Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry

Summary

Ruse defines a homosexual as a "person whose erotic yearnings and fantasies are directed toward his/her own sex and whose activities are influenced by such yearnings." Ruse defends sexual orientation research against ethical objections by appealing to the value of truth. He rejects social constructionist views of sexual orientation and defends the value of hormonal studies, summarizing the research. Ruse discusses sociobiological theories, concluding that despite objections to them, they are scientific and potentially helpful in understanding homosexuality. Ruse argues that psychological, hormonal and sociobiological hypotheses may be complementary rather than in conflict with each other. Ruse defends Sigmund Freud against the charge that his theories are untestable, finding Adolf Grünbaum's arguments against Karl Popper's view that psychoanalytic theories are pseudo-scientific because they can never be falsified to be decisive. He is also unconvinced by the criticism of Freud made by Roger Scruton in his Sexual Desire (1986). Whereas Scruton argues that genuine science does not involve metaphor, Ruse finds that "metaphor runs rampant through science from physics to sociology". Ruse rejects Irving Bieber's adaptational theory of homosexuality, but maintains that judgment should be reserved on other psychoanalytic theories: they are legitimate hypotheses, but none of them is supported by adequate evidence. Though the causes of sexual orientation are unknown, Ruse believes that people do not choose their sexual orientations. Ruse explores the issue of whether homosexuality is an illness, concluding that in general it is not.

Discussing ethical issues, Ruse distinguishes between involuntary inclination and willful behavior, arguing that while a homosexual orientation is morally blameless, this is not necessarily true of homosexual behavior. Ruse finds no justification for homosexual or heterosexual promiscuity, but nevertheless maintains on utilitarian grounds that people should be free to be promiscuous. He criticizes ethical arguments that appeal to scientific claims about the naturalness or unnaturalness of homosexuality, for example the views of the Greek philosopher Plato, according to whom homosexual behavior did not occur in animals. Ruse finds this claim to be mistaken, and dismisses the idea that homosexuality is unnatural. Ruse argues that both neo-Kantian and utilitarian theories of the just state must affirm the moral worth of homosexual relationships and support equal rights for homosexuals and heterosexuals.

Scholarly reception

Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry was reviewed favorably by biologist Douglas J. Futuyma in the Los Angeles Times, and has been praised by legal scholar Richard Posner for its care in evaluating rival theories of homosexuality. Futuyma noted that gay readers might find some of Ruse's comments about homosexuality to be insensitive, and also observed that Ruse took a somewhat more skeptical view of evolutionary explanations of homosexuality in Homosexuality than he had in his previous writings.

Philosopher Edward Stein has criticized Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry in The Mismeasure of Desire (1999). Stein finds Ruse's definition of a "homosexual" to be vague and open to possible objections. He notes that Ruse does not explain whether he considers someone who only rarely wants to have sex with a person of the same sex "homosexual", or whether wanting to have sex with a person of the opposite sex would disqualify a person from being "homosexual." Though Stein grants that Ruse's definition is wide enough to be a candidate for playing a role in explanation in the sciences or the social sciences, he believes that its wideness does not prove that sexual orientations are non-arbitrary groups ("natural kinds").

Stein finds Ruse's critique of social constructionism superficial and unconvincing, noting that it takes up only three pages of Ruse's book. He believes that Ruse does not provide a real argument for essentialism. He rejects Ruse's suggestion that defining sexual orientation in terms of sexual feelings rather than sexual behavior shows that social constructionism is false. Stein observes that while Ruse refers to the work of John Boswell to support his case that there were people in periods from that Ancient Greece to that of the Renaissance who were recognized as having a homosexual orientation, such historical evidence can be interpreted differently. Stein rejects Ruse's defense of sexual orientation research, on the grounds that the ethical implications of a research program must be considered in deciding whether the program is worth pursuing.