The 1953 New York Central Railroad accident was a railway accident involving the New York Central Railroad which occurred on the four track main line 2.4 miles east of Conneaut, Ohio at 10:02 P.M. on March 27, 1953.
The accident was caused by an improperly secured load of large pipes that broke loose from a gondola car on an eastbound freight train. The loose pipe, dragged by the moving train, damaged the eastbound passenger track. A passing westbound freight train notified the first train and it stopped to assess what had happened. A fast westbound passenger train then approached the scene. It was unable to stop and derailed from the damaged track, colliding with the westbound freight on the adjacent track. Then an eastbound fast passenger train approached and struck the derailed equipment from the first two trains. There were 21 deaths and 49 people were injured.
The accident site was located on the main line of the Erie Division at a point 2.4 miles east of Conneaut and 1861 feet from the Ohio - Pennsylvania state line. This was on the famous "Water Level Route," a four track mainline where fast passenger trains from the Midwest ran on an almost grade less route to New York. The main tracks here, from south to north, were designated as No. 4, eastward freight; No. 2, eastward passenger; No. 1, westward passenger; and No. 3, westward freight. The grade is practically level and it was raining at the time of the accident. The distance between the center-lines of adjacent tracks was 13 feet.
Extra 1871 East was an eastbound freight train consisting of two diesel electric units and was pulling 103 cars and a caboose. This train was moving on track No. 4 at a speed of 36 miles per hour.
Extra 1736 West was a westbound freight train powered by two diesel electric units, and was pulling 120 cars and a caboose. This train was moving on track No. 3 at a speed of 31 miles per hour.
No. 5, a westbound first-class passenger train, consisted of two diesel-electric units, a mail car, two express cars, one baggage car, two coaches, one sleeping car, one club-sleeping car, two sleeping cars and one observation-sleeping car. No. 5 was moving on track No. 1 at a speed of 76 miles per hour. This was the New York to Chicago Mohawk.
No. 12, an eastbound first-class passenger train, consisted of two diesel-electric units, one baggage-dormitory car, two coaches, one dining car, two sleeping cars, one coach, four sleeping cars and one observation-sleeping car. No. 12 was moving on track No. 2 at a speed of 71 miles per hour. This train, dubbed the Southwestern Limited, was en route to New York City from St. Louis.
Immediately east of the point where the accident occurred Extra 1871 East met Extra 1736 West moving on track No. 3. The flagman of Extra 1871 East observed that stop signals were being given with a white light from the rear platform of the caboose of the west-bound train. He acknowledged the signals and immediately informed his conductor. The brakes of the train were then applied from the caboose by the use of the conductor's valve. The train stopped with the front end in the vicinity of Springfield, Pa., 3.2 miles east of the point of accident. The flagman immediately proceeded westward to provide flag protection and the conductor inspected the train.
The seventy-third car of 1871 East, Baltimore and Ohio 254645, was loaded with 58 pieces of pipe. Each pipe was approximately 35 feet long and 18 inches in diameter. The conductor found the side stakes had broken on the north side of the car and part of the lading had fallen from the car. He observed that the ends of high tension bands used to secure the load were trailing over the sides of the car, counted 49 pieces of pipe on the car and later made a notation on the waybill that nine pieces of pipe were missing. After he completed his examination of the car he uncoupled it from the rear portion of the train and instructed the front brakeman to assist in the movements necessary to set out the car on an adjacent auxiliary track. Before the car was set out he communicated by telephone with the train dispatcher to inform him of the delay to his train and that some pipe were missing from the car. The dispatcher then informed him that the accident had occurred.
