39th PSOE Federal Congress

Susana Díaz's rise

Susana Díaz became President of Andalusia and Secretary General of the PSOE–A succeeding José Antonio Griñán—who had resigned as a result of political fallout derived from the ERE scandal—after a rapid ascent among party ranks throughout the previous years. Known for her political ambition, her power and influence grew as she became the leader of the most powerful Spanish Socialist Workers' Party regional federation, as well as premier of the largest and most populous region in Spain. Soon, she was publicly acclaimed by party colleagues who considered she had the skills, charisma and political appeal needed for leading the PSOE, and quickly rallied behind her as a potential contender for the role of Secretary General after Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba's announced resignation—as a consequence of the PSOE electoral setback in the 2014 European Parliament election—ushered in a rushed leadership race. However, the challenge posed by Eduardo Madina—whose pressure forced a primary election to be held on 13 July—, Díaz's own desire to become party leader by acclamation and not through a bitter leadership contest which could see her popularity eroded, as well as opposition from within the PSOE–A—members of which asked her to remain in Andalusia—motivated Diaz's decision not to run. Nonetheless, Díaz's grudge against Madina for his maneuvers to trigger a party primary and, consequently, thwarting her planned rise, resulted in the PSOE–A backing a dark horse candidate, then-relatively unknown deputy Pedro Sánchez, ahead of the previous federal congress. Thanks to Díaz's support, Sánchez was able to win the primary election by a wide margin and become the new PSOE Secretary General.

However, the alliance between Sánchez and Díaz was short-lived. Díaz's initial plans to become the PSOE candidate at the next general election were impeded by Sánchez's own growing political aspirations. This, coupled with personal differences derived from Sánchez's management over the party, seen as alienating the different party families, caused both leaders to grow increasingly distrustful of each other and to develop a personal rivalry. Susana Díaz took advantage of growing criticism to Sánchez's leadership, succeeding in causing many long-standing rivals within the party—such as Rubalcaba and Carme Chacón, Felipe González and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, or even Eduardo Madina and Díaz herself; as well as six out of the seven PSOE regional presidents—to abandon their feuds, attracting them to her sphere and uniting them against her former protégé.

2016 PSOE crisis

The 2015 general election had seen the PSOE obtaining its worst ever results in a general election since the Spanish transition to democracy, with the party reduced to just 90 seats and 5.5 million votes. Newcomer left-wing Podemos had finished within striking distance, winning 69 seats and 5.2 million votes, boosted by massive support from young voters, raising fears among some PSOE leaders that Podemos could eventually replace their party as the dominant Spanish party to the left-of-centre. Secretary General Pedro Sánchez, who had led the party into the general election and whose leadership had been widely questioned for some time by the critical faction led by Susana Díaz, announced he would run for re-election as party leader in the party federal congress initially scheduled for early 2016. Díaz, unlike 2014, was now allegedly determined to become new party leader herself by battling Sánchez in the incoming contest, intending for the congress to be held as early as March or April 2016, whereas Sánchez sought to have it held in June. A compromise solution was reached in order to avoid a major clash between both sides, with the congress being scheduled for 21 and 22 May and a primary election to be held on 8 May.

Government formation talks nationwide broke down after Sánchez's failed investiture attempt in early March 2016. On 28 March, the PSOE leadership race was postponed indefinitely until a new government was appointed, due to increasing odds for a fresh election being called for 26 June. The party's performance in the eventual 2016 general election, where it narrowly avoided being decisively overcame by the Unidos Podemos coalition, only temporarily called off criticism from party critics. Serious setbacks in the Basque and Galician elections held on 25 September, which had been turned by dissenters into an electoral test of Sánchez, prompted immediate calls for resignation among his opponents, unleashing a party crisis which weakened Sánchez's standing and indicated a loss of support for him within the party. Sánchez refused to step down and instead proposed to have the congress held inmediately, scheduling it for 12 and 13 November and the primary election for 23 October, while daring his critics to challenge him in a back-me-or-sack-me vote. This move enraged his opponents, who subsequently forced the resignation of half of the party's executive committee on 28 September in order to trigger Sánchez's downfall. Sánchez did not acknowledge his ouster and sought to keep his promise of an autumn congress, resulting in the party being openly split into two opposing factions, as critics no longer recognized Sánchez's legitimacy to act as Secretary General. In a troubled federal committee held on 1 October, Sánchez finally resigned as party leader after losing a key ballot on his congress' proposal by 132 votes to 107. A caretaker managing committee headed by Asturias President Javier Fernández was appointed to lead the party until the party congress to elect a new leadership could be organized.

