Let us call a set "abnormal" if it is a member of itself, and "normal" otherwise. For example, take the set of all squares in the plane. That set is not itself a square in the plane, and therefore is not a member of the set of all squares in the plane. So it is "normal". On the other hand, if we take the complementary set that contains all non-(squares in the plane), that set is itself not a square in the plane and so should be one of its own members as it is a non-(square in the plane). It is "abnormal".

Now we consider the set of all normal sets, *R*. Determining whether *R* is normal or abnormal is impossible: if *R* were a normal set, it would be contained in the set of normal sets (itself), and therefore be abnormal; and if *R* were abnormal, it would not be contained in the set of all normal sets (itself), and therefore be normal. This leads to the conclusion that *R* is neither normal nor abnormal: Russell's paradox.

Define Naive Set Theory (NST) as the theory of predicate logic with a binary predicate
∈
and the following axiom schema of unrestricted comprehension:

∃
y
∀
x
(
x
∈
y
⟺
P
(
x
)
)

for any formula *P* with only the variable *x* free. Substitute
x
∉
x
for
P
(
x
)
. Then by existential instantiation (reusing the symbol *y*) and universal instantiation we have

y
∈
y
⟺
y
∉
y
a contradiction. Therefore, NST is inconsistent.

In 1908, Ernst Zermelo proposed an axiomatization of set theory that avoided the paradoxes of naive set theory by replacing arbitrary set comprehension with weaker existence axioms, such as his axiom of separation (*Aussonderung*). Modifications to this axiomatic theory proposed in the 1920s by Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf Skolem, and by Zermelo himself resulted in the axiomatic set theory called ZFC. This theory became widely accepted once Zermelo's axiom of choice ceased to be controversial, and ZFC has remained the canonical axiomatic set theory down to the present day.

ZFC does not assume that, for every property, there is a set of all things satisfying that property. Rather, it asserts that given any set *X*, any subset of *X* definable using first-order logic exists. The object *R* discussed above cannot be constructed in this fashion, and is therefore not a ZFC set. In some extensions of ZFC, objects like *R* are called proper classes.

ZFC is silent about types, although the cumulative hierarchy has a notion of layers that resemble types. Zermelo himself never accepted Skolem's formulation of ZFC using the language of first-order logic. As José Ferreirós notes, Zermelo insisted instead that "propositional functions (conditions or predicates) used for separating off subsets, as well as the replacement functions, can be 'entirely *arbitrary'* [ganz *beliebig*];" the modern interpretation given to this statement is that Zermelo wanted to include higher-order quantification in order to avoid Skolem's paradox. Around 1930, Zermelo also introduced (apparently independently of von Neumann), the axiom of foundation, thus—as Ferreirós observes— "by forbidding 'circular' and 'ungrounded' sets, it [ZFC] incorporated one of the crucial motivations of TT [type theory]—the principle of the types of arguments". This 2nd order ZFC preferred by Zermelo, including axiom of foundation, allowed a rich cumulative hierarchy. Ferreirós writes that "Zermelo's 'layers' are essentially the same as the types in the contemporary versions of simple TT [type theory] offered by Gödel and Tarski. One can describe the cumulative hierarchy into which Zermelo developed his models as the universe of a cumulative TT in which transfinite types are allowed. (Once we have adopted an impredicative standpoint, abandoning the idea that classes are constructed, it is not unnatural to accept transfinite types.) Thus, simple TT and ZFC could now be regarded as systems that 'talk' essentially about the same intended objects. The main difference is that TT relies on a strong higher-order logic, while Zermelo employed second-order logic, and ZFC can also be given a first-order formulation. The first-order 'description' of the cumulative hierarchy is much weaker, as is shown by the existence of denumerable models (Skolem paradox), but it enjoys some important advantages."

In ZFC, given a set *A*, it is possible to define a set *B* that consists of exactly the sets in *A* that are not members of themselves. *B* cannot be in *A* by the same reasoning in Russell's Paradox. This variation of Russell's paradox shows that no set contains everything.

