Site Southall Crew 3 Aircraft type Vickers VC.1 Viking Injuries (nonfatal) 0 Total fatalities 7 (4 on ground) Passenger count 0 | Passengers 0 Survivors 0 Date 2 September 1958 Destination Tel Aviv Survivor 0 | |
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Summary Pilot error following engine failure Similar 1958 Channel Airways d, 1958 Dan‑Air Avro York, 1958 Central African Ai, Winter Hill air disaster, KLM Flight 607‑E | ||
The London Vickers Viking accident occurred on 2 September 1958 when an Independent Air Travel Vickers VC.1 Viking (registration G-AIJE), loaded with two Bristol Proteus turboprop engines as cargo, and with three crew members aboard, attempted a flight from London Heathrow Airport to Tel Aviv via Nice, Brindisi and Athens.
Contents
Accident
The aircraft took off from Heathrow at 05:54 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) but 15 minutes after take off the flight crew reported engine problems and requested a return to Blackbushe Airport. The crew was cleared by Air Traffic Control to descend to 3000 feet, but they could not maintain this altitude, and continued descending. A Mayday call was made from the aircraft at 0632 GMT, shortly before crashing into a row of houses on Kelvin Gardens, Southall. The aircraft burst into flames on impact killing all three crew and four people, a mother and three children, on the ground. Witnesses reported that they saw one of the crew waving outside of the aircraft just before the aircraft crashed.
Cause
The probable cause of the accident was that "The aircraft was allowed to lose height and flying speed with the result that the pilot was no longer able to exercise asymmetric control." While the reasons for the loss of power and the subsequent loss of height and speed were not known, the Public inquiry investigating the accident found a number of serious flaws in the running of Independent Air Travel and the maintenance of the aircraft. Maintenance had been carried out on one of the aircraft propellers at Heathrow on the night before the accident by personnel who were not qualified to carry out the work. The aircraft was overloaded, and the pilot had not had adequate rest, having effectively been on duty for 31 hours 30 minutes compared with the 16 hours required by the regulations (This took advantage of a loophole in regulations that allowed crew to carry out flights during "rest" hours if no passengers or cargo was carried.). Check flights, which should have tested the pilot's ability to handle the aircraft at high weights and with one engine out were "perfunctory" and did not adequately prove the pilot's ability to handle the aircraft with one engine failed.
The report stated that "It is quite clear...that the policy of this company was to keep its aircraft in the air at all costs and without any real regard for the requirements of maintenance." and that "it is not difficult for employers who are not unduly concerned to observe the regulations, to drive their employees and . . . to induce them to disregard the regulations designed to ensure safety in the air."