Concurrently with the ongoing PSOE crisis, the government formation process continued as the People's Party of Mariano Rajoy had secured the support of both Citizens and Canarian Coalition for Rajoy's investiture. The PSOE caretaker leadership appointed after Sánchez's sacking approved the party's abstention in such a vote, thus ensuring Rajoy's re-election as Prime Minister of Spain despite the party's previous stance not to allow a new PP government. A few hours ahead of the scheduled second ballot that would allow Rajoy's investiture, Pedro Sánchez announced his resignation as an MP—a decision advised by his close aides—arguing that he could neither abstain—and thus break his electoral pledge of opposing a PP government—or, as former PSOE leader, set a bad precedent by disobeying the decision of the highest party governing body, the federal committee. Right after government formation, in an exclusive interview for laSexta's Salvados news show, Pedro Sánchez publicly accused Susana Díaz's allies within the party and the "financial powers"—specially the PRISA Group, owner of El País media outlet—of having coerced him into avoiding a left-wing pact with Podemos and nationalist parties throughout the entire government formation process, accusing them of triggering the internal revolt within PSOE to oust him once he considered a serious attempt at forming such an alliance.

Late 2016: Díaz's consolidation, Sánchez in expectation

Taking advantage of the internal disarray resulting from Sánchez's demise, Susana Díaz, main orchestrator of the party revolt that brought him down, became widely regarded as the new PSOE leader in pectore as the Fernández-led caretaker team came to be seen as a mere puppet body under her control. As Díaz extended her influence throughout the party's structure, she sought party adhesions to its figure and visibility as the PSOE's organic and institutional reference by meeting Socialists' Party of Catalonia leader Miquel Iceta—securing the PSC neutrality for the incoming leadership contest in exchange of the promise to avoid a split between both parties—and planning a tour to the European Parliament as part of the greater national and international scope of her political agenda. She also staged a party rally in Jaén on 16 December, in which she was granted the public and unconditional support of former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero—long turned into an admirer of the Andalusian President and an opponent to Pedro Sánchez—. In the ensuing weeks, Díaz would receive public acclaim from regional Presidents Javier Lambán of Aragon—who publicly endorsed her and went as far as to assure that Díaz was "protected by the gods of Socialism"—and Guillermo Fernández Vara of Extremadura—who commented on her that "she's like a cannon communicating; she sounds like a winner"—.

Close aides to Díaz revealed that she preferred to face the primary election as the sole candidate in order to win unopposed, but the faction critical of the new leadership soon assured they would field a candidate of their own regardless of Díaz's intentions, and all sides soon acknowledged that the race would be competitive. Some called for Pedro Sánchez—who had hinted at such a possibility but had never officially confirmed it—to run again for leadership, but there were those who regarded both Díaz and Sánchez unfit for the role—arguing that their long-lasting grudge for power had deeply divided the party and that none of them would be able to fully re-unite it again—. Proponents of this alternative, 'third' way, considered former President of the Congress of Deputies Patxi López as a potential frontrunner. Support for a potential Patxi López's bid grew among Sánchez's loyalists as time passed and the former PSOE leader remained ambiguous on his intentions.

Concurrently and without revealing his future plans, Sánchez staged several events with the party's grassroots throughout November and December 2016. The first, held in Xirivella in the Valencian Community on 26 November, was an attendance success with more than a thousand assistants. This feat was repeated in another appearance in El Entrego, Asturias, on 10 December. In both events, Sánchez called for the party congress to be held immediately and accused Fernández's caretaker committee of leading the party as a full-fledged executive, when it should be limited—as per party statutes—to organizing the congress. Meanwhile, party members critical of the new PSOE leadership, under the Recupera PSOE platform (Spanish for "Recover [the] PSOE"), opened an unauthorized party office just 500 meters away from the main PSOE headquarters in Madrid to promote affiliation of new members to vote in the primary election, to which the caretaker committee replied by announcing legal actions for improper use and usurpation of the party's simbology.