Through the work of Zermelo and others, especially John von Neumann, the structure of what some see as the "natural" objects described by ZFC eventually became clear; they are the elements of the von Neumann universe, *V*, built up from the empty set by transfinitely iterating the power set operation. It is thus now possible again to reason about sets in a non-axiomatic fashion without running afoul of Russell's paradox, namely by reasoning about the elements of *V*. Whether it is *appropriate* to think of sets in this way is a point of contention among the rival points of view on the philosophy of mathematics.

Other resolutions to Russell's paradox, more in the spirit of type theory, include the axiomatic set theories New Foundations and Scott-Potter set theory.

Russell discovered the paradox in May or June 1901. By his own account in his 1919 *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, he "attempted to discover some flaw in Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal". In a 1902 letter, he announced the discovery to Gottlob Frege of the paradox in Frege's 1879 *Begriffsschrift* and framed the problem in terms of both logic and set theory, and in particular in terms of Frege's definition of function:

There is just one point where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [p. 23 above]) that a function too, can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let **w** be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can **w** be predicated of itself? From each answer its opposite follows. Therefore we must conclude that **w** is not a predicate. Likewise there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under certain circumstances a definable collection [Menge] does not form a totality.

Russell would go on to cover it at length in his 1903 *The Principles of Mathematics*, where he repeated his first encounter with the paradox:

Before taking leave of fundamental questions, it is necessary to examine more in detail the singular contradiction, already mentioned, with regard to predicates not predicable of themselves. ... I may mention that I was led to it in the endeavour to reconcile Cantor's proof...."

Russell wrote to Frege about the paradox just as Frege was preparing the second volume of his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. Frege responded to Russell very quickly; his letter dated 22 June 1902 appeared, with van Heijenoort's commentary in Heijenoort 1967:126–127. Frege then wrote an appendix admitting to the paradox, and proposed a solution that Russell would endorse in his *Principles of Mathematics*, but was later considered by some to be unsatisfactory. For his part, Russell had his work at the printers and he added an appendix on the doctrine of types.

Ernst Zermelo in his (1908) *A new proof of the possibility of a well-ordering* (published at the same time he published "the first axiomatic set theory") laid claim to prior discovery of the antinomy in Cantor's naive set theory. He states: "And yet, even the elementary form that Russell^{9} gave to the set-theoretic antinomies could have persuaded them [J. König, Jourdain, F. Bernstein] that the solution of these difficulties is not to be sought in the surrender of well-ordering but only in a suitable restriction of the notion of set". Footnote 9 is where he stakes his claim:

^{9}*1903*, pp. 366–368. I had, however, discovered this antinomy myself, independently of Russell, and had communicated it prior to 1903 to Professor Hilbert among others*.*

Frege sent a copy of his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* to Hilbert; as noted above, Frege's last volume mentioned the paradox that Russell had communicated to Frege. After receiving Frege's last volume, on 7 November 1903, Hilbert wrote a letter to Frege in which he said, referring to Russell's paradox, "I believe Dr. Zermelo discovered it three or four years ago". A written account of Zermelo's actual argument was discovered in the *Nachlass* of Edmund Husserl.

In 1923, Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed to "dispose" of Russell's paradox as follows:

The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition **F(F(fx))**, in which the outer function **F** and the inner function **F** must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form **O(f(x))** and the outer one has the form **Y(O(fx))**. Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of **F(Fu)** we write **(do) : F(Ou) . Ou = Fu**. That disposes of Russell's paradox. (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 3.333)

Russell and Alfred North Whitehead wrote their three-volume *Principia Mathematica* hoping to achieve what Frege had been unable to do. They sought to banish the paradoxes of naive set theory by employing a theory of types they devised for this purpose. While they succeeded in grounding arithmetic in a fashion, it is not at all evident that they did so by purely logical means. While *Principia Mathematica* avoided the known paradoxes and allows the derivation of a great deal of mathematics, its system gave rise to new problems.