The crew of Extra 1736 West approached the point of accident on track No. 3 at a speed of 31 miles per hour. When the locomotive passed the point at which the accident occurred, the crew did not observe any defective condition of the tracks or any obstruction on or rear the tracks. The flagman proceeded to the rear platform of the caboose to inspect Extra 1871 East moving on track No. 4. He observed sparks flying from the vicinity of the running gear of a car about midway of that train. When its caboose passed he gave stop signals with a white light which were acknowledged. He then entered the caboose and informed his conductor of the defective condition he had observed
Immediately afterwards, No. 5, moving on track No. 1, was approaching the point where the accident occurred at a speed of 76 miles per hour. The train was moving on a curve to the right and was passing Extra 1736 West moving on track No. 3. The engineer then observed that the track immediately in front of his locomotive had been shifted northward toward track No. 3. Before he could move the brake valve to emergency position the locomotive was derailed and collided with Extra 1736 West. At about the same time the locomotive of No. 12 passed the locomotive of No. 5.
As No. 12 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the speed was 71 miles per hour. The engineer made an emergency application of the brakes when the locomotive was passing the locomotive of No. 5. The fireman observed fire flying as derailed equipment obstructed track No. 2 immediately in front of the locomotive. The collision occurred before the speed of the train was materially reduced. No. 12's locomotive and the first 10 cars were derailed and collided with Extra 1736 West.
The seventy-sixth car of 1736 West was struck by the derailed locomotive and equipment of No. 5 and the seventy-fifth to the ninetieth cars, inclusive, were derailed. Immediately after the collision occurred the derailed equipment of No. 5 which obstructed track No. 2 was struck by No. 12. The derailed cars of Extra 1736 West stopped in various positions on or near the westward main tracks. The seventy-eighth, eighty-first, eighty-second and eighty-fourth cars were destroyed. The seventy-sixth, seventy-seventh and eightieth cars were badly damaged and the other derailed cars of this train were somewhat damaged.
A separation occurred between the locomotive and the first car of No. 5. The diesel-electric units remained coupled and stopped about in line with the track and with the front end about 740 feet west of the point of accident. Both diesel-electric units were badly damaged. A separation occurred at each end of each of the first six cars and these cars stopped in various positions on and across the tracks and intermingled with the derailed equipment of Extra 1736 West. The seventh car stopped with the front end against derailed equipment on track No. 3 and the rear end on the train structure of track No. 1 end the other derailed cars stopped in line with that track. The first six cars were destroyed and the other derailed cars of this train were badly damaged.
The locomotive and the first nine cars of No. 12 were derailed. A separation occurred between the locomotives and the first car. The locomotive units stopped in diagonal positions with the front end of the first unit south of the westward main tracks and about 95 feet east of the point of accident. The second unit stopped at right angles to the tracks and with the front end against the left rear corner of the first unit. Both units were badly damaged. The first four cars stopped in diagonal positions intermingled with the derailed cars of the other two trains and the other derailed cars stopped about in line with the track. The first two cars were destroyed and the other derailed cars of this train were badly damaged.
The accident site was isolated from any main road. Only a muddy dirt lane led from the crash site to a major road two miles south and it soon became blocked by vehicles mired in the mud. The injured were either carried on stretchers or moved by hand car to the nearest road. Some waited up to four hours for help. About 100 persons were treated on the scene and 62 were transported to hospitals.
The Interstate Commerce Commission investigated the accident. Their findings indicated that the lading of Baltimore and Ohio 254645 was not properly secured for movement when loaded because the high tension bands were not properly sealed. Because the lading was not properly secured, a portion fell from the car while in transit. When the pipes fell from the car in question, one piece became wedged between the track structure of track No. 1 and the next car, a box car. As the train proceeded at a speed of 36 miles per hour the resultant thrust transmitted by the pipe to track No. 1 moved track No. 1 northward a distance of about 18 inches before the pipe fell clear of the cars. The damaged condition of the track was not observed before No. 5 arrived at the point of accident. The track was sufficiently damaged to cause the derailment of No. 5 which in turn caused the derailment of Extra 1736 West. No. 12 struck the derailed equipment of No. 5 before protection could be provided.