January 2017: Date announced, enter López and Sánchez

On 14 January 2017, party leaders in federal committee formally set the congress' date for 17 and 18 June with a primary election scheduled for May, the preferred choice of both Javier Fernández and Susana Díaz who had called for postponing the congress' date to "just before summer [2017]" in hopes of Sánchez's support eroding over time. Despite previous calls from critics for the leadership contest to be held earlier, the proposed timetable was reluctantly accepted by critics with little opposition as Fernández and Díaz's faction commanded a comfortable majority among federal committee members. The next day, Patxi López unexpectedly became the first to publicly announce his candidacy to the party's leadership, stating that the party's abstention in Rajoy's investiture had been "an error" and claiming to "feel strong enough to rebuild the party". After weeks of waiting for Sánchez's final decision and of debating on whether it was advisable for the late Secretary General to return to office, many of his previous supporters switched sides and aligned with López, appealed by his 'third way' project, while calling for Sánchez to join them in an effort to prevent splitting the anti-Díaz vote. Among those withdrawing their support from the former party leader were Balearic President Francina Armengol—the only PSOE regional premier not aligned to Susana Díaz—as well as the party's regional branches in Madrid, the Basque Country, Navarre, Castile and León and La Rioja. Even the PSC, formerly staunch defenders of Sánchez before his deposition, now claimed "neutrality" by virtue of Iceta's agreement with Díaz.

Pedro Sánchez, who was said to be privately upset by López's move—both had been close allies during his time as Secretary General—, revealed on 18 January he would be meeting party members throughout Spain without clarifying whether he would withdraw from the race or not. Moreover, sources from within his team hinted that he had allegedly already chosen to run, but that he would not make the decision public until it better suited him, instead focusing in warming up his potential candidacy with events widely seen as a defiance to his rivals, such as one scheduled in Seville—Díaz's home province—for 28 January. It was later revealed that López was among those who advised Sánchez to resign his seat, a move which deprived him of a public platform from where to launch his leadership run and for which Sánchez was said to feel "deeply betrayed". Concurrently, Susana Díaz was determined to launch her bid in the ensuing weeks and started assembling campaign teams in the different PSOE regional federations to ready up the party's "machinery" under her control for collecting endorsements once the race would formally start. López's announcement, which was said to initially catch Díaz unprepared, did not alter her plans and, like Sánchez, she remained silent on her intentions to run, aware that her bid for the highest party office would rush a succession race within her party in Andalusia. Some suggested Díaz would try to combine her role as President of Andalusia with that of PSOE Secretary General if elected.

While Patxi López had been the first to announce his run and had quickly seen the anti-Díaz coalition coalesce around him, he did not obtain the express support of historical party leaders and long-time friends such as Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba—who disassociated himself from Lopez's strategy and praised Díaz's "political strength"—. He also stirred up suspicions among Pedro Sánchez's remaining loyalists that his move was an opportunistic maneuver aimed at thwarting Sánchez's potential bid and negotiating a future power sharing with Díaz, despite López's calls that he was willing to "go to the end" in the fight for PSOE's control. Sánchez found himself stranded from most of his previous collaborators and could no longer count with the party apparatus of the anti-Díaz regional federations to back him, facing the challenge of making up a minimal infrastructure able to grant his campaign the required resources for remaining competitive. Meanwhile, Susana Díaz embarked herself in a tour through PSOE territories hostile to her in order to mobilize her supporters, starting in Castile and León from 20 to 22 January. In León, her presence was received amid a polarized environment, with protesters throwing out boos and shouts of "¡No es no!" (Spanish for "No means no", an unofficial slogan that referred to Sánchez's opposition to the formation of a PP government) and accusing her of "handing over power to one of Europe's most corrupt parties". Díaz and López called for party unity ahead of the congress so as to avoid turning the primaries campaign into a "fraticide battle" that could further aggravate the party crisis, both aware that Sánchez's presence in the race would deeply divide the grassroots.

In his 28 January rally in Dos Hermanas, Seville, which gathered over 1,500 people, Pedro Sánchez announced his run for party leadership. Patxi López welcomed Sánchez to the "debate on proposals" and stated that it was now time of "confronting projects". Meanwhile, Susana Díaz, who concurrently was in a party meeting in Alcalá de los Gazules (Cádiz), remained unsettled on Sánchez's announcement and kept refusing to disclose when would she announce her bid, commenting that "it isn't time to talk about leaderships now" but of "strengthening the party with a winning project, without any complex and useful to Spain".

Declined

Opinion polls

Poll results are listed in the tables below in reverse chronological order, showing the most recent first, and using the date the survey's fieldwork was done, as opposed to the date of publication. If such date is unknown, the date of publication is given instead. The highest percentage figure in each polling survey is displayed in bold, and the background shaded in the party's colour. In the instance that there is a tie, then no figure is shaded. Polls show data gathered between PSOE voters/supporters.