley and Nullo spotted each other at 7 nmi (13 km; 8.1 mi). Borsini assumed that the ship was Sauro and then Kimberley opened fire at 05:53, taking Nullo by surprise, Nullo beginning to return fire four minutes later. Kimberley closed the range to 5,000 yards (4,600 m) and at 06:20, Nullo scraped a reef, which damaged a propeller and began to take on water. As Nullo rounded the island at about 06:25, it was hit once in the forward engine room and once in aft engine room. Nullo lost all power, Borsini gave the order to abandon ship and steered towards Harmil Island. The upper works were hit by shell splinters and the crew abandoned ship, while Borsini tried to run the ship aground on the island. Nullo was then hit by the second of two torpedoes at 06:35, which broke it in two. (Borsini and his assistant declined to leave the ship and were drowned.) At 06:15 the four 120 mm guns on Harmil Island had engaged Kimberley, which replied at 10,000 yards (9,100 m) until it was hit in the engine-room, having silenced two of the guns; Kimberley receiving three casualties.

Kimberley reported having been hit and that its speed was reduced to 12 kn (14 mph); Leander left the convoy and at 06.54 increased speed to 26 kn (30 mph; 48 km/h). At 06:55, Kimberley reported that it was stopped for repairs, under fire from the shore battery and that the enemy destroyer had been destroyed. By 07.34, Leander was making 28.7 kn (33.0 mph; 53.2 km/h) and soon after, Kimberley reported that it was steaming east at 15 kn (17 mph; 28 km/h) on one engine. The remaining guns in the shore battery maintained fire until the range had lengthened to 19,000 yd (17,000 m) At 08.25, Leander was 16 nmi (30 km; 18 mi) east by north of the Harmil South beacon and slowed to 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h). Leander circled near Kimberley freedom of manoeuvre, in case Italian bombers appeared. Kimberley had lost water in its boilers and Leander sent a boat with three shipwrights and an engine-room artificer and a wounded rating was transferred to the cruiser for medical attention. At about 10:00, Leander took Kimberley in tow.

Analysis

The British found that they were at a disadvantage in night fighting as they were temporarily blinded by the flash of their guns, while the Italian ships carried flashless cordite and good tracer ammunition. The escorts were blamed by the headquarters at Aden for a lack of aggression, except for Kimberley, despite the risk of abandoning the convoy at night in poor visibility. The Italians had managed to make two torpedo attacks as planned but the division of the destroyers into two units, after previous sorties had failed to find any ships, had meant that neither had the firepower to face the British escorts.

Casualties

Of the 120 crew of Nullo, Borsini and his assistant Ciaravolo declined to abandon ship and were drowned, 12 men were killed and 106 men were rescued by sailors of the Harmil Island battery. Kimberley was out of service until 31 October, then returned, capable of a reduced maximum speed and was fully repaired in the spring of 1941.

Subsequent operations

At 10:00 on 21 October, Leander opened fire on three aircraft at 13,000 ft (4,000 m), which bombed about 200 yd (180 m) ahead of Leander, two more bombs turning out to be duds. No damage was done and Leander and Kimberley re-joined Convoy BN 7 just after noon. (As they passed Felix Roussel they were cheered by hundreds of New Zealand soldiers.) In the afternoon, Leander transferred the tow to Kingston which left the convoy with Kimberley next morning, for Port Sudan. The southbound convoy BS 7 with 20 ships, was met by the convoy escorts in the afternoon of 23 October and after an uneventful passage, dispersed east of Aden on 28 October. Later on 21 October, three Blenheim bombers of 45 Squadron found the wreck of Nullo and bombed the wreck. The Italians made another fruitless sortie on 3 December, cancelled one in January 1941 after Manin was damaged by a bomb and on 24 January sortied again with no result.

Attack on Convoy BN 14

On the night of 2/3 February 1941, the Italian destroyers Pantera, Tigre and Sauro sailed from Massawa, to intercept a convoy known to be in the area. BN 14 consisted of 39 merchant ships escorted by the cruiser HMS Caledon, the destroyer HMS Kingston and the sloops Indus and Shoreham. Sauro sighted the convoy and fired three torpedoes, then fired again at a ship seen in a cloud of smoke, before turning away at high speed. The two other ships did not receive the sighting report from Sauro but ten minutes later Pantera saw the ships and fired torpedoes, hearing explosions and claiming probables on two merchantmen; Tigre never made contact. Close to the Massawa South Channel, Sauro ran into Kingston and fearful of an ambush, the other Italian ships converged and called by wireless for air cover at dawn, reaching port unharmed. Local Italian press reports claimed that two ships had been hit but this had not occurred.