In any event, Kurt Gödel in 1930–31 proved that while the logic of much of *Principia Mathematica*, now known as first-order logic, is complete, Peano arithmetic is necessarily incomplete if it is consistent. This is very widely—though not universally—regarded as having shown the logicist program of Frege to be impossible to complete.

In 2001 A Centenary International Conference celebrating the first hundred years of Russell's paradox was held in Munich and its proceedings have been published.

There are some versions of this paradox that are closer to real-life situations and may be easier to understand for non-logicians. For example, the barber paradox supposes a barber who shaves all men who do not shave themselves and only men who do not shave themselves. When one thinks about whether the barber should shave himself or not, the paradox begins to emerge.

As another example, consider five lists of encyclopedia entries within the same encyclopedia:

If the "List of all lists that do not contain themselves" contains itself, then it does not belong to itself and should be removed. However, if it does not list itself, then it should be added to itself.

While appealing, these layman's versions of the paradox share a drawback: an easy refutation of the barber paradox seems to be that such a barber does not exist, or at least does not shave (a variant of which is that the barber is a woman). The whole point of Russell's paradox is that the answer "such a set does not exist" means the definition of the notion of set within a given theory is unsatisfactory. Note the difference between the statements "such a set does not exist" and "it is an empty set". It is like the difference between saying, "There is no bucket", and saying, "The bucket is empty".

A notable exception to the above may be the Grelling–Nelson paradox, in which words and meaning are the elements of the scenario rather than people and hair-cutting. Though it is easy to refute the barber's paradox by saying that such a barber does not (and *cannot*) exist, it is impossible to say something similar about a meaningfully defined word.

One way that the paradox has been dramatised is as follows:

Suppose that every public library has to compile a catalogue of all its books. Since the catalogue is itself one of the library's books, some librarians include it in the catalogue for completeness; while others leave it out as it being one of the library's books is self-evident.
Now imagine that all these catalogues are sent to the national library. Some of them include themselves in their listings, others do not. The national librarian compiles two master catalogues—one of all the catalogues that list themselves, and one of all those that don't.
The question is: should these master catalogues list themselves? The 'Catalogue of all catalogues that list themselves' is no problem. If the librarian doesn't include it in its own listing, it remains a true catalogue of those catalogues that do include themselves. If he

*does* include it, it remains a true catalogue of those that list themselves.
However, just as the librarian cannot go wrong with the first master catalogue, he is doomed to fail with the second. When it comes to the 'Catalogue of all catalogues that don't list themselves', the librarian cannot include it in its own listing, because then it would include itself, and so belongs to the

*other* catalogue, that of catalogues that do include themselves. However, if the librarian leaves it out, the catalogue is incomplete. Either way, it can never be a true master catalogue of catalogues that do not list themselves.

As illustrated above for the Barber paradox, Russell's paradox is not hard to extend. Take:

A transitive verb <V>, that can be applied to its substantive form.

Form the sentence:

The <V>er that <V>s all (and only those) who don't <V> themselves,

Sometimes the "all" is replaced by "all <V>ers".

An example would be "paint":

The

*paint*er that

*paint*s all (and only those) that don't

*paint* themselves.

or "elect"

The

*elect*or (representative), that

*elect*s all that don't

*elect* themselves.

Paradoxes that fall in this scheme include:

The barber with "shave".
The original Russell's paradox with "contain": The container (Set) that contains all (containers) that don't contain themselves.
The Grelling–Nelson paradox with "describer": The describer (word) that describes all words, that don't describe themselves.
Richard's paradox with "denote": The denoter (number) that denotes all denoters (numbers) that don't denote themselves. (In this paradox, all descriptions of numbers get an assigned number. The term "that denotes all denoters (numbers) that don't denote themselves" is here called *Richardian*.)
The liar paradox and Epimenides paradox, whose origins are ancient
The Kleene–Rosser paradox, showing that the original lambda calculus is inconsistent, by means of a self-negating statement
Curry's paradox (named after Haskell Curry), which does not require negation
The smallest uninteresting integer paradox
Girard's paradox in type theory